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ABSTRACT
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The boundary between public and private is a contested area. What 
occurs “behind closed doors” is considered personal business, protected and 
confidential, as opposed to that which is “fit for public” viewing and general 
discussion. This becomes particularly salient when the origin of a problem, in this 
case domestic violence, is in the shuttered realm of the private, yet deemed by 
some to be worthy of, and requiring, public remediation. This study looks at the 
evolution of “domestic violence” as a public problem, through rhetorical analysis 
of narratives from three representative texts. Gusfield tells us that in order for an 
issue to become a public problem it must have an owner, who assigns causal 
and political responsibility; it must be deemed real (possessing facticity) and 
remediable; and it must be seen as a moral responsibility of the individual 
member of society. Issue owners are viewed as able to speak authoritatively on 
the topic; they frame the issue, define the boundaries, assign blame and demand 
resolution. In this study, a loose coalition of feminist advocates, survivors of 
domestic violence, and a local safehouse (domestic violence outreach/advocacy 
agency and shelter), are seen to assert ownership of the issue of domestic
violence. This study examines how narratives are used to make arguments about 
the mental state of victims, to personalize and humanize women survivors, and 
as an instrument of institutional voice as Boulder County Safehouse attempts to 
redefine domestic violence into a matter of social justice. During the course of 
the evolution of a public problem, narratives are also used to make what Hauser 
would label vernacular appeals for localized publics formation, and as suasory 
tools to call publics to personal ownership of the problem, and to moral action. 
Finally, the attempt to redefine domestic violence as a social justice issue 
illustrates the attempt by an institution to retain and extend control over a public 
problem, as Boulder County Safehouse educational outreach continues to 
advance a narrative calling for publics formation and action.
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1CHAPTER ONE 
THE ISSUE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
The Problem and Review of Literature
Issues of “Public” and “Private”
“Public” and “private” are terms that, as members of the general 
populace and as scholars, we encounter almost daily in conversation and in 
text. They are indeed so ubiquitous that we rarely stop to define them, yet we 
accept a rather general consensus: that “public” is that which can readily be 
seen and talked about (public affairs, public consensus, public opinion, public 
knowledge), while “private” is that which is behind closed doors, of concern to 
family members, held to be sacred and/or secret: not for “public” 
consumption (private relationships between family members, what we say 
around our dinner table [“not for public broadcast”], what we “really think” 
about people, places and things).
In some cases, the nature of the public has defined the private, rather 
by default: the Aristotelian public was the realm of the political, central to 
democracy and rule by law; the Arendtian public is the realm where social life 
exists. A Habermassian public sphere is where bourgeois citizens gathered to 
(rationally) decide issues of importance. Voice is the instrument of politics and 
publics. To be in public is to be seen — and heard. That leaves the private
2realm rather murky. It is the realm of interpersonal relationships, intimacy, 
emotions, and pain, or that which is, by definition or default, “not public.”
This somewhat arbitrary but very real distinction has both personal and 
public ramifications. In order for a problem to be mediated, it must be voiced. 
Rhetoric tells us that if it cannot be communicated, it does not have 
intersubjective existence and, therefore, it cannot be resolved. When the 
problem is of significant scope that it requires socio-political remediation, 
there must be a forum to voice the issue, an audience or public called into 
existence to deliberate, to present reasoned, public, moral arguments. What 
if the origin — and some might argue the rightful “home” --- of the issue is in 
the private realm? That question is at the heart of my research.
How does a private issue become a public concern? How does a 
group, or agency, or segment of the population, attempt to push “private” 
problems, which arise behind closed doors in that most private of private 
places, the home, into the public view? How do they act, collectively and 
individually, to rhetorically construct a meaning which serves to identify and 
label, to socially construct and name, a problem which may redraw the 
boundary between public and private?
Our society has a history of recognizing private actions that receive 
public sanctions, including, but not limited to: abortion, drinking and driving, 
“recreational” drug usage, child abuse, regulation of sexual behavior (incest, 
prostitution), and domestic violence. Behind every “private” problem that 
requires “public” response (often in terms of intervention or active sanction) is
3a history of individuals or groups who attempt to “frame” the issue by socially 
(rhetorically) constructing it as a problem which, even though it may take 
place behind closed doors, out of public view, nevertheless is of such 
consequence to society that it requires public remediation. Those who 
attempt to “own,” “define” the problem, and assign causality or blame, make 
rhetorical choices (Gusfield, 1981). Of a range of possible rhetorical 
constructions of the problem, some are highlighted and others ignored. There 
may be contestation, even between those who seem to be on the “same 
side,” over the presentation of the problem.
Attempts to Define the Issue
Domestic violence remains such a contested problem. On the one 
hand, most rational adults would not hesitate to agree that battery is against 
the law and should be punished, whether that battery occurs in the 
neighborhood bar, or the neighbor’s house (although those same rational 
adults would probably agree that battery in public, with witnesses who may be 
viewed as “disinterested” is substantially easier to punish than battery that 
occurs in a private residence, without “disinterested” witnesses, and between 
partners who have an intimate history). Legally, we agree that, barring 
mitigating factors like self defense, it is unacceptable to beat or batter another 
human being.
Numerous factors exist which complicate a simplistic definition of 
domestic violence. The term itself is a symbolic, hence rhetorical, 
construction, subject to contested meanings. Feminist advocates have long
4called for the term to be “spousal abuse” or “spousal battery” contending that
1) “domestic” is too closely related to “domesticated” thus rendering the term 
rather tame and harmless, and that 2) “violence” does not adequately cover 
the spectrum of behaviors that involve power, control, domination and 
intimidation, any and all of which are harmful, almost all of which are directed 
at dependent and more powerless individuals, usually women and children.
Also of interest and concern are the symbolic and consummatory 
physical ways in which violence is enacted. On the one hand, there is general 
social consent that we need to stop physical violence against women. 
However, we do not have a social consensus on what domestic violence is 
and on how we respond to forms that don’t allow the victim to have protection. 
For example, domestic violence does not equal battery: if it battery, it 
would not necessarily require another whole literature and debate. What 
makes domestic violence arguably more than battery? Obviously, the 
location and relationship: “domestic” implies within the home, and the 
relationship is between intimates, non-strangers. Within the home and family 
situation, there are bonds held almost sacred: parental, spousal, sibling, 
emotional bonds that carry weight and responsibility. Physical violence 
threatens or ruptures those bonds, bonds based upon affection and trust, in a 
way that is not present in a roundhouse at Joe’s Bar. Thus there is an 
inherent moral dimension to the problem involving the breaking of bonds that 
extend beyond “mere” legal sanctions or conventions.
5Further complicating the attempt at resolution is that dimension of the 
problem which involves the negotiated, hence rhetorical, definition of the 
relationship between batterer and victim, and their use of a term we, as 
members of the general public, accept as commonly understood: “love.” 
Domestic violence, by definition, does not take place between strangers on 
the street corner. It is between relational partners, adults who have 
apparently chosen to engage in intimate relationships of love and trust.
Terms like “love” and “trust” are not usually common fixtures in political and 
legal public forums: they are of the realm of the personal and the emotional. 
Moreover, “love” and “trust” are not “tables” and “chairs”: they are far more 
abstract symbolic, social constructions. Like “relationships,” they are 
negotiated, perhaps even contested terms. If you ask almost any battered 
spouse, they will respond in all earnestness that they “love” their batterer, and 
are sure that the batterer “loves” them. The “victimless prosecution” of 
domestic violence enacted in many states, wherein the state can prosecute 
without the active testimony and support of the victim, is evidence of an 
attempt to remedy the seemingly paradoxical construction of love and 
violence coexisting in a way that seems incomprehensible to those not 
involved.
There is also serious contention over the definition of “violence.” 
Boulder County Safehouse, an organization serving women and children who 
are seeking escape from situations involving domestic violence, offers a view 
of “violence” that broadens the definition to include psychological, not merely
6physical, harm or threat. Safehouse contends that domestic violence is “any 
physical or psychological harm that is used to maintain power or control over 
another person with whom an intimate relationship is shared -  regardless of 
their legal status” (Safehouse, 1996). Thus the symbolic enactment of 
violence, (e.g. raised voices, emotional battery in the form of criticism and 
belittlement, isolation from support systems, destruction of inanimate but 
valued objects, threats of destruction to objects or others, unwanted sexual 
contact) becomes part of a continuum of which physical battery is a form of 
culmination, but not necessarily the most egregious emotional, psychological, 
or spiritual harm. Moreover, there is increasing documentation that children 
who witness (even the symbolic enactment of) violence may grow up to 
become the batterers of the next generation. How do we, as a society, protect 
victims from emotional, spiritual, psychological “violence”?
Thus, while most will agree that “domestic violence” is “bad.” there still 
remains an active, rhetorical attempt to challenge the definition of the 
problem, to negotiate the meanings of the terms, to reexamine the scope and 
social construction of “public” problems and to present — re-present — the 
face of the victim.
Domestic Violence as a Social Problem
Domestic violence is arguably one of the most important social issues 
of the twentieth century. Tragically, it is of particular interest to women: 
According to Rennison & Welchans, (2000) “In 1998, women were nearly 
three out of four victims of the 1,830 murders attributable to intimate
7partners.” Further, they point out, “Estimates from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (NCVS) indicate that in 1998 about 1 million violent 
crimes were committed against persons by their current or former spouses, 
boyfriends or girlfriends. Such crimes, termed intimate partner violence, are 
committed primarily against women. About 85% of victimizations by intimate 
partners in 1998, about 876,340, were against women” (p. 2).
Jones tells us damage to women is severe:
untold numbers of women suffer permanent injuries -- brain damage, 
blindness, deafness, speech loss through laryngeal damage, 
disfigurement and mutilation, damage to or loss of internal organs, 
paralysis, sterility, and so on. Countless pregnant women miscarry as a 
result of beatings, and countless birth defects and abnormalities can be 
attributed to battery of the mother during pregnancy. So many battered 
women have been infected with HIV by batterers who force them into 
unprotected sex, in some cases deliberately to prevent their having sex 
with other men, that the National Centers for Disease Control have 
identified a direct link between battering and the spread of HIV and AIDS 
among women. And every day at least four women die violently at the 
hands of men who profess to love them" (Jones, 1994, p. 87)
Domestic violence also impacts families. (Rennison & Welchans,
2000): “About 4 of 10 female victims of intimate partner violence lived in
households with children under age 12”. The consequences to those
children is equally chilling:
Uncounted millions of children live in households dominated by violent 
men. Millions of children see and hear their mothers beaten repeatedly, 
a traumatic experience that many experts regard as in itself a form of 
child abuse. Some studies suggest that children who witness battering 
may suffer long-term consequences; both as children and as adults they 
may be particularly anxious, depressed, or aggressive (Jones, 1994,p. 
84)
8The costs extend beyond the families to the economy. Jones tells us
that
...federal officials estimate that "domestic violence" costs U.S. firms four 
billion dollars a year in lower productivity, staff turnover, absenteeism, 
and excessive use of medical benefits. One New York City study of fifty 
battered women revealed that half of them missed at least three work 
days a month because of abuse, while 64 percent were late for work, 
and more than three-fourths of them used company time and company 
phones to call friends, counselors, physicians, and lawyers they didn't 
dare call from home. As surgeon general, C. Everett Koop labeled the 
"epidemic" of battering a leading national health problem, and pointed 
out the costs to hospital emergency services, public health, and mental 
health facilities. (1994 p. 12)
As a report by the Council of Mayors (1999) concludes, the costs, 
ultimately are borne by society as a whole: “Among cities in a recent survey, 
57 percent identified domestic violence as a primary cause of homelessness” 
(Mayors, 1999).
Four Key Research Perspectives
While few will disagree that domestic violence is a social problem with 
far-reaching affects, the “how” and “why” of the problem are met with different 
answers from scholars, each seeking to contribute a means of analysis and a 
lens for viewing the problem. Four of these perspectives are especially 
important to this study: the feminist perspective, with its focus on, and 
concern with, access, power, voice and control; public ownership of 
problems, especially contestation for formation and control of the issue; 
narratives as they present public arguments; and a rhetorical understanding 
of the public sphere.
9Many feminists are looking at this challenge of representation and 
resolution from the perspective of power relations. Feminists, especially 
liberal feminists, view domestic violence as a result of violations of individual 
rights, while other feminists view it as a result of a patriarchal system which 
allows women and children to be possessions of the male. The male has the 
“right”, in some cases the “duty” to “control” the behavior(s) of his family. Most 
feminists, however, would be united in their concern over systemic social 
forces that impact individual women and children. By definition, feminists 
would be involved in ongoing social discourse around the issue of voice, 
access, and power imbalances which impact marginalized populations, 
specifically women, but often including women’s dependents and support 
systems
Another way to view domestic violence is to see it as a matter of public 
ownership of a problem (Gusfield, 1981). Issues coming into the public are 
brought forward and held up to public scrutiny by those who claim ownership 
of the issue and assign blame for the existence of the exigence. Those who 
succeed in establishing and claiming ownership are accorded rights, 
responsibilities, power and access unavailable to contestants -  other 
individuals or groups -- who would argue for a different representation or 
delineation of the issue. Thus ownership has material consequences, as 
does failure to establish public perception of authority over an issue.
Yet another way the issue is framed is in terms of “stories:” narratives 
are presented as argument and proof of the real existence of a problem.
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Fisher (1980; 1984; 1985a; 1985b; 1988) and Weal (1985) tell of the force of 
public moral arguments framed as narratives. While Fisher’s Narrative 
Paradigm has been subject to criticism, scholars from psychology, sociology, 
philosophy, law, and communication have argued convincingly for the critical 
importance of narratives as worthy vessels for illustrating worldviews, framing 
and creating political and social reality, and not least, presenting compelling 
arguments.
The issue of domestic violence can also be framed as one of access to 
a public sphere. Habermas (1989, 1995; 1992), credited with labeling the 
bourgeois public sphere, and Fraser (1989, 1990) who named the subaltern 
counter public, gave birth to the view of a public whose task is to provide for 
the rational presentation of ideas to determine proper political action, and a 
counterpublic called into being in opposition to exclusionary practices of that 
larger public sphere. Hauser (1999) posits the existence of a reticulate public 
sphere, contested and open to the influence of vernacular voices, yet still 
focused on public judgment and discursive action. While interested parties, 
often personally and politically motivated (e.g. feminists) contest for the right 
to frame and present the issue (as publicly acknowledged “owners” of the 
problem), and while narratives are often their argumentative vehicle of choice 
for delivering their appeals, it remains up to an energized public to direct and 
demand social action to remediate the issue.
This study stands at the meeting of those four threads: it is a rhetorical 
analysis of the way narratives (as an inherently rhetorical construct) are used
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by feminists and victims’ advocates, survivors of domestic violence, and 
spokespersons for agencies committed to serving victims of domestic 
violence, to formulate the rhetorical construction of domestic violence as a 
“problem.”Moreover, these narratives must gain purchase in a public/public 
sphere, thus an analysis of those narratives which have “made it” into a public 
forum assumes greater importance.
Dimensions of Domestic Violence: Presentations in Scholarly Research
Whatever the theoretical or scholarly bent, domestic violence is a 
problem that resists easy answers. Scholarly research tends to divide the 
discussion logically, into specific fields of study, usually involving at least four 
dimensions: legal, medical, social, and communicative. Each dimension has 
its own focus of concern, its own language to describe the phenomenon. A 
strong argument could be made that each field socially, through discourse, 
constructs the reality of domestic violence as it enters or overlaps their field of 
knowledge, experience, and expertise. To a legal mind, domestic violence is 
a matter of torts, of criminal process, of efficacy, of legally valid evidence. 
Legal journals debate issues such as the efficacy of restraining orders (Nallin,
2001), whether mandatory reporting of domestic violence helps or hinders 
victims (Dare, 2000); whether hearsay is acceptable as evidence (Hudders, 
2000), and whether homeowner’s insurance covers domestic violence injuries 
(Journal, 2001).
The medical dimension constructs domestic violence as a physical 
problem: how do we recognize and treat battery in a patient? Presented with
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physical injuries, what is the appropriate response? Medical journals 
concentrate on screening for injuries (Cole, 2000; Diloreto, 2001; Preboth, 
2000; Salornhut, 2000); interventions (Carpenito, 2001; Feldhaus, 2001; 
Gerbert et al., 2000; Jensen, 2000; Phelps, 2000); and the value of 
mandatory reporting of suspected domestic violence injuries (Rodriguez, 
McLoughlin, Nah, & Campbell, 2001; Sachs & Rodriguez, 2000).
Those who focus on the “social” dimension construct domestic 
violence as a phenomenon which impacts society and which is, in turn, 
impacted by the social system. It is a product of relationships and, as such, 
might be isolated and treated. Sociologists study the context of abusive 
relationships (Lloyd & Emery, 2000) and even how football games impact 
domestic violence (Sachs & Chu, 2000). Social workers are concerned with 
the way the welfare/governmental/organizational system works (Magen, 
Conroy, & Del Tufo, 2000; Shamai, 2000), the way marital violence impacts 
children (Chamberlain, 2001; Lee, 2001; Mills et al., 2000) and whether 
mediation is successful in cases of domestic violence (Imbrogno & Imbrogno, 
2000).
The communicative dimension of the problem is of particular interest to 
rhetoricians since humans construct the richness and complexity of issues 
and problems through language and symbol systems. Communication 
scholars traditionally have looked at the problem as a relational one (Baxter & 
Bullis, 1986); in terms of a series of communication traits (e.g. “verbal
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aggressiveness”) (Infante & Wrigley, 1986); and as a result or function of 
message design (Feldman & Ridley, 2000; Vangelisti, 1994).
Personal narratives have been studied, often in terms of self definition 
(Shaw, 1997). There are accounts of narratives in relation to domestic 
violence, but most are narratives about specific battering incidents from 
women usually identified as victims. Again, the focus is on the interpersonal 
relational level of analysis and the analysis is of “accounts” rather than a 
rhetorical focus on “narratives” (Adams, Towns, & Gavey, 1995; Rudd,
Dobos, Vogl-Bauer, & Beatty, 1997; Stamp & Sabourin, 1995).
Moreover, many of the narratives studied presume narratives to be 
data or evidence rather than arguments. Narratives, especially narratives-as- 
accounts, limit narrative to what might more classically be thought of as 
narratio: that which sets the scene. Narratives can unarguably function as 
evidence that a particular condition exists: stories told by battered women 
provide evidence that domestic violence is “real,” just as witness testimony 
can be used to validate claims about guilt or innocence. This study attempts 
to address how narratives present “more” than evidence: how narratives are 
used to construct a particular worldview of an issue, presented as a public call 
to action.
What is missing in previous communication research studies is 
precisely what this study offers: a focus on the public nature and contested 
character of issue formation; the role that narratives play as presenting 
arguments about the shape and dimension of domestic violence and
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narrative’s role in calling a public to action; and the presence -  or lack -  of 
voices of women victims: who tells their stories?
The Rhetorical Nature Of Narratives
This noticeable lack of focus on narratives in terms of their rhetorical 
characteristics is what this study attempts to address. The rhetoric of 
narrative includes emplotment (temporal sequencing and causation), 
character (actors with varying degrees of agency), scene, narrator and voice. 
Narratives arise in response to a rift in the fabric of (accepted) reality: they are 
an answer and a re-presentation of reality. Because narratives are so 
intrinsically rhetorical, as addressed presentations of reality offered to the 
reader/listener to explain a trouble (or in Bitzer’s terms, to respond to an 
exigence) they are especially germane to a study of how a problem, in this 
case domestic violence, is constituted. Narratives provide answers, and 
those answers frame domestic violence into a public problem of a certain sort.
There are a range of potential narratives to answer the question(s) 
posed by domestic violence, yet only certain narratives are presented in 
public forums, are offered as evidence by interested social actors, have 
traction as “[truly] reflective” of social reality. Why those narratives? What 
picture do they draw? What stories are not present? Who tells the tales? 
Who owns the issue? Are the stories all the same? Do they construct a 
unified picture of domestic violence, or are there differences between the 
stories presented by feminist advocates, by survivors, and by agencies? To 
what extent do these narratives seem to clash, contradict or support the
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overarching construction of “domestic violence?” How do stories of “helpless 
victim” support or undermine narratives of “survivor”? Are there stories of 
women who return to abusers? How would a story like that impact competing 
narratives of survivors as women who leave abusers? How do the narratives 
of these key “players” respond to contradictory narratives [for example, 
counselors who assert that domestic violence is just about patriarchal 
power and control: it is about the batterer’s feelings of powerlessness and 
lack of control]? There are many intriguing questions that need to be asked, 
and strategies that call for analysis.
[Further] Problematizing the Problem 
Again, domestic violence seems to be a clear cut problem: Battery is 
wrong. Agreed. No discussion or negotiation: let’s go home. However, the 
ongoing and decisive struggle is to construct a view of domestic violence that 
goes beyond “mere” physical battery, acknowledging the existence of 
complex factors. Those actively seeking to change the social conception of 
domestic violence see, and argue that, battery is one stop on a continuum of 
harm that seriously impacts individuals and can have grave repercussions for 
a most vulnerable population: children. Moreover, child witnesses to 
“violence” are more likely to become the abusers of tomorrow, thus 
participating in a regenerating nightmare of violence begetting violence, and 
increasing the costs to society. Consider a few scenarios:
• Pat and Terry have been living together for 6 years. Like any couple, they 
disagree, sometimes volubly. Terry’s mother taught Terry an anger
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management tool: keep a set of inexpensive dishes around the house, 
and when your temper threatens to get out of control, break one of those 
dishes: your anger is diffused and no harm done. Neighbors hear Pat and 
Terry yelling, followed by the sound of breaking dishes. Is this domestic 
violence?
• What if Pat is breaking Terry’s dishes and yelling that “you could be 
next”?
• What if Pat and Terry have young children who witness the threats?
• What if the children are alarmed and crying, or yelling “Stop it! Stop it!”
• What if Pat and Terry are lesbian, or gay males?
• What if Terry is a male and Pat is the female breadwinner?
• What if Pat and Terry have no children? Is there then no harm?
• What if Pat and Terry have been drinking?
• What if Terry is a woman whose husband, Pat, belittles her regularly, 
chipping away at her self-esteem and causing her to question her ability to 
parent, or even to function as a socially responsible adult? Pat tells Terry 
that no one else could ever care for her; that he is the only one who really 
loves her; that if she ever should leave, she would have no money, no 
assets; that he would fight her for custody of the children. Terry tells you 
of the things Pat says, nasty things that, in your opinion, no caring person 
would say to another. You tell Terry to leave him. But Terry has no 
money. She can’t find a job that pays above minimum wage, and child 
care costs would soon eat that up. Her children would suffer. She has no
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credit rating, no way to purchase a vehicle. So she goes back. The next 
time she tells you about Pat, you tell her, gently, “Terry, we’ve discussed 
this. You know what I think you should do.” The violence may escalate, 
but Pat is always sorry afterwards. He loves her. She tells you again.
You again respond “Why don’t you leave? There are shelters...” Soon 
Terry quits telling you about Pat. She is silenced. She is isolated. She 
doubts her abilities and her sanity, after all, the question is “Why don’t you 
leave?” and not “Why isn’t Pat told to change his behavior?” Is this harm? 
Is this violence? For the sake of their children, do we intervene? How do 
we treat Terry? As a victim? As incompetent to care for her children? Do 
we take the children away from Terry? Does Pat’s behavior escape 
censure?
Questions and narratives very like the Pat and Terry scenario are 
representative of the complexity and contestation surrounding the naming and 
definition of the problem of domestic violence. It is the attempts to address 
such concerns, and the public, rhetorical struggle for the ownership and 
definition of this complex problem that is central to this project.
Before moving to discuss the research question, some explanation of 
terminology and theoretical perspectives is required.
Definition Of Terms
A more detailed description of publics theory will follow, however, 
consistent with Hauser (1999), distinctions will be made between Public 
Sphere (the/an “undifferentiated public domain in which civic conversation, in
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general, occurs” [p. 40]), and public spheres, which refer to multiple arenas, 
multiple spheres, multiple sites of public discourse and publics formation. 
Moreover, common usage of terms public and private will remain, public 
reflecting life lived in Arendt’s public realm, as opposed to the private realm of 
the individual home, family, and life “behind closed doors.”
Narratives will be defined as stories using Bruner’s (1990) adaptation 
of Burke’s pentad: stories must contain Agent, Action, Goal, Setting, 
Instrument, and Trouble. In addition, stories will be viewed as inherently 
emplotted, plot containing, per Martin (1986)“a combination of temporal 
succession and causality” (p. 40).
A Theoretical Framework 
This study is a rhetorical analysis of narratives that have found their 
way into “the public.” Their existence and function is predicated upon an 
understanding of what “public” means: how “public” is different from “private,” 
what it means to “be” in the public, and what “a public” or “the public” has to 
offer citizens who desire remediation of social problems. To that end, a 
theory of public/publics/publicness is mandated. Further, since public space 
is almost always contested space, Gusfield’s (1981) theory of ownership of 
public problems will also be useful.
On “Publics” and Publics Theory
Habermas (1989,1995; 1992) did a masterful job of outlining the 
bourgeois public sphere, which he theorized existed in opposition or tension 
to the private, the state and economic spheres. Fraser’s (1990) critique and
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presentation of subaltern counterpublics, engaged in agonistic struggles for 
voice in the public realm, expands and enhances Habermas, allowing for the 
multiplicity of voices contesting for public attention and existence. Neither, 
however, took the necessary step to move from a public sphere to the notion 
of multiple sites of publics creation, empirically verifiable and rhetorically 
active. That move was left to Hauser (1999).
Hauser offers many insights into how publics function as
multiple, reticulate, contested, discursive sights for vernacular engagement in 
public policy debate. Four essential contributions will be of seminal 
importance: the inherently rhetorical and agonistic nature of publics; the 
concept of publics as discursively constructed and empirically verifiable 
entities; the fluid and reticulate nature of the publics; and the focus on 
vernacular discourse as representative and evidentiary.
Hauser argues for a rhetorical model of publics. This rhetorical model
is nested in the lived experiences of individuals. Further, the rhetorical model;
would require openness to those conditions that produce a plurality of 
spheres within the Public Sphere. It would focus on civil society’s lattice 
of spheres ... and would conceptualize publics as processes that 
emerge through discourse of social actors who are attempting to 
appropriate their own historicity... A rhetorical model of public spheres 
not only expects participants to have interests but regards them as 
essential for the exercise of prudent judgments on public problems. 
(1999, p.55)
Moreover, Hauser’s rhetorical model is issue (or, for purposes of this 
dissertation, problem) and audience-specific: “Invoking audience-specific 
standards that can accommodate conflicting interests suggests that good 
reasons are the operative basis for actual consensus” and “a rhetorical model
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abandons the search for generalizable arguments. Its concern is for how the 
dialogue within any given public sphere mounts appeals that lead participants 
to understand their interests and make prudent judgments” (p. 56). Hauser 
concludes that “...a rhetorical model recognizes that civil society’s defining 
conditions of interdependence and diversity require that communicative 
partners share a common reference world. Common understanding 
supplants warranted assent as the communicative norm for achieving 
reasonable mutual cooperation and toleration” (p. 56).
Not only are publics rhetorical constructions, they are identified and
analyzed through empirical evidence: through their discursive activity:
Sensible thought about publics requires capturing their activity: how they 
construct reality by establishing and synthesizing values, forming 
opinions, acceding to positions, and cooperating through symbolic 
actions, especially discursive ones. Put differently, any given public 
exists in its publicness, which is to say in its rhetorical character (p. 33)
The fluid and reticulate nature of publics allows for contestation, for
multiple interests engaging in discursive attempts to form judgments. It
privileges the complexity of interests and discourses. We identify actors by
their discursive acts, yet social actors operate in multiple forums, are often
polyvocal, and resist reification into “a public.” Rather they act, and
these activities are often local, are often in venues other than institutional 
forums, are always issue specific, and seldom involve the entire 
populace. Rather than searching for “the public,” we are well advised to 
follow Herbert Blumer’s ... lead and commence with an understanding of 
developed societies as montages of publics, each one, as he has 
argued, activated as its members feel issues intersect with the 
conditions of their lives in ways that require their attention. Thus, we 
may define a public as the interdependent members of society who hold 
different opinions about a mutual problem and who seek to influence its 
resolution through discourse" (Hauser, 1999, p. 32)
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Moreover, the publics are “not pregiven: publics emerge as those who 
are actively creating and attending to these discursive processes for 
publicizing opinions” (p. 33). Publics may best be seen as processes, rather 
than fixed bodies of committed members: “publics do not exist as entities but 
as processes; their collective reasoning is not defined by abstract reflection 
but by practical judgment; their awareness of issues is not philosophical but 
eventful” (p. 64).
Hauser’s move “shifts the focus of analysis from a specific, concrete 
political entity to activity in the public realm” (p. 33), a move which allows for 
coalitions of individuals and groups to form around issues, yet remain, in their 
complexity, not a reification of, or identical to, each other.
Finally, Hauser’s focus on vernacular discourse as representative and 
evidentiary opens the door to a wide variety of data. Radically different from 
a focus on oratory or “public opinion polls” as evidence of a public’s action, 
Hauser posits the importance of everyday, common, shared and constructed 
symbol systems: “we belong to a community insofar as we are able to 
participate in its conversations. We must acquire its vernacular language in 
order to share rhetorically salient meanings” (p. 67). This is especially 
important since, as aforementioned, common, shared understanding 
supplants warranted assent.
Hauser’s publics “may manifest their attention to issues through votes 
but just as often by exercising their buying power, demonstrations of 
sympathy or opposition, adornments of colored ribbons, debates in
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classrooms and on factory floors, speeches on library steps or letters to the 
editors...” (p. 32).
Explicitly highlighting the centrality of narrative/story-telling as a social 
activity, a public activity, Hauser asserts “ ...when tradition has been 
shattered, we make sense of what has occurred and what we now confront by 
reconstructing the past in a new story that is subject to constant revision and 
reinterpretation as the conversational partners change” (Hauser, 1999).
Vernacular discourse allows the rhetorical action to take place in other 
ways than mass mediated sound bites: it allows for the very real and resonant 
activity that takes place in neighborhoods and on the pages of the local 
newspapers editorial section, involving narratives as arguments providing 
good reasons, allowing controversy over artwork hanging in a library to be 
part of the rhetorical struggle for voice and negotiation and definition and 
resolution.
Hauser, then, provides an admirable theoretical framework for an 
analysis of how private problems move into the public. His project, however 
did not involve elaborating on the narrative link. Hauser’s chapter five, on 
“Narrative, Cultural Memory and the Appropriation of Historicity” focuses on 
narrative writ large, as the master narratives of a society or culture are 
manipulated and the resulting consequences to citizens. While 
acknowledging the importance of narratives to individuals, the focus is not on 
individual narratives, or on the narratives of individuals, as central to his 
argument.
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Moreover Hauser, and indeed, the majority of scholars today, did not
focus on narratives as representative of an organizational voice. The
question in this study thus becomes how does an organization use narratives
to position itself and to argue for ownership?
As is exemplified by his analysis of citizen letters to Franklin Roosevelt,
Hauser used these letters to provide evidence of how average people argue.
This is closer to my project, but Hauser moves in a different rhetorical
direction, using letters as the method of providing good reasons, rather than
studying stories offered as evidence of good reasons. This study will attempt
to expand Hauser’s description of vernacular voices to include narratives as a
vehicle for individuals and agencies, as they attempt to rhetorically construct
a problem in such a way that it demands/commands public action.
Gusfield and Public Problems
Studying the movement from private to public is facilitated by an
examination of Gusfield (1981). Gusfield traces how drinking-driving became
a public problem. He is concerned with “How...an issue or problem emerges
as one with public status, as something about which ‘someone ought to do
something’” (p.5). He provides a vocabulary which allows us to speak about
ownership of public problems:
The concept of ‘ownership of public problems’ is derived from the 
recognition that in the arenas of public opinion and debate all groups do 
not have equal power, influence, and authority to define the reality of the 
problem. The ability to create and influence the public definition of a 
problem is what I refer to as ‘ownership.’ (p. 10).
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Ownership carries power: “At any time in a historical period there is a 
recognition that specific public issues are the legitimate province of specific 
persons, roles, and offices that can command public attention, trust, and 
influence. They have credibility...Owners can make claims and 
assertions...they are looked at and reported to by others...They possess 
authority in the field...They are among those who can gain the public ear” (p. 
10). In order for domestic violence to be framed in a specific way, as a 
specific sort of problem, ownership is essential, and contested.
Gusfield also highlights the contested nature of public problems: “...the 
status of a phenomenon as a problem is itself often a matter of conflict as 
interested parties struggle to define or prevent the definition of a matter” 
requiring public intervention.
Gusfield theorizes the relationship between ownership of a problem, 
and the assignment of responsibility, causal and political. “Owners” of a 
problem are perceived as having the authority to assign causal responsibility, 
to allocate the blame for the existence of the problem (“a matter of belief or 
cognition, an assertion about the sequence that factually accounts for the 
existence of the problem” [p.23]). Owners may also attempt to assign political 
responsibility for addressing the problem: “...political responsibility is a matter 
of policy. It asserts that somebody or some office is obligated to do 
something about the problem, to eradicate or alleviate the harmful situation” 
(p. 13). In the case of domestic violence, those who attempt to own the issue 
(for example, feminist victim advocates) also attempt to assign causal
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responsibility (domestic violence is a result of patriarchy) and political 
responsibility (all of society should hold perpetrators criminally and morally 
responsible for harm).
Lest we think ownership is not at the heart of a serious struggle, of, in 
some cases, life and death, Gusfield reminds us that “what happens on the 
public stage is made the standard of legitimacy, of what are the canons of the 
society. To grant acceptance to ...behavior when it emerges in the light of 
public reports is to create the societal rule; to generate the perception of living 
in a society in which such action is legitimate” (p.181). If we, as a society, 
accept that, for example, domestic violence is only of concern when physical 
battery is evidenced, how are we valuing, or more accurately, ignoring those 
acts whose culmination is battery, but whose collective weight provides such 
harm that women, and men, are trapped in a spiral that all too often ends in 
death, through murder and/or suicide?
Moreover, these public presentations of the issue do not spring fully 
formed before a pre-ordained audience. They are carried on the back of 
narratives and statistics -  vehicles which lend credibility and shape the 
parameters of the issue. While there is more than adequate public discussion 
of the accessibility and validity of statistics as evidence or proof, this 
dissertation focuses on what Aristotle would label artistic proofs; specifically, 
the ways in which stories present (make, create, shape, serve as) arguments. 
Narratives describe a narrated worldview which calls an audience to see itself
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within that frame, which resonates with an internal fidelity and coherence, 
which requires an action on the part of that audience.
Together, Hauser and Gusfield provide a theoretical framework that 
allows examination of narratives as public, empirical evidence of critical 
contestations for ownership, voice, and the rhetorical construction of a public 
problem.
Statement of Research Question(s)
This dissertation asks the question: How do feminist advocates, 
survivors of domestic violence and spokespersons for Safehouse use 
narratives to negotiate the public/private boundary in presentations of 
domestic violence in the public sphere?
The research question implicitly involves the theoretical position that 
narratives present arguments, not merely supplemental data for arguments. 
Further, the question concerns the problem of the public/private distinction: 
Domestic violence consists of “private” acts with personal consequences that 
require public policy and agency for remedy. It is a question with important 
social consequences, which will be discussed and analyzed in Chapter Two.
There are also some closely related areas with implications for 
understanding the public/private boundary. They help illuminate the nature 
and relationships among those who attempt to control and own the issue of 
domestic violence, as it moves from a private issue to one requiring public 
remediaiton.
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How does an agency use narrative to negotiate the boundary 
between public and private: Safehouse as boundary-spanner. Boulder 
County Safehouse is an organization committed to self-avowed feminist 
principles of ethics, social justice and the redress of power imbalances. The 
organization sponsers a shelter, and serves as a publicly recognized authority 
on the issue of domestic violence, offering the community an educational and 
referral agency on domestic violence concerns. Safehouse provides a shelter 
for women and children escaping situations involving domestic violence, and 
as such exists as a quasi-public entity, or space. Safehouse is also an 
organization, one which issues arguments, often in the form of narratives, 
claiming a public voice, vigorously attempting to engage a public audience, 
or, in Fraser’s (1990) terms, a subaltern counter public, around the issue of 
domestic violence. Further highlighting its dual role, Safehouse, as shelter, is 
a place where abused women flee from the isolation, the closet of the private; 
it is a place where women’s stories are heard and validated; where, if 
successful, women move from a non-rhetorical life in the private, to a public 
identity—where their stories can be heard. It is at once both a public and 
private space: women are guaranteed protection from their batterers, yet 
members of the public (e.g. volunteers and trainees in Boulder County 
Safehouse support programs) are allowed access, can meet and interact with 
the women and their children. The rooms are shared, the chores are shared, 
the resources are shared. There is no residential phone service, but a pay 
phone: no perpetrators can call residents, but residents can call out to make
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job appointments. Privacy is a scarce commodity, and fellow residents are 
very often transient strangers, yet it is a “home” a dwelling place where 
women and children shelter from the often-nightmarish private world they fled 
It is a place largely free of men: the mission statement reads: “The 
mission...is to provide safe shelter, support, and advocacy for battered 
women and their children...’’(Boulder County Safehouse, 1994). The shelter 
is in a secret location, whose residents promise not to divulge the location. 
While men may enter the business office location, where meetings are held, 
business conducted, training offered, I have never seen a man (other than 
perhaps a repairman) at the shelter itself. Men may be accepted as Domestic 
Abuse Prevention Project Advocates, or Speaker’s Bureau Presenters, but 
will probably not be Crisis Line Workers, or Relief Counselors.
How do advocates in the battered women’s movement use 
narratives to negotiate the tension between individual agency and social 
responsibility? On the one hand, feminist ideology clearly posits that 
domestic violence is a result of a patriarchal social system that oppresses 
women (among others) and makes them so subservient to men that they 
become possessions or chattel who the master has the “right” or duty or 
obligation to discipline and control. It is a social issue. It requires and 
mandates, social attention, social action, and social agency. That is at the 
core of the strongest public presentations. On the other hand, Safehouse 
qua Safehouse seems to be informed by an almost classic liberal feminist 
ideology: each individual must make the changes, the stories are individual
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stories, the remediation is at an individual level. “Success” stories are 
individual stories, and even those stories are carefully chosen. Potential 
residents are screened and must be judged “fit for shelter” according to 
established criteria and counselor’s experienced recommendation, before 
they are allowed to enter the shelter. In some cases, a woman may be 
judged “not fit” or may be asked to leave the shelter for violating norms, rules 
and expectations. Where do these women go? Back to their abusers? Are 
they really talking about saving the woman on an individual level, ignoring 
those who refuse to accept the ideology and (sometimes literally) die? How, if 
at all, do they reconcile the apparent conflict: to publicly argue that it is a 
social problem, yet affix tremendous responsibility, on the private/individual 
level of the victim/survivor to change her own narrative (with the real, but 
extremely limited assistance of 6 weeks in shelter and job leads?). How, if at 
all, do they account for the ones who fade from view? Are there stories of 
women who go back to their abuser, get counseling, and lead “normal” lives?1 
Is there any “happily ever after” story other than “and she left her abuser and 
moved on with her life?” If there were alternative “happily ever after” stories, 
what would that do to the other stories agencies tell? And how, if at all, do 
they juggle “Here is a story of a national tragedy, it is our story and our 
shame...” with “And Susan is a hero: here is her story...”
1 Thus far, I have never encountered such a story. Should I, that would be noteworthy in and of itself.
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More specifically, the answers to these public/private boundary 
questions will grow from answers to my questions that frame three important 
“sub issues”:
1) How do feminist advocates, survivors of domestic violence 
and spokespersons for Boulder County Safehouse, use narratives to 
reframe a “private matter/private issue” as a public and political 
responsibility? 2 This question involves the use of public (narrative) 
arguments that domestic violence is, indeed, a matter of concern for society 
writ large, not a matter of “what goes on behind closed doors should remain 
there.” I am specifically interested the way these three groups narrate public 
arguments in ways that create domestic violence) as a public problem.
I will be looking at the ways these groups 1) generate data through 
stories, and 2) use stories as data; 3) attempt to establish identification with 
the audience through narratives that place domestic violence as not “out 
there” but in neighborhoods and families and the “real” world experienced by 
“normal” people; 4) establish new relationships among the data: transforming 
“murder victim #127” into, not only a mom, a wife, a churchgoing, good 
employee, but also “your sister”, “your mother”, “your cousin.”
2) How do feminist advocates, survivors of domestic violence 
and spokespersons for Boulder County Safehouse, use narratives to
2 Although this study is focused on feminist advocates, and while these tend to be the both female and 
the majority o f “visible” voices, they are not the only voices. M en can certainly advocate on behalf of 
victims and survivors, and many who advocate m ight resist being labeled “fem inist” . There is no 
intent to imply that only feminist women can identify, care and seek to becom e involved. Nor is there 
any intent to imply that men are always perpetrators and never victims. Statistics show, however, that 
men are m ost often the perpetrators, and women most often the victims, though even that data is under 
contention.
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resolve the issue of “invisibility” (a “voice without a face”; the non- 
rhetorical private vs. a life in public)? This sub-question concerns the attempt 
to bring forward, from the “private,” the faces of women who are 
victim/survivors of domestic violence. When I asked a trusted mentor “What 
do you have when you have a voice but no face?” he responded “An invisible 
[wo]man.” Invisibility is an apt metaphor for women who are victim/survivors. 
As Fala (1993) has theorized “the closet” as a non-rhetorical space for 
gay/lesbian individuals, for women who are battered, the home, the realm of 
the private, is a non-rhetorical space where stories are censored, reframed, 
and/or ignored. When stories DO make it into the public realm, they are 
either stories of survivors (told mostly in and around the battered women’s 
movement), or of victims (i.e. women who are murdered as a result of 
domestic violence). In public presentations, there seems to be an increasing 
tendency to show victim/survivor’s faces: to insert them into visibility and 
argue for a place in public.
Here I will be looking specifically for: 1) who “owns” the story (first 
person, third person -  who is telling the story and claiming it to be “her” story);
2) what stories are untold (who remains silenced?); 3) identification formation 
(how creating an identifiable story, an identity, and a face that can be 
“identified with” allows victim/survivors to overcome anonymity/invisibility); 4) 
patterns of stories that attempt to debunk stereotypes and establish a positive 
identity/identification (domestic violence victim/survivors are not deviant, are 
not mentally ill, are not crippled emotionally which causes them to be
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victimized, are not a “type” of “other”); 5) stories which provide arguments for 
why women take actions (murdering a batterer, leaving a relationship, staying 
in one); 6) instances where tellers create and reinforce the “survivor” identity.
3) How do feminist advocates, survivors of domestic violence 
and spokespersons for Safehouse, use narratives to help construct a 
personal “survivor” identity as a counter to a “victim” identity? Again, 
closely related to question number two, this question concerns the stories we 
tell (about) ourselves. Bruner (1987) refers to the power of story as 
autobiography: we are, and become, the stories we tell about ourselves. To 
move from the position of a “victim” -  (to whom things happen), to a “survivor” 
(a person who is capable of voice, who has agency and is capable of a public 
presence), is to significantly change the stories the women tell about 
themselves. Needless to say, stories of “I am a victim” do not have the same 
reception (if they are received at all), as stories of “I am a survivor.”
Therefore, changing narratives is necessary (though tempting, I will refrain 
from arguing “which came first, the story or the change?”).
Here I am looking for: 1) women’s stories told in their own words; 2) 
stories involving movement and change (e.g. “I was.... I am” — “I was a 
victim, I am a survivor); 3) stories told by representatives about women who 
“didn’t make it” -  what they failed to make and what story is told for WHY 
they failed to make it; 4) narratives which describe “success” and how that 
term is used and explained; 5) narratives which are told FOR women: by 
whom they are told, and when; 6) gaps where stories seem to be missing,
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perhaps because the subject has been silenced by her batterer (or has left 
the arena where stories can be told?); 7)patterns in narratives which suggest 
a certain picture of a “survivor” or a “victim.”
There is an interesting dynamic present involving 1) the public-realm 
desire to use “victim” stories to publicize the (real) horror of domestic violence 
[the argument that domestic violence is indeed a public problem]; 2) the 
appearance of “survivor” stories in the public realm to (as aforementioned) 
give “next-door neighbor” faces to heretofore silenced/invisible women 
[blurring -  or spanning -  the public/private boundary]; 3) the, again real, 
need to empower women by helping them make the transition from “victim” to 
“survivor” [rewarding the transition by helping them change their personal 
narrative[?] and giving them a public life and a public identity]. That is the 
dynamic/tension reflected in the three sub-issues. How are narratives being 
managed and presented?
Methodology
In looking at the problem of how feminist advocates, survivors of 
domestic violence and spokespersons for Boulder County Safehouse use 
narratives to negotiate the public/private boundary in presentations of 
domestic violence in the public sphere, I will be concentrating on public 
presentations of narratives which attempt to reframe the issue of domestic 
violence as a public concern. My analysis will be rhetorical and 
empiricalfollowing Hauser, that is taking an “ empirical attitude toward the 
ways publics, public spheres, and public opinion are manifested” (Hauser,
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1999, p. 275). The analysis “draws its inferences about public, public 
spheres, and public opinion from actual social practices of discourse” (p.
275).
Further:
The evidentiary requirements...are tied to statements social actors 
advance on public problems. Evidence includes not only what can be 
said but what is proscribed; not only the formal statements of officials, 
leaders, and spokespersons or of institutional voices, such as the 
press, but vernacular exchanges among the actively engaged 
segment of society; not only institutional forums but counter- and 
preinstitutional public spheres where those who are not privy to official 
sites or are marginalized engage as publics and counterpublics in 
society’s multilogue on issues that impact their lives, (p. 275).
Justification of Texts
This study begins with the assertion that domestic violence is an issue
that has some import in the American society of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. To that end, one goal of the study was to search for evidence 
present in public forums -  available to concerned members of an existing or 
potential public-that would focus on the stories of women involved in 
situations of domestic violence.
Another focus was on narratives: what stories are told, of and by 
women, in an attempt to frame domestic violence as a problem of concern to 
an audience of citizen actors? Repeating an earlier observation: not all 
stories make it into a public forum. Not all women’s voices are heard by those 
citizen-strangers who are called to make a decision on an issue of key 
significance to the woman/victim/survivor. While oral narratives are certainly 
valid and valuable, especially in cases involving a vulnerable,
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underrepresented, marginalized or suppressed population, this particular 
study was not concerned with collecting those narratives, but with examining 
narratives that had been preserved and presented to the general public in an 
apparent attempt to present a particular face and voice for consideration. Two 
key words are presence and function: what kind of stories are present, and 
how are those stories use to frame the issue?
Further, since an empirical attitude demands that the search not be 
limited to a priori definitions of text, the desire was to sample from diverse 
media and types of text, texts which might indicate the expansion of the issue 
beyond letters to the editor or theoretical/academic texts. Again, the purpose 
is not to belittle letters to the editor, but rather to expand the perception of 
rhetorical appeals available to interested citizens. While acknowledging that 
there are myriad appeals, this study sought to present texts both diverse, in 
terms of their form, and representational, as they met the criteria of availability 
and victim/survivor centered narratives. The requirement for diversity would 
be met through the use of a film, a book, and a variety of public documents 
representing an organizational voice, in this case Safehouse of Boulder 
County.
To that end, the question involved “Does this particular text involve 
stories and/or voices of women who have experienced domestic violence?” 
and “Is this text available to members of the general public and/or members 
who are attempting to form an opinion on the issue?” In short, the question 
originally was “What’s out there?” and, after that, ‘What might that indicate?”
36
. Boulder County Safehouse is a non-profit, feminist organization in 
Boulder Colorado that has achieved national recognition for its outreach and 
educational efforts on the topic of domestic violence. As we shall see in later 
chapters, they are an acknowledged local “owner” of the issue, and to that 
end, their public communication on the issue is a key voice, as they are 
credited with speaking for -  and about -- the victims. Documents Safehouse 
has made available for general public consumption are an important textual 
source. Moreover, the voice they provide is also an institutional voice, 
informed by feminist principles. This voice allows a glimpse of an organization 
which spans the public/private boundary, and how narratives negotiate that 
boundary through the organization.
A second important text is the movie Defending Our Lives. This 
documentary won an Academy Award in 1994, is regularly used as a source 
for domestic violence educational outreach, is available in public and 
university libraries, and can be purchased through the internet. Receiving an 
Academy Award arguably places the film in the cultural mainstream. The 
documentary can be seen as a rhetorical attempt to contextualize domestic 
violence in terms of the social scope of the issue, while providing first person 
narrative presentations of four women convicted of murdering their abusive 
partners.
The final text, A Woman Like You (Anderson, 1997) is a paperback. 
The book’s title clearly indicates an appeal to a specific audience. Anderson 
herself states she was motivated by the question
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...what did a “battered woman” look like?...The truth is, battered women 
are all around us. We just don’t recognize them, because they look like 
us. And so I began my journey with my camera to explore the “face” of 
domestic violence (1997, p. 1)
The book’s pages consist of pictures and stories of victims/survivors of 
domestic abuse: a black and white portrait of a women is placed next to her 
paragraph-to-page-long narrative. It is first-person and immanent, with a 
sense that Anderson, as the photographer, records each woman’s story as 
each photograph: simple, unadorned, real.
There are a number of fiction and non-fiction, paperback as well as 
hardcover books available to the public dealing with the subject of domestic 
violence. However, this text best met the aforementioned criteria of 
presenting the voices, narratives and, an unanticipated bonus, the faces of 
women victims. Moreover, that presentation frames the women as normal, 
ordinary, and “like” every other woman: in other words, it is a particular 
framing of the voice and face of abused women.
While not as enthralling as Anna Quindlen’s (1998) New York Times 
bestseller Black and Blue, or Dare’s (2002) Avenging Angel, Anderson has 
the advantage of being a work of non-fiction. There are other non-fiction 
books which present the pathos and fear suffered by battered women, 
including Jones’s (1996) Women Who and (2000) Next Time, She’ll be 
Dead. There are even other books which report stories of, and from, battered 
women, including Weiss’s (2000) Surviving Domestic Violence: Voices of 
Women who Broke Free and LaViolette and Barnett’s (2000) It Could Happen 
to Anyone: Why Battered Women Stay. In all these cases, while poignant
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narratives are present, they are all mediated in such a way that they remain 
stories of “other.” While we may indeed react to the pain and pathos as 
described by the author, we never lose consciousness of the fact that the 
author is standing between the reader and the individual woman.
Though the intellect clearly appreciates that Anderson’s own 
(photographer’s) lens separates the public from the individual woman, the text 
nevertheless allows a depth of identification not possible in any of the other 
texts mentioned.
Thus through a close examination of the texts, this dissertation studies 
attempts to rhetorically construct and “own” the issue of domestic violence 
through narrative presentations that seek to call a public into existence for the 
purpose of remediating a social ill.
Preview of Chapters
Chapter Two will involve an overview of the problem including an 
historical perspective; grassroots action; the enactment of the Violence 
Against Women Act; religious response to, and backlash against, feminist 
attempts to define domestic violence; a description of two primary theories 
offered to explain domestic battery; and a preview of Boulder County 
Safehouse’s attempt to own the issue.
Chapter Three is centered on theoretical perspectives: public, publics 
theory, Gusfield’s insights on the assignment of responsibility, discourse 
communities and the “public sphere”, Hauser’s contemporary public sphere, 
and narrative analysis.
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Chapter Four begins the analysis as it describes the “pure victim” and 
uses the documentary Defending Our Lives as a text. The focus is on 
asserting claims and ownership, the battle for control, making the issue a 
public issue, and indictments of the police and court system.
In Chapter Five, the issue is seen as becoming more “personal.” 
Graham’s “Natural Proceedure of Argument” is used as a backdrop to 
analyzing how narratives present in the text, A Woman Like You can be seen 
to articulate a worldview and picture of battered woman as personalized, 
recognizeable, and immediate.
Chapter Six focuses on Boulder County Safehouse, as an organization 
that attempts, through educational outreach, to make ownership claims. 
Safehouse exercises an organizational voice as it seeks to call a public into 
existence and to expand the definition of domestic violence to include the 
broader term “social justice.”
Chapter Seven advances some conclusions, calls for further research, 
and presents implications for publics theory and the “face” of the victim of 
domestic abuse.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction
Almost ten years after passage of the 1994 federal Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) the consequences of domestic violence remain severe. 
According to the Bureau of Justice Crime Data brief, in 2000, intimate partner 
homicides accounted for 33.5 percent of murders of women, while less than 
four percent of the murders of men (retrieved 8/03 from http://endabuse.org). 
Further:
Although only 572,000 reports of assaults by intimates are officially 
reported to federal officials each year, the most conservative estimates 
indicate two to four million women of all races and classes are battered 
each year. At least 170,000 of those violent incidents are serious 
enough to require hospitalization, emergency room care, or a doctor’s 
attention (www.now.org/issues/violence/stats.html).
The damage to children remains a serious concern:
Violent juvenile offenders are four times more likely to have grown up in 
homes where they saw violence. Children who have witnessed violence 
at home are also five times more likely to commit or suffer violence when 
they become adults (www.now.org/issues/violence/stats.html).
Additionally:
Women who are battered have more than twice the health care needs 
and costs than those who are never battered. Approximately 1 percent of 
pregnant women report having been battered, and the results include 
miscarriages, stillbirths and a two to four times greater likelihood of 
delivering a low birth weight baby. Abused women are 
disproportionately represented among the homeless or suicide victims. 
Victims of domestic violence are being denied insurance in some states 
because they are considered to have a ’pre-existing condition’ 
www.now.org/issues/violence/stats.html).
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Historical Overview
Interest in, and focus on, domestic violence/battery arose out of the 
Women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. Consciousness raising 
groups brought women together and opened discussion on topics such as 
rape and sexual violence against women. As women shared experiences, 
they realized that domestic violence and sexual assault had many ingredients 
in common: the victims were almost always women; the violence seemed to 
occur across the boundaries of age, race, religion, and economic status; the 
women victims were not believed; they were accused of acting in a 
provocative manner, or somehow "asking for it"; the stigma of "going public" 
about the rape or violence often caused more pain; and the common 
acceptance of stereotypes that portray men as being somehow prone to 
violence and aggression, at the mercy of their "animalistic" urges, and thus 
somehow biologically predisposed to commit certain acts, argued against 
rape or domestic violence being treated seriously as a crime. Finally, there 
was limited space for legal action: rape victims were often doubly victimized 
by police and the criminal justice system, trials were traumatizing, and often, 
unless there was incontrovertible evidence that gross violence was involved, 
the system did not punish men reliably or consistently.
The case for battered women was all that and more: sheltered within 
the sacred bonds of the family, home and the private, they were also unable 
to cry "rape," even though rape was often involved in battery; they were tied
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to their abuser by social, economic, emotional, and religious bonds; family 
members were often unwilling to deal with the stigma and told the victim to 
"go home, he’s a good man, he loves you." This was compounded by the 
system, which did not want to interfere in the bonds of family. Even today, 
the social welfare system is designed to keep families intact, and the stories 
are legion of children who have been returned to abusive or neglectful 
situations because the "family" should remain together.
Perhaps more disturbing for victim advocates, tales circulate of courts 
who have awarded child custody to the (most often male) battering partner, 
since that parent is often most willing to "facilitate interactions with the absent 
parent," usually a woman who fled the relationship specifically to avoid that 
contact and unhealthy dynamic. Women who stay in battering relationships 
are also caught in the catch-22 of having "failed to protect" their children from 
violence, thus calling into question their ability to be a strong parental figure. 
Grassroots Action
Part of second wave feminism’s cry "the personal is political" was 
converted into grassroots action, and the first shelters for women and children 
victims of domestic violence were opened in the late 70s and early 80s. 
"Although some shelters for battered women opened in the mid-1970s, public 
attention to the plight of domestic violence victims did not increase 
dramatically until the 1980s" (Burt, 1996, p.6). "Grassroots advocacy played 
a pivotal role in bringing these crimes to public attention, creating demand for 
expanded legal protections, and offering services to victims" (p. 5)
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Feminists created and staffed the first shelters, which allowed women 
and children a place to which they might flee and, at the same time, offered 
job and coping skills should they decide not to return. Further, shelter staff 
and organizations such as NOW (National Organization of Women) began 
working within the system to agitate for legislation which placed blame and 
punishment on the offender. At the same time, they offered education to 
police forces in appropriate ways to deal with domestic violence situations.
Jones (2000) discusses the legal actions taken on behalf of victims. 
Feminist attorneys began to file lawsuits against police departments. 
Oftentimes battered women won their cases, or advantageously settled out of 
court. Class action law suits, on behalf of groups of battered women, were 
filed against court officers and police departments, to compel them to enforce 
laws against assault, arrest perpetrators, and help victims press charges in 
court. Important victories in similar lawsuits against police departments in 
Oakland, California and New York City, in 1976, “...prompted policy and 
procedural changes in those cities, sparked other lawsuits across the country, 
and convinced police in some jurisdictions, under pressure from local battered 
women's advocates, to change their policies without litigation" (2001, p. 22).
In 1984, Sherman and Berk supported the efficacy of arrest in 
domestic violence cases, leading to the development of pro-arrest or 
mandatory arrest policies in many parts of the country. That same year, the 
Family Violence Prevention and Services act, a report of the Attorney 
General's Task Force on Family Violence, provided grants for prevention
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programs, shelters, victim assistance and technical assistance and training 
for police officers and law enforcement personnel in 20 states.
Perhaps not coincidentally, 1984 proved an important year in the
advance toward federal protection for women, as injured women and even
families of some women murdered by husbands or boyfriends brought suits
against police. Multiple court actions charged police with “...failing to protect
them as they would protect other crime victims, a violation of their civil rights”
(Jones, 2001, p.23). The move to frame domestic violence as more than
battery, but a violation of a woman’s civil rights, was masterful and
consequential. Courts began to uphold the rights of women to be protected -
even if the abuser is her husband.
Jones tells us of a particularly troubling, landmark case:
... One woman, Tracey Thurman, won a suit against the police of 
Torrington, Connecticut, who had stood by and watched while her 
estranged husband stabbed and slashed and kicked her nearly to death. 
Awarding her substantial damages, a federal district court ruled that "a 
man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman merely 
because he is her husband. Concomitantly, a police officer may not 
knowingly refrain from interference in such violence, and, may not 
automatically decline to make an arrest simply because the assaulter 
and the victim are married to each other" (Jones, 2001, p. 23).
The Violence Against Women Act
In 1990, Senator Joseph Biden proposed the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA), which made domestic violence a crime against women's civil 
rights. In 1992, even before the act was passed, the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court judges proposed model state codes for standards 
and punishment for domestic violence.
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The VAWA addresses both sexual assault and domestic violence 
crimes. As aforementioned, sexual assault and domestic abuse share many 
common characteristics, including and perhaps especially important, that the 
preponderance of victims are female. Further, while sexual assault was 
legally treated as a felony, and domestic violence as most often a 
misdemeanor, or even a civil matter, both had traditionally been overlooked 
and/or under-enforced by the legal system. As explained by the Urban 
Institute's report “Evaluation of the STOP Grants to Combat Violence Against 
Women: The Violence Against Women Act of 1994:” “ ... both have been 
subject to failures of the criminal justice system (law enforcement, 
prosecution, and the courts) to treat these offenses as serious crimes” (Burt 
et.al,, 1996. p. 5).
The report continues, highlighting that “ In part, these failures have 
stemmed from public attitudes that did not demand a strong response” (p. 5). 
As we shall see in later chapters, the change of public attitudes was, and 
remains, the burden assumed by feminists, advocates and agencies engaged 
in proactive support of battered women: it is the burden, the responsibility and 
the right of “owners” of public problems.
Biden's proposed VAWA was ratified and signed into law in 1994 by 
President Clinton, as title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322). The Urban Institute describes the signing as 
an event which “marked a turning point in federal recognition of the extent
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and seriousness of violence against women, and a commitment to address 
the problem from the federal vantage point” (2002).
Domestic Violence Becomes Visible
Although Federal legislation awaited the mid 1990s for enactment, and 
law enforcement practices were slow in responding to domestic violence as a 
crime, the migration of domestic violence into the public sphere, where it was 
forged as a public problem, started in earnest during the 1980s and 90s in the 
U.S. and elsewhere. In 1995, Australia developed a government sponsored 
10-year community education campaign. The focus of the campaign was on 
the perpetrators: asking them to accept responsibility, to leave the house.
The program also encouraged men to speak to men about domestic violence. 
Follow up reports demonstrated that "The campaign has demonstrated the 
potential of using social marketing principals to achieve voluntary behavior 
change."
Here in America, corporations as diverse as The Body Shop, Motorola, 
and cigarette manufacturer Phillip Morris sponsored anti-domestic violence 
campaigns. The Body Shop provides a brochure "Stop Family Violence," 
which includes fundraising initiatives; definitions of family violence that include 
psychological, sexual, physical and financial categories; current statistics, 
including references and citations; a one-page answer to the familiar question 
"Why does she stay?"; warning signs of family violence; and multiple 
suggestions for how the reader/consumer can help. The brochure concludes
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with contact information for national organizations that aid victims and 
families.
Motorola sponsored the "Donate a Phone" program, beginning in 1990. 
Spokesperson actress Susan Sarandon appeared on commercials asking 
people to donate old cell phones for use by domestic violence victims in an 
attempt to protect their freedom and mobility. Phillip Morris offered a message 
campaign, including print and television commercial media, supporting 
women victims, by focusing on the story of an individual woman and linking it 
to statistics surrounding violence. While one may inquire somewhat cynically 
about the public relations value of such work, especially in the case of the 
besieged Phillip Morris corporation, the insertion of such publications in the 
public sphere was a sign that the issue was receiving the critical publicity of 
widespread discussion.
Internationally, countries have created policies and programs to 
address domestic violence, including (but not limited to) Africa, Albania, 
Armenia, Australia, Bulgaria, China, Great Britain, India, Japan, Macedonia, 
Moldova, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
The US Newswire, (Sept 7, 2001) discusses the United States Helsinki 
Commission briefing which surveyed domestic violence in states participating 
in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The briefing 
examined “the extent to which governments, particularly law enforcement 
authorities, have fulfilled their responsibilities to protect individuals from such 
abuse” (p1008250n9543).
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The Inter-American Commission of Women (2002) reports violence 
laws in Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Of those, Argentina, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Peru, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, all had laws enacted prior to the 
1994 signing of the VAWA.
Media coverage of domestic violence included popular movies, such 
as "The Burning Bed" starring Farah Fawcett (1984). In 1994, "Defending 
Our Lives" won an Oscar for documentary film. The film, which will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 4, concerns domestic violence episodes in the 
state of Massachusetts during one calendar year. It also includes the stories 
of four women, two white and two black, who were in prison for murdering 
their abusive partners.
There has been an explosion of books surrounding the topic, from 
popular fiction, like Black and Blue by Anna Quindlen (1998) to serious 
treatises on the issue. A recent survey of books available on Amazon.com 
(July, 2003) revealed 35 "hits" [excuse the awful pun] for books on "battering" 
and 426 for "domestic violence." [Note: in 2003, there were 34 on battering 
and 319 on “domestic violence.”]
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Numerous websites exist that provide information, opinion, facts,
statistics, advice and support. A partial list of them will be found in Appendix
A. When searching the worldwide web for information, the google.com web
crawler posted 879,000 for "domestic violence."
Religious Response
Religious leaders have jumped into the fray. Catholic Bishop Ricardo
Ramirez of Las Cruces, New Mexico, has been outspoken in his belief that
wife beating is against the moral precepts of the church:
Domestic violence is a shameful exercise of power against those whose 
lives are entwined by ties of blood and family," Bishop Ricardo Ramirez 
...said in a new pastoral letter. The letter, dated July 6 to mark the feast 
of St. Maria Goretti, contains an apology for mistakes made by clergy 
who contributed to the domestic violence by encouraging the abused to 
return to their abuser for the sake of the marriage. "To encourage a 
victim to return to such an environment without benefit of qualified 
professional help is irresponsible," Bishop Ramirez said in the letter. 
"When such errors are made or sinful actions are excused in God's 
name, the consequences are even more tragic." ( , July 16, 2001
v185 i2 p4.)
Ramirez cited pastoral precedent:
He repeated the U.S. bishops' statement in a 1992 pastoral letter that 
'violence in any form -- physical, sexual, psychological or verbal -  is 
sinful; many times it is a crime as well.'
Ramirez asked for the forgiveness 'of all persons affected by the 
inadequate response of the church's pastoral leaders to violence which 
has occurred in homes and in the family -- places meant to be of 
sanctuary for all persons.' ( National Catholic Reporter, July 13, 2001 v37 
i34 p10.)
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Irish Catholic bishops have also made a strong stand against violence 
in the home:
A document titled Domestic Violence, by two Irish bishops’ commissions, 
denounced all forms of violence in marriage and identified seven New 
Testament readings they said should not be used at Mass because they 
give "an undesirably negative impression regarding women." Four of the 
passages cited by the Irish bishops--Col. 3:12-21, Eph. 5:21-32, 1 Pt. 
3:1-6 and Titus 2:4-5--are in the Lectionary. On Aug. 27, the day the 
document was released, the second reading at Mass included the verse, 
"Wives should be subordinate to their husbands as to the Lord."
( America, Sept 16, 2000 v183 i7 p4)
Even the conservative Focus on the Family has, on its website, 
repudiated domestic violence as being repugnant to God’s chosen people. 
However.........
Despite the increased attention to domestic violence over the past two 
decades, it remains a serious social problem. In part its persistence can be 
traced to the rhetorical struggle that has marked its definition as a public 
problem. This struggle has centered on the meaning and application of the 
term “domestic violence.” While resistance to the issue-ownership asserted 
by feminists and advocates for battered women does not seem to have as 
clear an organizational matrix as the grassroots feminists, there is an obvious 
backlash against the primarily feminist-dictated view of domestic violence and 
an attempt to wrest control of the issue from those who were responsible for 
bringing it to public attention to begin with. We will examine one website, 
www.dvmen.org. the “Domestic Violence Against Men in Colorado” site as an 
example of public contestation for ownership of the terms and qualities 
involved in the issue.
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Backlash
Critics of the feminist conception of domestic violence have been in 
existence for as long as the battered women’s movement itself. In 1993, CBS- 
TV aired a movie "Men Don’t Tell" starring Peter Strauss, in which the victim 
was a man, frequently battered and at the mercy of his much smaller wife. 
Recently, there has been increased momentum in the form of a "battered 
husband" movement that claims statistics are not representative, that women 
batter as often as men, that mandatory arrest policies do more harm than 
good, that legislation actually works to prevent people from calling 911, and 
other serious charges.
While not specifically designated a “battered husband” advocacy 
forum, the website, www.dvmen.org. is the “Domestic Violence Against Men 
in Colorado” site. They are listed as being sponsored by the Equal Justice 
Foundation, and their motto, presented on the homepage, is "These words 
are written in defense of freedom."
Their site contains many chapters, full of sections with such 
provocative titles as "Cult Of The Domestic Violence Industry," "When Men 
Are Driven To Desperation," "The Dark Side Of Women," "Justifiable 
Violence Against Women," "The Change Of Life, Hysterectomies, And 
Domestic Violence," "A Toolkit To Destroy Families," and "The Emotional 
Terrorist." The site is headed by "Charles E. Corey, Ph.D" with contributors 
including one Psy.D, five Ph.Ds, two who list MAs, and one JD. Of the 
seventeen contributors, six are women.
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While the aforementioned titles do indeed seem provocative, there is a 
bibliography containing over 300 references, many scholarly works and 
Bureau of Justice Statistics publications. Interestingly, there are articles 
authored by, and a bibliographical link for, Erin Prizzey, who is rather well 
known (and cited in Boulder County Safehouse literature) as "a key figure in 
the British battered women’s movement" (Safehouse, 2000).
While it might provide web-crawler validity for the Equal Justice 
Foundation, Prizzy’s work is most often cited out of context, as an argument 
to be overcome or in a manner that feminists might view as twisted. For 
example, in an unattributed article entitled: Is it always domestic violence? 
Prizzy has the lead quotes:
Is it always domestic violence?
In a subsequent section we examine when it is not domestic violence.
Erin Pizzev states that:
"...it is essential to understand the differentiation between our use of the 
words battered and violence-prone. For us, a battered person is the 
innocent victim of another person's violence; a violence-prone person is 
the victim of their own addiction to violence."
In her book, The Emotional Terrorist and the Violence PMs. Pizzey
(1998, p.47-48) points out:
"...that the difference between a non-violent woman and a violent woman 
is that a non-violent woman can get into a relationship with a man who is 
violent, and love the man but hate his violence. A violence-prone woman 
will look for a violent man with whom she will hate the man but cling to 
his violence."
A non-violent, and even a violence-prone woman may need to call the 
police because there is a real need for intervention. However, there are 
many other reasons a woman may report a male.
(Retrieved 7/26/03 from http://www.dvmen.org/dv-18.htm#pgfld- 
1000404)
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Note that, while Prizzy is indeed cited, her work seems merely a 
springboard from which to launch an attack on the current system -  the post 
1994, VAWA-supported system -  that the grassroots feminists fought to 
implement.
The article continues, citing reasons why women might call police, 
such as media reminders (equated with “propaganda” that “always includes 
the female victim and the male perpetrator”[italics theirs]).
The following direct quotes, taken in order, represent some backlash 
claims made by the article, most of which are diametrically opposed to the 
battered women’s movement’s claims:
• Some women call police because they are frightened by a minor 
incident. Or perhaps she thought calling the police was a 'trump card' 
in an argument...
• Some women make false reports because there are legal, financial, 
and child custody rewards for making a such [sic] reports, and there 
are no penalties for such lies...
• About one-half the men we encounter who have become ensnared in 
false allegations and the court-assisted vengeance and 
vindictiveness of a former intimate partner become so incoherent with 
rage that they appear to justify the laws they are trapped with...
• The present laws, generated by feminist doctrine, have as their 
avowed purpose permanently separating the man and woman no 
matter what the circumstances, and no matter how fervently the 
women wish otherwise...
• ...battering is only apparent in 3% to 5% of domestic violence cases.
• Commonsense should tell you that if you take everything a man 
holds dear from him, he will be dangerous. Throw him out on the 
street, take his children from him, convict him without a hearing, 
throw him in jail on unproven charges, take away the rest of his civil 
liberties, and few men remain meek and humble.
• But the feminist politicization of the term 'abuse' renders it virtually 
meaningless...
• Many behaviors now branded 'domestic violence' by feminists are 
well within the range of normal human behavior. For example,
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couples often scratch and bite during and before sexual congress. 
Alex Comfort, in his widely read book of Sex, pointed out in
1972 that: "Tenderness does not exclude extremely violent games..." 
(from http://www.dvmen.ora/dv-18.htm#pqfld-1000404 [italics theirs])
What is of interest and importance is the obvious attempt to present a
different ownership claim in terms of responsibility and causal attribution: this
issue is not a matter of life and death for women and children, caused by a
patriarchal system, but rather the issue is one of gross infringement on civil
liberties, especially for men, caused by feminists and their ilk. The victim here
is, undeniably, the male: helpless and at the whim of vengeful women and a
feminist-controlled legal system. In the Abstract to the website, which is
recommended reading for anyone who wishes to understand the site, the
Equal Justice Foundation states:
...Charges of domestic violence, often combined with allegations of child 
physical and sexual abuse, have become the weapon of choice for 
women in divorce and custody battles. Despite the fact that over 90% of 
these charges are lies, women are rewarded with the house and kids for 
making such statements, and face no penalty for their false accusations.
Further, they assert:
In studying the problems of family violence some simple facts emerge 
from study after study:
• The safest place for a child is with their biological father;
• The safest place for a woman is in her home married to the biological 
father of her children;
• Men and women are equally violent in domestic relationships;
• And finally, Erin Pizzey, who started the shelter for battered women 
movement in 1971, states that "Any country that has tried to create a 
political solution to human problems has ended up with concentration 
camps and gulags." [italics theirs]
The concept of concentration camps, strife, and warfare could easily 
have been used by feminists in their description of the experience of battered
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women. Here we see it used to present the reality of men in America in this 
century. Indeed, analogies of war (even more poignant and pointed than the 
“battle of the sexes” so common in popular discourse) are used by both sides. 
We shall see the feminist appropriation in the movie Defending Our Lives, in 
Chapter 4. Below, we see its use by the Domestic Violence Against Men in 
Colorado site:
...It would be well to keep these fundamental findings in mind as you 
proceed through these pages. But make no mistake, we are engaged in 
an epic battle between two incompatible ideologies with fundamentally 
different views of the rights of the individual and the power of the state, 
with the future of civilization at stake, [from “Abstract,” italics mine]
The website posits the battle between patriarchy “representing the 
present system” and matriarchy “representing the return of the goddess and 
earth mother, and a more primitive relationship between man and woman and 
their children. And the return of the matriarchy is to be imposed by force of 
law when reason and logic fails.” No doubt feminists would assert that 
patriarchy has been, and continues to be not only imposed by law and 
custom, but seminal to the existence of both.
The site does make clear that its attack is aimed at radical feminists
with the disclaimer, also from the site Abstract:
It is basic to our premises to understand that we are not speaking here 
of those individuals who consider themselves "feminists" because they 
support equal rights under the rule of law, equal opportunity in 
employment and education, equal protection under law, and protection 
from violence for all persons. These positions are supported by those on 
the right and the left and certainly by the Equal Justice Foundation.
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One only need read the next paragraph to view the construction of said
radical feminists and their agenda:
In the radical feminist ideology there is no distinction between potential 
and probability. An allegation suffices for proof. Hearsay is taken for 
gospel. The terms "accused" and "accuser" are therefore inadmissible. 
As defined by radical feminists the only acceptable terms with reference 
to males are "abuser," "batterer," or "perpetrator." And
women are always, and only, "victims, and violence by a woman is 
exclusively "self defense."[italics theirs]
Thus even in 2003, almost 10 years after the implementation of the 
VAWA, the issue is still contested, with strong arguments being offered for an 
alternative rhetorical construction, not only of the issue, but of the victim and 
the consequences: battered women and their children, victims of civil rights 
violations and helpless to escape without intervention are positioned against 
concerned and loving men and fathers, victims of gross abridgements of civil 
liberties, helpless to escape a system which caters to, and is successfully 
manipulated by, untruthful and vengeful women.
As if the matter were not already complicated enough, there are also 
competing theories about the locus of blame, if you will, or who is responsible 
for fixing the problem. One popular theory holds that domestic violence is a 
result of faulty interpersonal relationships, and the other that it is the result of 
a faulty social system.
A Tale Of Two Theories
There are two basic approaches to social problems in general. One 
school of thought regards social problems as matters of individual acts and 
responsibilities. Another school of thought treats social problems as systemic.
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In Gusfield’s (1981) study of drinking and driving, the responsibility for the 
social problem was affixed at the level of the individual: the individual driver is 
responsible for his/her actions and the consequences thereof.
The problem could well have been treated as a problem: we, as 
a society, have a problem because we allow, even encourage and protect, 
the lightly regulated (virtually unregulated if the individual is over 21) 
consumption of a mind and perception altering drug known to, almost without 
exception, cause discomfort, disease, physical impairment, and lapses in 
judgment. Moreover, this readily available and socially sanctioned drug 
figures prominently in cases of violence and sexual assaults.
It is not hard to imagine well-reasoned arguments for either perception, 
and easy to understand how well-intentioned, intelligent and caring persons 
could view the problem, reasonably, as either a matter or individual acts or as 
a consequence of systemic forces, greater than the individual.
While Gusfield persuades that the assignment of responsibility was at 
the level of the individual, he does not claim that, indeed, the problem of 
drinking-and-driving is uniquely or solely a result of the individual, 
independent of social pressure to comply with accepted mores. The matter is 
not one lending itself to a de facto, pre-given assignation of blame: it is a 
matter of perception, and perception is almost always a matter of rhetoric. We 
will see here, and again in Chapter 4, that the struggle between competing 
theories for the assignment of locus of blame remains pertinent to the 
advocates’ struggle to establish patriarchal societal mores as causal and to
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remove from the victim the accusation that she is responsible for her 
victimization.
“Family Violence’’ vs. “The Feminist”
Stalans and Lurigio (1999) outline two, primary, competing 
perspectives on domestic violence. Each offers differing reasons concerning 
the causes of the violence. The key lies in the resulting action: solutions are 
vastly changed if the causal attributions are significantly divergent. One 
theory is the "family violence perspective" which presupposes that men and 
women from a violent family background will be equally violent. While 
seeming to agree with data offered by feminist anti-domestic violence 
literature -- that children who witness violence are much more likely to repeat 
it as adults — this approach focuses on individual batterers and suggests 
individual treatment.
The second perspective, the "feminist perspective" holds that societal 
values, particularly patriarchal values that subordinate women, foster 
domestic violence. Domestic violence is seen primarily as the exercise of 
power and control by males over females. Following the feminist perspective 
results in giving police broader powers to arrest batterers, and providing 
shelters for women victims where they can receive counseling, support, and a 
safe place to live.
Key to an understanding of these theories is the locus of blame. In 
almost any incarnation of the family violence perspective, the focus is on 
individual families and the dynamics therein. The unit of study is the single
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family unit. In an interesting parallel to Dana Cloud’s (1998) work the family 
violence perspective tends to diffuse societal responsibility and place the 
blame on the individuals in the situation. As the blame is localized, so is the 
cure: get the batterer help, get the family into counseling, let them solve their 
problems. This is especially appealing to proponents (and equally troubling to 
feminist advocates) as it sends the problem "back where it belongs" -- in the 
private sector, between a man and his wife and whomever they choose to "let 
in" as a moderator or counselor.
The feminist perspective, however, diffuses the blame across society 
as a whole: it is the social system that is indicted. We are a culture of 
violence, and a culture which allows men to systematically rob women of their 
rights because men are, per patriarchy, the “natural” leaders, and, thus, 
women are/must be subordinate.
Since feminist accounts place the blame on society as a whole, 
remediation must be on the level of society: laws; law enforcement; education 
of citizenry; social change in terms of the way violence is analyzed and dealt 
with; economic and social support for women and children who must form 
their own, self-sufficient family unit.
Both approaches, the family violence and the feminist perspective, 
hold merit and suasory potential. Indeed, feminists appropriate the family 
violence perspective (that children exposed to violence will beget violence) as 
a primary reason for charging perpetrators of domestic violence with child 
abuse if the alleged violence occurs in the presence of children. That said,
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the family violence perspective does present a challenge that feminists must 
overcome. In its advocacy of domestic violence as a family systems problem, 
the perspective encourages, and indeed may be seen to support, the 
continued presence of domestic violence as a relationship-bound, and thus 
inherently private matter, whose cause and remediation should thus be a 
matter of the private sphere, the world of the home. Individuals bear 
responsibility for the creation, maintenance and/or correction of the situation. 
In many ways, this may be seen as reflective of the status quo the feminist 
perspective must unseat before the issue can truly be judged as a “public” 
problem.
As may be expected, the feminist approach, with its insistence on 
societal locus of the problem, requires vigorous social agitation. One of the 
consequences, also, is that, in a busy and fragmented social system, the 
problem must be made to seem as though it is problem. Among the 
vastly competing cries and claims each individual is exposed to, those who 
demand social change can only accomplish it if an argument is presented, if 
good reasons are put forward and accepted by individuals who are then 
motivated to take action. In other words, it is the enactment of the rhetorical 
calling of a public into being, a public which can act to mediate and solve the 
problem.
Further, we must not lose sight of the reality that, as would-be owners 
of the issue, feminists must assign causal responsibility systemically 
(patriarchy is the villain) while dealing with the actuality that change can only
happen, for each women, very much on the level of the individual and her 
efforts to escape an abusive relationship, to move from victim to survivor...
This becomes an interesting balancing act, when put into actual 
practice at the level of the shelters: individual women and their children are 
given safety, education, support, encouragement, and urged to leave the 
abusive situation. The work of "change" from a victim to a survivor is borne 
by the victim. She, ultimately, is the one who must find a job, living 
accommodations, learn to work within the system, learn to make the system 
work for her, and all in a span of six weeks!
If there is a movement from "victim" to survivor, that action can only be 
accomplished by the individual woman. All the help and resources in the 
world cannot force her to take action. At the same time, the shelter lobbies 
for social justice and a change in the system: macro political maneuvers 
which go beyond the individual women and argue that women are oppressed 
as a group. The Boulder County Safehouse recently celebrated their 20th 
anniversary with the motto "Envisioning a Future Without Violence."
Acceptance of this balancing act reveals challenging dynamics, 
especially when we look at empirical evidence for how the issue is engaged 
by real people in real discourse communities.
Safehouse As A Boundary Spanner
While a more in-depth history of Boulder County Safehouse will be 
discussed in Chapter Four, the basic frame was begun in 1972. From a
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YWCA sponsored program, "Options for Women" grew a Boulder Task Force 
on Women and Children. The Task Force urged the creation of a Women’s 
Resource Center, and in 1974, the Boulder County Women’s Resource center 
opened. The Resource Center began as an educational, support and referral 
service. Soon an emergency shelter was opened. In 1981, Boulder County 
Safehouse became an independent, non-profit organization. The combined 
roles of sheltering women and children, and public advocacy remain clear.
The dedication to accomplishing both roles places Safehouse in a boundary- 
spanning position.
One way to view the issue is to see Safehouse as a symbolic boundary 
spanner between the private realm, where women often live in voiceless 
silence, and the public realm, where women reclaim their voice and place as 
citizens. It is a transitional space for women and children, in part because 
there are limits on their stay, and, possibly, in part because dependence upon 
a shelter is not an acceptable substitution for dependence upon a 
dysfunctional relationship. Safehouse is also, physically, a boundary spanner: 
the emergency shelter is in a "secret" location; its residents are protected, 
counseled, listened to, supported, educated, and guided to reclaiming their 
status as a participant in society. The shelter is a "house" and as such has 
expectations and practices, similar to "family" relationships in many homes: 
self disclosure is accepted but not forced; ethical communication a goal and 
practice; household chores and rules and regulations are in effect; negotiation 
of personal space and boundary issues is common. It is a place where
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emotions and pain are present. It is a place designed to heal. It is a place 
where vulnerability is a given, empathy a requirement, and nurturing second 
nature. In short, an attempt is made to make the shelter personal, private, 
protected and healing.
But Safehouse is more than the emergency shelter. It is also an 
"outreach" organization: a non-profit corporation employing paid staff, a large 
group of volunteers, and programs designed to reach out to the community. 
These outreach services include an Advocacy program, including Legal 
Advocates who "assist victims with obtaining restraining orders, offer support 
at pre-trial conferences and provide training for prosecutors, judges and 
police" (all following descriptions are from Safehouse, 2002).
There are Outreach Services, including the Outreach Counseling 
Program, which "offers both individual and group counseling for adult, 
children and teen victims who are not in need of emergency shelter"; and a 
Safehouse Transitional Services Program, which "works with other 
community and government agencies to provide long-term, comprehensive 
support for women as they work toward emotional and economic self- 
sufficiency."
Education has not been neglected: "the foundation of Safehouse’s 
school-based Education Program is the Choices and Change Curriculum, a 
tool developed to educate students K-12 about interpersonal violence". The 
Peer Education Program is "a collaborative effort between Safehouse and the 
Boulder County Rape Crisis Team to educate middle and high school
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students about the issues of dating violence, sexual assault and sexual 
harassment".
In addition, Safehouse, through the Speakers Bureau, also "provides 
educational presentations throughout the community in order to build 
awareness and encourage change in the beliefs and practices that perpetuate 
domestic violence." Volunteers can serve in an array of roles, as Children’s 
Volunteer, Shelter Support Staff, Victim Advocate, Court Advocate, Peer 
Educator, Peer Mentor, and member of the Spiritual Support Team (an 
"interfaith group of spiritual leaders who provide domestic violence education 
to their religious communities and one-on-one support to survivors").
Thus Safehouse is both a metaphoric and literal boundary spanner.
To use, again, their own words:
The vision and mission of Boulder County Safehouse grew from a 
profound belief in the power of women. Emboldened by feminism and 
the understanding that domestic violence stemmed from sexism and 
power imbalances, the Safehouse Foremothers sought to create a 
refuge that could both change women’s lives and change the
world..Safehouse has worked to ensure safety and justice for battered 
women and their children, and to end the senseless tragedy of domestic 
violence...Our vision for the future, much as it was more than twenty 
years ago, is to simply end domestic violence, and to inspire a new 
generation to create relationships, families, and communities founded on 
respect, compassion, and a profound commitment to justice (Safehouse, 
2000), [italics added].
Safehouse is attempting both "micro" and "macro" change: on the level 
of the individual woman victim/survivor, and on a societal level. They are 
grounded in both the personal, "private," and the public. They must provide 
discourse for both constituents; the private empowerment of victims as they
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(hopefully) transition into survivors, and the larger "public" project where they
hope to engage a public that can affect social change.
Safe house and an Attempt to Own the Issue
As previously discussed, the battered women’s movement is a direct
offspring of the feminist/women’s movement of the 60s and 70s. It was
grassroots efforts, led by feminists, that named the issue and brought it to the
attention of the public. As advocates sheltered and educated, they also
lobbied and created a climate that resulted in legislative change, on city,
state, and federal levels. It would be premature, however, to assume that
advocates can rest on their laurels. As aforementioned, domestic violence is
still a topic of concern to women, children, and society. Law enforcement
alone cannot provide enough change to eliminate the problem:
Recognizing that attitudinal change and knowledge are essential to 
practical implementation of legal reforms, VAWA authorizes support for 
prevention, education, and training and the development of systems for 
maintaining records on violent incidents and perpetrators, and improving 
communication within the justice system."(Burt, et al., 1996, p. 7)
The Urban Institute reports that:
Changes in attitudes and public opinion are critical. Recognition of the 
harm of violence and the need of victims for protection and redress is 
necessary to effective form...efforts to extend legal protections to 
women have been hampered by the reluctance of judges, police, and 
prosecutors to recognize the magnitude of the harm inflicted on female 
victims...public education is now a topic priority of foundations (Burt et 
al, 1996, p. 8)
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Moreover, women victims of abuse are not identical to victims of other 
crimes:
The system must take into account that women victims of violence differ 
from other crime victims in important ways...the system must redefine its 
mission to include protection and prevention of future harm, not just 
accountability in the form of arresting a perpetrator. (Burt et al, 1996, p. 
9)
This, then, is where a new contested terrain is reached: not over the 
question of whether battering a woman is "wrong," but in terms of what do we 
mean by "domestic violence?" Advocates and feminists, and even, in some 
cases previously noted, representatives of the Catholic Church, consider 
emotional and verbal abuse to be violence. Body Shop literature shows the 
public presence of the financial component of abuse, long held important by 
victim advocates. Social change may indeed take place individual by 
individual, but feminists, victim advocates and survivors, and agencies which 
deal with them, are faced with redefining the face of the abuser, as well as the 
face of the victim: faces they originally sketched in the early 70s.
Chapter Three will provide entry into an examination of this question, 
by showing the issue as particularly suitable to an application of publics 
theory, of ownership of issues, as presented by Gusfield; of the morally 
imperative, vernacular call to a public empowered to act on behalf of women 
and children; and one which can best be analyzed by looking at narratives, as 
they attempt to span boundaries, give voice to the voiceless, and change the 
face of domestic violence.
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRIVATE LIVES, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, AND THE NARRATIVE LINK
Introduction
The boundary between the public and the private is the locus of 
potentiality and possibility for social change. It is an area in tension, as the 
world of the private—the home, the family, behind closed doors—interacts 
with, and sometimes against, the world of the public, of civil society, of 
strangers and difference and courts of law. Many members of society 
recognize the difference between what is acceptable behavior in public, and 
what is allowed in the home: witness the score of etiquette books, or trace the 
progression from the theatrum mundi of Sennett (1974). Most recognize that 
there is a clear separation between the realms. That boundary was 
challenged by the feminists’ cry that “the personal is political,” but the 
boundary remains in place.
What happens, then, when there is a challenge to the line drawn 
between the private and the public, when there is an issue that belongs “in 
the home” but which some citizens say requires the spotlight of public 
attention and the benefit of public remediation? That is the challenge faced by 
feminist advocates, survivors and members of the movement to end domestic 
violence: their argument is that domestic violence is not merely “private” as a
function of family dynamics, but “public,” in that the consequences are 
societal in impact and require society’s intervention and remediation.
On, And About, The "Public"
What is the primary difference between a private issue and a public 
one? What distinguishes something that is “public”? How do we recognize 
it? For most of us, public would be that which is seen, which is accessible, 
which is present to our view as we go about our daily lives. Past generations 
have had different standards of what was considered “fit for public” — think of 
Grandmother’s sense of propriety in fashion and manners. While standards 
of acceptability and permissiveness might change from generation to 
generation, society to society, certain things remain constant: public is where 
things are seen. Public is (with the notable exception of “reality television”) 
outside the home. In many ways, public is where the action is. Certainly a 
strong public forum is necessary in a democratic or representative 
government, where the assent of the masses is theoretically required for 
political change to be implemented.
But how is an issue brought before the citizens and legislators? What 
is involved in shining attention on an issue or cause that members of society 
deem important? Few issues spring full-blown from an elected official’s mind, 
transformed into legislation without any public input (though that public may 
well be a narrow section of constituents or lobbyists).
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Sociologist Joseph Gusfield (1981) attempts to answer just such a 
question, through his examination of the formation of drinking-driving as a 
“public problem.” Gusfield traces the formation of "drinking-driving" as an 
issue that is rhetorically constructed and presented to "the public." In the 
rhetorical construction of "drinking-driving", there are many similarities to the 
way domestic violence is/has been constructed. As Gusfield points out: “All 
situations that are experienced by people as painful do not become matters of 
public activity and targets for public action” (p.3).
Gusfield provides us a lens through which we can view groups and 
individuals as they attempt to shape society through rhetorical means, as they 
struggle to “own” an issue, thereby assigning cause and responsibility. He 
shows a rhetorical sensibility in that he believes “the public” to be an agonistic 
realm, where there is active contestation for control of issues. He also allows 
analysis of characters involved in the struggle, and provides a framework for 
naming the practical goal of that struggle: control and ownership of an issue; 
the ability to assign causal and political responsibility; the ability to define the 
nature of the phenomenon, to name it, to describe it in such a way that it then 
becomes reality. Against the often-heard concerns about the language used 
to describe violence to domestic partners being hidden behind a patina of 
“normal relational ups and downs” or “romantic squabbles” Gusfield offers the 
real politik answer: the comparative success at issue ownership by those who 
see the issue through a less threatening lens.
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Gusfield begins his analysis of the construction of drinking-driving with
the separation of "public" and "private" problems:
It is useful to distinguish public problems from private ones...All social 
problems do not necessarily become public ones. They do not become 
matters of conflict or controversy in the arenas of public action. They do 
not eventuate in agencies to secure or in movements to work for their 
resolution. Whether or not situations should be public problems is itself 
often a major issue.... (1981, p.5).
He asks a familiar question: "How is it that an issue or problem 
emerges as one with a public status, as something about which ‘someone 
ought to do something’?” (p. 5). One answer is to look at who "owns" the 
issue:
The concept of ‘ownership of public problems’ is derived from the 
recognition that in the arenas of public opinion and debate all groups do 
not have equal power, influence, and authority to define the reality of the 
problem. The ability to create and influence the public definition of a 
problem is what I refer to as ‘ownership.’ The metaphor of property 
ownership is chosen to emphasize the attributes of control, 
exclusiveness, transferability, and potential loss also found in the 
ownership of property. (1981, p. 10)
Thus the agency or organization which "owns" the problem has a great 
deal to say in how the matter is framed, presented, understood, and resolved. 
The owner can assign "blame" by making assertions and attributions of 
causal responsibility (who or what caused this condition to exist) and political 
responsibility (who/which group is obligated to "take action" to correct or 
ameliorate the problem).
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As with many issues when power is involved, the ownership, or
disownership, of an issue can be hotly contested:
...the status of a phenomenon as a problem is itself often a matter of 
conflict as interested parties struggle to define or prevent the definition of 
a matter as something that public action should ‘do something about’ 
...there is a recognition that specific public issues are the legitimate 
province of specific persons, roles, and offices that can command public 
attention, trust and influence. They have credibility while others who 
attempt to capture public attention do not. Owners can make claims and 
assertions. They are looked at and reported to by others anxious for 
definitions and solutions to the problem. They possess authority in the 
field. Even if opposed by other groups, they are among those who can 
gain the public ear. [Gusfield 10].
This ability to “gain the public ear” is particularly significant, indeed 
critical, in a society where, as Gusfield has pointed out, not all have equal 
access to power, to authority, and to the media — necessary ingredients to 
generate critical publicity and call for public response and judgment on an 
issue. Further:
The question of ownership and disownership is very much a matter of 
the power and authority groups and institutions can muster to enter the 
public arena, to be kept from it, or to prevent having to join. The power to 
influence the definition of the reality of phenomena is a facet of the 
politics of reality’ (p. 12).
Gusfield also stresses the importance of the agonistic nature of public 
contention. The presence of conflict allows us to view the process of struggle 
to own and form the issue. When no conflict can be seen, when there is no 
challenge to the presentation of reality, the issue might well have moved into 
a state of reification and acceptance of the owner's view that the issue is 
reflective of "the way it is":
72
The existence of overt conflict and debate makes the politics of an issue 
manifest. The lack of such conflict may hide the very features of the 
structure which make for its absence, which prevent the opposite forms 
of consciousness from being observed. They contribute to ‘what 
everyone knows,’ what is ‘common sense’ -- the taken-for-granted by 
which the objective world is made into experienced life. (p. 13)
And: "This absence of alternative modes of consciousness is also the 
subject of analysis of the structure of public problems. Acceptance of a 
factual reality often hides the conflicts and alternative potentialities possible. 
Ignoring the multiplicity of realities hides the political choice that has taken 
place” (13).
Gusfield refers to the three aspects of structure central to public 
problems: ownership, causation and political responsibility. Ownership allows 
the assignment of responsibility.
Gusfield on the Assignment of Responsibility
Responsibility, according to Gusfield, can be both causal and political:
To say that ‘cancer was responsible for someone’s death’ is to use the 
term responsibility in a manner different from saying that ‘parents are 
responsible for preventing their children from making noise.’ The first 
usage looks to a causal explanation of events. The second looks to the 
person or office charged with controlling a situation or solving a problem. 
The first answers the question , How come? The second answers the 
question, What is to be done? The first -- causal responsibility -- is a 
matter of belief or cognition, an assertion about the sequence that 
factually accounts for the existence of the problem. The second -- 
political responsibility -- is a matter of policy. It asserts that somebody or 
some office is obligated to do something about the problem, to eradicate 
or alleviate the harmful situation, (pp. 13-14)
Owners have tremendous power in labeling an issue and assigning 
responsibility. "Quite often those who own a problem are trying to place 
obligations on others to behave in a ‘proper’ fashion and thus to take political
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responsibility for its solution” (p. 14). Thus "The structure of public problems is 
then an arena of conflict in which a set of groups and institutions, often 
including governmental agencies, compete and struggle over ownership and 
disownership, the acceptance of causal theories, and the fixation of 
responsibility" (15).
Those who own the issue, for all practical purposes, determine the 
scope and parameters of the problem, assign blame for its existence, and 
dictate who is responsible for fixing the problem. One can hardly fail to notice 
the political and rhetorical benefits of "owning" an issue, and one can also 
understand why ownership would remain an area of contestation in an 
agonistic public realm. Whose voice is heard? The owner.
Other Important Dimensions of Public Problems
Gusfield offers another intriguing aspect of public problems: they must
address both cognitive and moral concerns:
As ideas and consciousness public problems have a structure which 
involves both a cognitive and a moral dimension. The cognitive side 
consists in beliefs about the facticity of the situation and events 
comprising the problem... The moral side is that which enables the 
situation to be viewed as painful, ignoble, immoral. It is what makes 
alteration or eradication desirable or continuation valuable, (p. 9)
Both the moral and the cognitive dimensions must be present for a for 
a phenomenon to be recognized as a "problem." This is particularly intriguing 
in the area of domestic violence. The cognitive dimension would required that 
we accept the facticity of a phenomenon that the negative impacts can be 
altered: "...events and situations are ... cognitively assessed. A world of fact 
is posited. Crime may be seen as a result of broken homes, poverty, genetics,
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community disorganization, or any number and type of variables.
Significantly there are beliefs about the alterability of phenomenon" (Gusfield, 
1981, p.9).
Gusfield uses the examples of age and racial inequality: aging is 
usually perceived to be "negative" and/or "unfortunate," but considered 
inevitable; while racial inequality is also viewed negatively, but considered 
alterable. Thus, the phenomenon of domestic violence must be established 
as factual (through research, crime statistics, newspaper articles, etc) and 
also as alterable (victim assistance programs, violence prevention initiatives, 
legislation, police training, community information programs).
While facticity can certainly be debated, it is a debate that evidence 
and statistics can generally resolve. It is of the realm of inartistic proof. The 
moral dimension, however, requires a different form of proof. "The moral side 
of a problem suggests a condemnable state of affairs from the perspective of 
someone’s morality" (Gusfield, 1981, p. 9). The question of whose morality 
might well be answered by Gusfield's attribution of ownership, but the 
question of how the evaluation is made and supported is square in the realm 
of rhetoric, as we shall see with Hauser's (1999) polyvocal lattice of publics 
and counterpublics present and weigh evidence for public judgment. "Without 
both a cognitive belief in alterability and a moral judgment of its character, a 
phenomenon is not at issue, not a problem" (Gusfield, p. 10).
Thus, ultimately, for a phenomenon to exist as a problem demanding 
public remediation, it must be rhetorically constructed as social knowledge:
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existing, alterable, and morally deserving of attention and action. Put simply: 
a problem isn’t a problem until we recognize it as such, and it does not 
become a “moral problem” for me until I accept my responsibility to render 
moral judgment. And how are moral judgments made? Hauser (1999) would 
answer:
[Civil] judgment is an outcome of the vernacular exchanges dispersed 
across media, public meetings, face-to-face interaction, ballots and even 
representative deliberation ...It occurs when opinions emanating from a 
variety of perspectives and held for a variety of reasons nevertheless 
converge to form a prevailing view of preference and possibly of value... 
[Civil judgment] expresses a common understanding among diverse 
social actors primarily based on formal and vernacular exchanges 
enacted in and across public spheres ... [and] reflects the associational 
character of relationships that depend on nothing beyond the common 
action of discussion and debate occurring in these discursive spaces... 
Civil judgment expresses a shared understanding that grounds an 
actually existing public (p. 74).
Further: “ ... Importantly, civil judgments are the vehicle for 
transporting us from our private and subjective existence into the common 
realm of shared reality” (p. 76).
Those who view partner abuse as a form of violence that is more than 
“romantic squabbles” appear to be succeeding in their efforts to own the 
issue. Partner abuse -  physical and psychological -  is now accepted as a 
form of violence, “domestic violence.” The presence of state and federal 
legislation, education and outreach from publicly accepted authorities on the 
issue (Safehouse, various coalitions on domestic violence), and the “common 
knowledge” that valid information on the issue can be obtained from these 
sources indicate that the facticity and remediability of the issue have been 
established. These successes at establishing the cognitive dimension of the
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problem have not been matched, however, with equal success at establishing 
its moral dimension.
Domestic violence cannot be merely " a condemnable state of affairs 
from the perspective of someone’s morality" (Gusfield, 1981, p. 9; italics 
mine). It must be condemnable from the perspective of my morality, and 
yours, and other citizens/strangers like you and me. It must be personally 
important to individuals in a discourse community.
This process of an issue becoming a public problem calling for remedy 
requires a public space, a public sphere, where discourse communities come 
into being, and exchange ideas leading to judgment. There must be a forum 
where individuals can engage in the formation of critical publicity and its goal: 
analysis and judgment.
Discourse Communities and “The Public Sphere”
The notion of discourse communities is central to action in the public 
forum. While Gusfield does an admirable job of outlining the contestation for 
control and ownership of an issue, past history and rhetorical analysis has 
focused attention on the concept of a singular, reified “public” or of a unified 
“public sphere.” For a historical perspective and current discussion of public 
sphere(s) we will rely heavily on cornerstone work done by Habermas and 
Fraser, but focus on more recent and challenging work of Hauser.
Scholars observed that, in the 1800s, there emerged a new arena, 
aside from that of the Church, and the State, and separate even from the 
realm of economics, as groups of citizens began to gather in coffeehouses
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and salons, fueled by the explosion of print and the forerunners of our modern 
newspapers, and this group, these groups, began to gather and discuss 
politics. “These new spaces afforded a public sphere in which a public could 
form an opinion that might challenge the state’s primacy in setting social 
purposes and that might expect its understanding to bear weight on what the 
state did” (Hauser, p. 23). They were, according to Habermas, the bourgeois 
public sphere, and from them emerged a concept we deal with today: public 
opinion, vox populi, the voice of the people. As representative governments 
replaced feudal systems, the middle class, the tradesmen and shop owners, 
began to flex muscle and attempt to intervene in matters of state.
In Habermas, the public sphere is counterfactual: it is a realm where 
rationality rules supreme, where all are granted access, where claims must be 
redeemed, and where reason decides the issues of the day. His work is, in 
some ways, a lament for the public, as colonization by special interests 
represents the death knell for a vital and engaged public sphere.
The Habermasian Public Sphere
In 1974, Habermas concisely outlined the characteristics of “the public 
sphere”:
By “the public sphere” we mean first of all a realm of our social life in 
which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is 
guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into 
being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form 
a public body. They then behave neither like business or professional 
people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional 
order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens 
behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion --- 
that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and 
the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of
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general interest. In a large public body this kind of communication 
requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing 
those who receive it. Today, newspapers and magazines, radio and TV 
are the media of the public sphere. We speak of the public sphere in 
contrast, for instance, to the literary one, when public discussion deals 
with objects connected to the activity of the state. Although state activity 
is so to speak the executor of the political public sphere, it is not a part of 
it. To be sure, state authority is usually considered “public” authority, but 
it derives its task of caring for the well-being of all citizens primarily from 
this aspect of the public sphere. Only when the exercise of political 
control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand that 
information be accessible to the public, does the political public sphere 
win an institutional influence over the government through the 
instrument of law-making bodies, (p.49)
Habermas’s analysis traces the existence and ultimate demise of a 
temporally located and unique sphere.
Habermas rather quickly came under criticism, especially from
feminists who argued, with some force and a good measure of judicious right,
that Habermas’ “public” was exclusionary, systematically denied access to
women and minorities, and did not allow for alternate ways of argument and
persuasion: "the Bourgeois public sphere was, for the most part, a restricted
male preserve" (Landes, 1992, p. 111) -- a significant departure from
Habermas' ideal of equal access. Indeed, Eley (1992) charges that "The
most consistent of these exclusions... is based on gender" (p. 308). And
The new category of the "public man" and his "virtue" was constructed 
via a series of oppositions to "femininity" which both mobilized older 
conceptions of domesticity and woman's place and rationalized them 
into a formal claim concerning women's "nature." At the most 
fundamental level, particular constructions of "womanness" defined the 
quality of being a "man", so that the natural identification of sexuality 
and desire with the feminine allowed the social and political 
construction of masculinity. In the rhetoric of the 1780s and 1790s, 
reason was conventionally counterposed to "femininity, if by the latter we 
mean (as contemporaries did) pleasure, play, eroticism, artifice, style, 
politesse, refined facades, and particularity" [Landes, 1988, p. 46]. Given
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this mannered, frivolity, women were to be silenced to allow masculine 
speech, in the language of reason, full rein (p. 309).
The concept of a "unitary" sphere, of "a" public sphere, was
challenged. If the concept of "a" public sphere is revised to accept the view
that multiple spheres exist, then one can assert, with Benhabib (1992) that
The public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all 
affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a 
practical discourse, evaluating their validity...In effect, there may be as 
many publics as there are controversial general debates about the 
validity of norms (p. 87).
Fraser’s Critique of Habermas
Fraser (1990) lauds Habermas’s contributions, and highlights the 
discursive nature of “the public sphere”
The idea of ‘the public sphere’ in Habermas’s sense... designates a 
theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted 
through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate 
about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalized arena of 
discursive interaction.” (p. 110)
Habermas’s public sphere is central to the function of democracy. It is:
... conceptually distinct from the official economy; it is not an arena of 
market relations but rather one of discursive relations, a theater for 
debating and deliberating rather than for buying and selling. Thus this 
concept of the public sphere permits us to keep in view the distinctions 
among state apparatuses, economic markets, and democratic 
associations, distinctions that are essential to democratic theory, (p. 111)
However:
...I contend that his analysis of the public sphere needs to undergo some 
critical interrogation and reconstruction if it is to yield a category capable 
of theorizing the limits of actually existing democracy, (p. 111)
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Fraser finds four areas of specific concern:
...four assumptions that are central to the bourgeois, masculinist 
conception of the public sphere, at least as Habermas describes it. 
These are as follows:
• The assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in a public 
sphere to bracket status differentials and to deliberate as if they 
were social equals...
• The assumption that the proliferation of a multiplicity of competing 
publics is necessarily a step away from, rather than toward, 
greater democracy, and that a single, comprehensive public 
sphere is always preferable to a nexus of multiple publics...
• The assumption that discourse in public spheres should be 
restricted to deliberation about the common good, and that the 
appearance of private interests and private issues is always 
undesirable...
• The assumption that a functioning democratic public sphere 
requires a sharp separation between civil society and the state.
(p. 117-118)
Fraser’s four points attempt to move Habermas’s model from 
counterfactual, to something more closely approximating the way democracy 
works in the real world. First, Fraser echoes and supports feminists’ 
contentions that merely intending to “bracket status differentials and to 
deliberate as if they were social equals” does not result in real-world 
diminishing of those differences. In fact, “...discursive interaction within the 
bourgeois public sphere was governed by protocols of style and decorum that 
were themselves correlates and markers of status inequality. These 
functioned informally to marginalize women and members of the plebian 
classes and to prevent them from participating as peers” (p. 119).
Mere recognition, even sincere desire to change, does not eliminate 
barriers: “...informal impediments to participatory parity that can persist even 
after everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate...” (p. 119).
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Moreover, “[bracketing] usually works to the advantage of dominant groups in 
society and to the disadvantage of subordinates” (p. 120).
Second, “The assumption that the proliferation of a multiplicity of
competing publics is necessarily a step away from, rather than toward,
greater democracy, and that a single, comprehensive public sphere is always
preferable to a nexus of multiple publics” (p. 117). Fraser points out that a
unitary public sphere further restricts access to dominant groups and prevents
access by marginalized groups:
...where there is only a single, comprehensive public sphere...members 
of subordinated groups would have no arenas for deliberation among 
themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies...no venues in 
which to undertake communicative processes that were not, as it were, 
under the supervision of dominant groups... (p. 123)
The cost to the larger public is serious, as it potentially results in a 
reification of a narrow point of view, and a loss of the give and take among 
opposites that ought to be central when societies incorporate the voices of 
distinct cultures:
...cultural identities are woven of many different strands, and some of 
these strands may be common to people whose identities otherwise 
diverge, even when it is the divergences that are most salient...After all, 
the concept of a public presupposes a plurality of perspectives among 
those who participate within it, thereby allowing for internal differences 
and antagonisms and discouraging reified blocs. In addition, the 
unbounded character and publicist orientation of publics allows people to 
participate in more than one public, and it allows memberships of 
different publics partially to overlap. This in turn makes intercultural 
communication conceivable in principle, (p. 127)
Third, Fraser takes to task the “...assumption that discourse in public 
spheres should be restricted to deliberation about the common good, and that
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the appearance of private interests and private issues is always undesirable”
(p. 118). Using a most appropriate example, she points out that
...only participants themselves can decide what is and what is not of 
common concern to them. However, there is no guarantee that all of 
them will agree. For example, until quite recently, feminists were in the 
minority in thinking that domestic violence against women was a matter 
of common concern and thus a legitimate topic of public discourse (p. 
129). [Thus suggesting the other side in the contest for issue ownership 
mentioned earlier]
The great majority of people considered this issue to be a 
private matter between what was assumed to be a fairly small number of 
heterosexual couples (and perhaps the social and legal professionals 
who were supposed to deal with them). Then feminists formed a 
subaltern counterpublic from which we disseminated a view of domestic 
violence as a widespread systemic feature of male-dominated societies. 
Eventually, after sustained discursive contestation ... succeeded in 
making it a common concern, (p.129)
The notion of a public deciding what is acceptable or appropriate for
discussion further supports the notion of agonistic, multivocal, contested
spheres of deliberation, and resists the reification of discursive action:
...there are no naturally given, a pri boundaries here. What will count 
as a matter of common concern will be decided precisely through 
discursive contestation. It follows that no topics should be ruled off limits 
in advance of such contestation. On the contrary, democratic publicity 
requires positive guarantees of the opportunities for minorities to 
convince others that what in the past was not public in the sense of 
being a matter of common concern should not become so. (129)
Fourth and finally, Fraser critiques “The assumption that a functioning 
democratic public sphere requires a sharp separation between civil society 
and the state” (p. 118). She rightly points out that a citizenry, or civil society, 
separated from the state is a citizenry deprived of real power and voice. A 
public which has no ability to influence change is a “weak public”: a 
“ ...public[s] whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion
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formation and does not also encompass decision making” (p. 134). The 
counter to a “weak public” is a “strong public:” “...whose discourse 
encompasses both opinion formation and decision making” (p. 134). In 
terms of presenting a public whose opinion has consequence and weight: 
“...the force of public opinion is strengthened when a body representing it is 
empowered to translate such ‘opinion’ into authoritative decisions” (p. 135).
Thus Fraser highlights the importance of discursively formulated 
spheres, and provided valuable critical modifications to Habermas which 
allow for a multiplicity of public spheres, highlights the contestation present in 
an agonistic public, empowers the publics to decide on appropriate inclusion 
of issues, and requires that publics not be limited to a weak role, but 
empowered to call for and enact change.
On Contestation and a Multiplicity of Spheres
With Fraser and feminist critics, the multiplicity of "publics" becomes 
possible and Habermas' singular public becomes one of many potential or 
actual discursive arenas. Fraser’s key move posited the existence of sub­
altern counter publics: groups which form in opposition or resistance to 
prevailing publics. She notes that some publics are formed not "merely" to 
discuss issues: they are called into being in response to perceived lack of 
power, access, and/or influence in an already existing sphere:
...history records that members of subordinated social groups -- women, 
workers, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians -- have repeatedly 
found it advantageous to constitute alternative publics. I propose to call 
these subaltern counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel 
discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent 
and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.
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Perhaps the most striking example is the late-twentieth century U.S. 
feminist subaltern counterpublic (Fraser, 1990, p. 67).
McLaughlin (1993) concurs: "Counterpublic spheres are defined as 
multiple and heterogeneous sites of oppositionality united only by a common 
concern to create new forms of social and political relations" (p. 610). She 
refers to
... the feminist proposal that the emancipatory potential of the feminist 
counterpublic sphere resides in a dialectic between internal and external 
functions:... they are places for withdrawal into specific, oppositional 
identity and... they have a "public" character directing oppositional claims 
and agitational activities outward through media and other channels 
toward wider publics (p. 600).
The concept of feminist subaltern counterpublic(s) is important when 
viewing the women’s movement as a form of response to a dominant 
ideology, especially when domestic violence is an issue. They may be seen 
as counterpublic, formed in active opposition to institutions in the "broader" 
public which attempt to silence them:
The literary critic Rita Felski has argued that the American feminist 
movement...is an excellent illustration of alternative public space. She 
believes that the movement enabled women to oppose the rhetoric and 
institutions of the mainstream, and at the same time develop a new 
arena for discourse. Feminists, through books, journals, consciousness- 
raising groups, and other media, have been able to create a thriving 
parallel public sphere. This counter-public of female activists has 
developed what Felski calls a "counter-ideology," which challenges the 
values of the hegemonic culture industry. In the new public space 
created by the women’s movement, feminists can use their preferred 
lens of gender to view the world around them. Although the women’s 
movement pressures the mainstream from outside, feminist thought has 
certainly affected the contours of the conventional (male dominated) 
public sphere (Herbst, 1994, p. 15).
Thus Fraser’s groundbreaking "naming" of subaltern counterpublics 
recognizes the existence of multiple sites of public engagement and 
significantly alters the notion of "a" public. Moreover, Fraser allowed for the
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agonistic nature of the sphere, and accounted for the obvious and vocal 
attempts by marginalized groups to have input into the process whereby 
social decisions are made. Fraser’s desire was to provide a picture of how 
democracy actually works.
Contemporary Public Spheres: Hauser 
That move was left to Hauser. In Hauser we find an empirical, 
rhetorical, and ultimately rejuvenating view of publics as they actually exist 
and function in society. Hauser’s model of the public sphere has these 
important features: He presents a rhetorical model, he expands on Fraser’s 
concept of multiple publics, he develops a reticulate model of multiple public 
spheres, he advances a vernacular rhetoric model of public opinion, and, 
unlike Habermas, he contends that an adequate theory must be in
the sense that it comports with the practices of actually existing democracy 
and that claims about the role played by rhetoric in shaping publics be tied to 
concrete discursive practices of those who were actively engaged in attending 
to discourse and forming public opinion.
First and foremost, Hauser presents a rhetorical model of public(s):
Our relationship as members of a public is the fruit of our own rhetorical 
competencies, of our capacity to experience rhetoric. For this reason, 
rhetoric foregrounds publics and is rudimentary to their individuating 
identities; publics are constituted by the character of rhetorical 
exchanges shared among their members, (p.35)
Key is the notion of publics: multiple sites where citizens gather to
discuss and decide upon issues of importance to members of the society. The
call for a view of "publics" rather than a public, echoes Fraser, but expands,
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based on the observation that “The model of a monolithic public based on 
shared interests is contrary to the actually existing coalitions of interests that 
can cooperate in pursuing a common end, even though for different reasons” 
(p. 31). The existence of multiple sites of agonistic contention, with publics 
and subaltern counterpublics competing for voice, demands a new 
understanding:
Our understanding of the possibilities for and the problems of society’s 
active members requires a framework that connects their material 
shape and activity of discourse. We may begin this reconceptualization 
by acknowledging that “the public” is a generic reference to a body of 
disinterested members of a society or polity and is no more informative 
to an understanding of social knowledge and social action than an 
undefined reference to “they.” It fails to capture the activities of the 
working part of society engaged in creating cultural awareness, social 
knowledge, and public policies and in evaluating deeds. These activities 
are often local, are often in venues other than institutional forums, are 
always issue specific, and seldom involve the entire populace, (p. 32)
Hauser reconceptualizes “the public as a plurality of publics grounded 
on their capacity for rhetorical engagement “ (p. 14). Sites exist whenever, 
and wherever, citizens are actively engaged in discourse which attempts to 
arrive at and render a decision: “Thus we may define a public as the 
interdependent members of society who hold different opinions about a 
mutual problem and who seek to influence its resolution through discourse” 
(p. 32, italics Hauser’s) and “...publics emerge as those who are actively 
creating and attending to these discursive processes for publicizing opinions, 
for making them felt by others. Their members are society’s dynamic 
participants and judges who are actively engaged in evolving opinions that
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influence how our cultural, social, and political wheels turn” (p. 33, italics 
Hauser’s).
Hauser’s theory is both rhetorical and empirical: “Sensible thought 
about publics requires capturing their activity: how they construct reality by 
establishing and synthesizing values, forming opinions, acceding to positions 
and cooperating through symbolic actions, especially discursive ones. Put 
differently, any given public exists in its publicness, which is to say in its 
rhetorical character” (p.33).
Publics are purposive: they are discursively constructed, called 
together and responsive to issues of concern to engaged citizens. Rather 
than viewing "the public" as a rather large, somnolent giant that can be 
roused from apathy in times of great crisis, "publics" might [I do tremble as I 
write this] better be viewed as localized cells of activity; fluid, moving into and 
out of existence as needed to render decisions, whose boundaries are 
permeable, whose existence can be traced in examination of the discourse 
which is both creative of, and evidence of, its life. Discourse, written, oral, is 
the lifeblood of these publics: “... a public’s members converse through the 
everyday dialogue of symbolic interactions by which they share and contest 
attitudes, beliefs, value, and opinions. These are vernacular exchanges 
expressed in the language and style that members of a society must share to 
negotiate daily life in a community of strangers” (p.36).
Publics, by their very fluidity, their permeability, their ebb and flow to, 
and away from, issues, defy reification. We recognize them by their
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discourse, by the detritus of posters, pins, letters to the editor, public 
speeches, parades, debates, attempts at crafting and presenting legislation.
Hauser expands upon Habermas and Fraser to present a rhetorical 
model of public spheres. He specifies six “critical points of difference 
between rhetorically conceived communication and the normative frame 
Habermas has proposed” (p. 46).
First, Habermas’s idealized public “conceals the ways in which 
particular, often marginalized public arenas form and function” (p.46, italics 
Hauser’s). Moreover, Habermas’s model “fails to take account of ...[the] 
range of differences within and between spheres” (p. 46). A rhetorical model 
“requires openness to those conditions that produce a plurality of spheres 
within the public sphere” (p. 48).
Secondly, a unitary model of the public sphere “neglects the lattice of
actually existing public spheres”(Hauser, p. 48, italics his):
Civil society cannot be equated with the state or reduced to the 
economy...it is a web of discursive arenas in which members of society 
engage one another in ongoing dialogues that continually confront public 
problems, constitute publics, and challenge within and across domains 
for the formation of public opinion (p. 49).
This is a fluid, changing, ongoing, living and dynamic process, thus “ 
rhetorical model reveals rather than conceals the emergence of publics as a 
process” (Hauser, p. 49, italics his).
Thirdly, Habermas’s principle of disinterest “ those
subspheres whose members are decidedly i(Hauser, p. 49, italics 
his), for example, the feminist subaltern counterpublic, or subaltern
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counterpublics representing the battered women’s movement. Rhetoric, by
its nature, is always addressed:
Discourse intent on gaining the assent of those who share the 
consequences of a public problem inevitably addresses them as 
particular individuals and groups. We adapt our arguments to our 
audience’s readiness to attend, understand, and respond... These 
rhetorical characteristics of addressed discourse belie the condition of 
disinterest, (p.50)
Hauser rightly points out that “People become engaged because 
issues tough their lives. A rhetorical understanding of communication regards 
life-engaging decisions as necessarily involving emotions. Emotions are 
essential for establishing the relationship between an attentive and 
empowered audience and their particular circumstances” (p. 51). Further, “In 
the classical tradition’s rendition of rhetoric as an architectonic productive art, 
engaging emotions in tandem with reason is necessary for sound public 
judgment...consequently they cannot arrive at a judgment that is 
‘disinterested’” (p. 51). Hauser concludes “ ...accommodation of conflicting 
interests should supplant disinterestedness as a mark of a well-functioning 
public sphere” (p. 51, italics Hauser’s).
Fourth, “The criterion of communicative rationality contributes to the
exclusionary character of the public sphere by constraining open access?’
(Hauser, p. 51, italics his). Hauser posits that
the rhetorical character of addressed arguments suggests local norms of 
reasonableness as a more appropriate criterion than global norms of 
rationality for assessing appeals in a given public sphere. This standard 
acknowledges that there are no absolutes for assessing the force of a 
better arguments since arguments have no force apart from satisfying 
those standards that particular publics are prepared to summon ...[which 
suggests that] good reasons are the operative basis for the actual state
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of agreement forged through the polyvocality of a public sphere (p. 52, 
italics his).
Hauser’s fifth challenge: the “norm of warranted assent to be achieved
by generalizable arguments is contrary to the particularity of public issued’ (p.
52). Since publics are indeed polyvocal, processual, interested, and specific,
and moved by good reasons, their issues and discourses will similarly be
particular to the publics. A rhetorical understanding of publics would concern
itself with “how the dialogue within any given public sphere mounts appeals
that lead participants to understand their interests and make prudent
judgments (p. 53).
Sixth, and finally, Habermas’s ideal speech model "is at odds with
conditions of diversity that define civil society' (p. 53). In a polyvocal,
multicultural, latticed and interested sector of citizens
...interdependence with strangers does not require that you agree with 
those aspects of belief and conduct divergent from your own, but that 
you are tolerant of differences in order to sustain the range of 
cooperation necessary for society to function....The basic right of 
individuals to their cultural traditions creates a moral necessity for 
tolerance...Put differently, understanding does not necessarily lead to 
agreement (p. 53)
And: “Mutual dependency requires that communicative partners share a 
common reference world in which common understanding supplants 
warranted assent as the communicative norm for achieving reasonable 
mutual cooperation and toleration1’ (p. 53-54).
Thus Hauser moves beyond Habermas’s counterfactual model of “a 
public sphere,” incorporating and supporting the best of Fraser’s plurality of 
spheres and desire to represent democracy as it actually functions, and offers
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a rhetorical model of living publics as they exist today and attempt to exert 
influence on issues of interest to citizens.
Some Final Qualities of Public Spheres
Hauser’s theory holds that the arena of multiple public spheres has a 
reticulate structure; their boundaries are fluid, rather than fixed, permeable 
rather than protected. They form and disband as issues—or other citizens— 
call them into being. Moreover, a citizen may belong to numerous publics. I, 
as a mother and citizen, respond to civic issues that require decisions as 
those issues affect me: should teenagers be allowed to get an abortion 
without parental notification? What about the issues of under-aged drinking? 
Do graduate students require a Bill of Rights? Should part-time instructors be 
unionized? To some degree, those issues call to me and I discuss with 
friends, and often with strangers, in an attempt to render a judgment.
Hauser also focuses on the discursive nature of the spheres: we know 
one is in existence because we see the discourse. We have a trail, not 
necessarily in public oratory, but in letters to the editor, in pins and badges, in 
bumper stickers and parades and billboards, in interviews and even, perhaps, 
on talk shows, all of which are empirical in the earlier-discussed Hauserian 
sense.
In sum, Hauser's rhetorical model includes the processual nature of a 
public: " publics do not exist as entities but as processes; their collective 
reasoning is not defined by abstract reflection but by practical judgment; their 
awareness of issues is not philosophical but eventful’ (p. 64); the focus on
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"local norms of reasonableness as a more appropriate criterion than global 
norms of rationality for assessing appeals in a given public sphere" (p. 52); 
the assertion that "good reasons are the operative basis for the actual state of 
agreement forged through the polyvocality of a public " (p. 51); and his 
insistence that "We belong to a community insofar as we are able to 
participate in its conversations. We must acquire its vernacular language in 
order to share rhetorically salient meanings” (p. 67).
Further seminal requirements: a rhetorical model's "concern would be 
with how the dialogue within any given public sphere mounts appeals that 
lead participants to understand their interests and make prudent judgments"
(p. 53); and the requirement for common understanding: "Mutual dependency 
requires that communicative partners share a common reference world in 
which common understanding supplants warranted assent as the 
communicative norm for achieving reasonable mutual cooperation and 
toleration" (p. 55).
In sum: A rhetorical model would require openness in its focus on the 
lattice of spheres within the Public Sphere; accommodate society’s 
“multilogue” and view publics as emerging through discourse of engaged 
social actors; replace disinterestedness with “accommodation of conflicting 
interests” (p. 55); recognize that engagement in civic conversation includes 
“particular issues with specific interlocutors and audiences” (p. 55); realize 
that situation and audience specific “good reasons” are the operative basis for
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consensus, and that those reasons are based on a shared, common
reference world.
Finally, Hauser would
...argue for the Public Sphere as a nested domain of particularized 
arenas or multiple spheres populated by participants who, by adherence 
to standards of reasonableness reflected in the vernacular language of 
conversational communication, discover their interests, where they 
converge of differ, and how their differences might be accommodated, 
(p. 56)
The importance of Hauser's theory is central to any research that 
attempts to make apparent the ways in which real citizens are called by 
issues to render judgment. That Safehouse sponsors and supports seminars 
and brown bag lunches to educate the community about domestic violence 
might not be surprising. That there are increased numbers of women -- and 
m en- attending "Take Back the Night" rallies; that Safehouse is responding 
to the challenge of engaging the public by changing their message to one of 
"social justice" rather than merely "stop domestic violence"; to read editorials 
in the Boulder Daily Camera challenging the notion that Domestic Violence is 
a result of patriarchy: these are signs that a public, or publics, is at work, 
attempting to engage citizens in discourse and discussion around an issue of 
some importance to the citizenry.
On Salience and Stories: Narrative Analysis 
How does domestic violence attain, and retain, that salience which 
qualifies it as a public and not a private problem? One way is through an 
analysis of the rhetorically salient meanings that emerge from the public
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sphere. That is to say, how the exercise of issue ownership constructs the 
reality of domestic violence. How do feminists, activists, survivors, and 
Safehouse personnel use narratives to create persuasive moral appeals and 
rhetorically salient meaning as they continue to struggle to own the issue and 
reframe the face and voice of the victim(s) of battery?
You and I may be members of a discourse community concerned with 
domestic violence as it calls us to render judgment. Gusfield (1981) reminds 
us that we must believe the issue contains both cognitive and moral 
dimensions. We must believe that a problem exists, and is remediable, and 
we must believe it is of personal moral concern. If our common understanding 
involves primarily statistics and lists of victims, our resulting judgment would 
be influenced by our knowledge: We would, quite possibly, conclude that it is 
a serious issue, and that it appears to be remediable, through the actions of 
others. We have acceded to Gusfield’s facticity and remediability, a key two- 
thirds of his requirement for a problem to be perceived as public. We have 
not, however, necessarily concluded that there is any personal, moral 
imperative that involves us: it remains “somebody else’s” problem.
If, on the other hand, our common understanding involves "Pat, my 
next-door neighbor who was in an abusive relationship" or your cousin, Terry, 
"whose daughter was a good woman and was beaten by her partner," then 
our knowledge becomes personal, our good reasons impacted and influenced 
by the stories we tell and share. Domestic violence becomes not an abstract 
situation that happens "out there" to faceless and largely voiceless victims, it
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happens to people we know, people like us, people with whom we can 
identify. Our common understanding includes recognizable and identifiable 
persons.
As indicated, one way to increase understanding and identification is 
through the sharing of stories, or narratives. Narratives have been placed 
solidly in the realm of public moral deliberation (Fisher). Their importance to 
communities (Hauser) and individuals (Bruner) is well documented. Their 
ability to be appropriated is of importance to Ricoeur, as we shall see later in 
this chapter. But it is narratives as text, and narrative analysis of public 
discourse, that is central to this specific intellectual endeavor.
Stalin is reported to have said “A single death is a tragedy, a million 
deaths is a statistic.” How is the tragedy of the one, and the reality of the 
million, woven together to create a rhetorically salient, shared meaning, with 
the additional moral imperative required to call a public together? Fisher 
(1984) tells us of the importance of narratives in public moral arguments. He 
outlines the key criteria of narrative coherence (does it make sense?) and 
narrative fidelity (is it true to my experience of life?), which bear striking 
similarities to Gusfield’s call for facticity and moral dimensions. Narratives are 
offered as reasons for, remedies to, and constructions of reality.
While the structure of the narrative is undeniably important, and 
structural analysis of narratives has provided a wealth of insight into deep 
structures of meaning, motifs, themes, linguistic markers, and rich typologies,
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key to this analysis is not the structure of the narrative but the public moral 
arguments that they raise.
One feature is common across all analysis of narratives is: stories are 
emplotted. There is a teller of the tale. Part of this analysis is concerned with 
the speaker: who tells the story? Whose story is told? Is it a first-person tale 
of a victim of domestic violence? There is a difference between “I know 
someone named X who experienced violence...” and “My name is Chris and I 
am a victim...”
Another concern is where the story appears. This analysis, as 
aforementioned, is concerned with tales that have “made it” into the Public 
Sphere: narratives that are accessible to, or provided for, the greater public 
consumption; narratives held as examples, narratives that ask to be 
appropriated, narratives that give account and attempt to issue moral calls, or 
moral justifications, to an audience of strangers, in an attempt to form a 
public. The concern is with what narratives are available, and from what 
source, to the general citizen and potential member of a public.
Finally, this analysis is concerned with the good reasons offered for 
action — or inaction --- on the part of the speaker. Remember that, a la 
Hauser, good reasons now supplant universal rationality as the criteria for 
judgment in vernacular public spheres. As narratives are used to issue a 
moral clarion call, what reasons do they provide to move the audience to 
action?
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"Narrative analysis takes as its object of investigation the story itself" 
(Riessman, 1993, p. 1). Thus the first task will be to identify narratives. This 
rhetorically informed narrative analysis will examine the narrative as it 
presents good reasons for decisions; as it constructs a view of reality that it 
offers for appropriation by interlocutors; as it reflects the common 
understanding of publics and their members.
Narratives will then be analyzed with respect to the theories of publics 
outlined above, with particular attention to Gusfield’s issue ownership and 
Hauser’s vernacular discourse, and how the two interact in the continuing 
struggle to gain, maintain, and exercise control over the issue of domestic 
violence.
Narratives make arguments, invite identification, rhetorically attempt to 
create a world. Their examination allows us to expand our understanding of 
how a public works; how an issue is presented; how ownership, responsibility, 
and obligation are contested over and constructed.
On, and About, Narratives
Wallace Martin (1986) tells us that theory of narrative has replaced the 
theory of the novel. He traces the history of the study of the novel/narrative 
from the New Critics emphasis on form, to the early 20th century battles which 
raged between those who emphasized form and those who emphasized 
content and subject matter. Martin cites Booth’s Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) as 
key in arguing that the novel is “inevitably a ‘rhetorical’ form in that it involves 
communication from an implied author to an audience of readers...” (p. 22).
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Martin proceeds to outline major divisions and shifts in the study of
narratives. One key difference is the contrast between literary and
anthropological approaches to narrative, trends which still exist in the
literature today. Anthropologists study primarily oral tales: their research
question attempts to establish how stories across a culture or cultures are
similar, thus enabling them to come to conclusions about cultural values,
similarities and differences. Literary critics, and their linguistic counterparts,
attempt to discover how each story is unique. As Martin explains:
Rather than original, realistic stories fixed in print, the anthropologist 
encounters dozens of oral tales, many of them only slightly different from 
one another... In almost every respect, the questions the anthropologist 
must try to answer are the opposite of those posed by the literary critic: 
not “why is this story unique?” but “How and why is this to similar to 
others?”; not “what did this (identifiable) author mean?” but “what 
function does this (anonymous) collective myth serve when it is repeated 
on certain occasions?” For the critic, a single work is the locus of 
meaning.. (1986, p. 23)
French structuralists, including Barthes, Levi-Strauss, Bremond and 
Greimas were inspired by the anthropological approach. Heavily influenced 
by Vladamir Propp’s Morphology of the Folk-tale (1928), structuralists seek 
the deep structures and underlying thematic similarities they view as inherent 
in narratives. While Bakhtin rejected the “formalistic emphasis on literary 
technique at the expense of social and political factors in the study of the 
novel” (Martin, 1985, p. 25) he nonetheless represented an anthropologically 
influenced analysis of novels and narratives.
The literary critic, linguistic form of analysis remains a strong presence 
in 20th and 21st century analysis. It can be seen in the works of Bamberg and
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Marchman (1991); Barton (1985); Bestgen and Costermans (1994); Gee 
(1989); Kreitler and Kreitler (1986); Omanson (1982); Reiser, Black and 
Lehnert (1985); Stewart (1986); Young (1982) and any analysis which 
concentrates on the experience of a singular unit of discourse.
Martin (1986) highlights a most important shift in narrative theory:
... the shift from formally defined linguistic models to communication 
models. The linguist and the critic who imitates him begin from our 
knowledge of what a noun and a sentence (or character and story) are: 
what they seek is a scientifically rigorous description of such 
structures...Recent theories based on the communication model may 
treat the literary work as a rhetorical form that conveys meaning from 
implied author to reader (Wayne Booth’s approach) or study the literary 
and cultural conventions that shape literary perception... (p. 27).
A third key meta-view of narrative sees narrative, whether fairy tale, 
folk tale, novel or public moral discussion, as presenting arguments. This 
rhetorical view seeks neither to understand deep structures across cultures 
(although that may be part of a rhetorical analysis) nor does it seek solely to 
focus on the codas and sentence fragments which distinguish a particular 
story although, again, that may be part of a rhetorical analysis. When 
narratives are viewed from a rhetorical meta-perspective, they are seen as 
presenting arguments, as offering a worldview for acceptance by an 
audience, as being constitutive of reality, of society, of the individual.
Theorizing Narratives: Ricoeur and Bruner
Theorizing the importance of narrative is not a new occupation. 
Theorizing narrative as rhetorical became a significant intellectual enterprise 
beginning in the late 20th century (Fisher 1980, 1984, 1985). There are, 
however, few scholars who have created as rich a theorizing of the
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importance of narrative as Jean Paul Ricoeur (a partial cite includes Ricoeur 
1985, 1988, 1991, and 1995) and, after Ricoeur, Bruner (1987, 1990).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to trace, in any depth, the 
evolution of Ricoeur’s theory on narrative, a very brief look at this process 
begins with the move from a phenomenological to a hermeneutic viewpoint. 
As such, interpretation becomes essential to Ricoeur.
Ricoeur also goes into great depth in his presentation of the 
relationship of time and narrative: indeed, his three-volume set, so named, is 
a masterful representation of his beliefs. Key to understanding the centrality 
of narrative is an examination of Ricoeur’s perception of history and the 
essential historization of humans, an experience and reality that find 
actualization in narrative.
Narratives are, further, intrinsically and inescapably tied to 
relationships. As we are “thrown” into history, we are also thrown into 
relationships. Essential to an understanding of Ricoeur will be an 
examination of the ties between narratives and identity, empathy, and voice. 
On the Importance of Narratives
The idea of narratives as important is an intuitive one for perhaps 
every child who has grown up on the stories of daring deeds and historic 
actions, or spent lazy summer afternoons immersed in the worlds of science 
fiction or mythology -- or fairy tales. Narrative permeates our lives, from "fish 
tales" to accounts, to metanarratives about how we come to be and what we 
should strive to attain. Part of the problem may be the very pervasiveness of
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narratives: psychology, sociology, anthropology, classics, English, literature, 
fiction, drama, linguistics, cultural studies -- everyone has a theory -- 
sometimes two or three or a hundred --- about what a narrative is, what a 
narrative does, how narratives are, and how narratives should be; narratives 
upon narratives upon narratives about narratives.
And if one does decide to study the stories that we tell one another, the 
first finding is that -- despite its pervasiveness -- theorizing "narrative" is not 
simple. About all that many theorists can agree on is that narratives exist, 
and are powerful:
We seldom think about it, but we spend our lives immersed in narratives. 
Every day, we swim in a sea of stories and tales that we hear or read or 
listen to or see (or some combination of all of these), from our earliest 
days to our deaths. And our deaths are recorded in narratives, also -- 
for that’s what obituaries are. As Peter Brooks (1984) puts it; ‘Our lives 
are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with the stories that we tell, all 
of which are reworked in that story of our own lives that we narrate to 
ourselves...We are immersed in narrative’ (Berger, 1997, p.3).
Not only do we swim in a sea of narratives, we use them to navigate 
our world: Lewin (1994) states that "Because our life is in time, one of our 
fundamental forms of world-constitution is through composing narratives that 
emplot our activity in coherent stories that impart meaning and order to our 
ongoing experience of the world" (p. 35).
Beyond navigation, story/narratives allow us to build bridges to 
understanding another’s point of view: “Narratives are one way to study how 
people imagine life to be, for themselves and for others" (Brodkey, 1987, 
p.46), and "One studies stories not because they are true or even because 
they are false, but for the same reason that people tell and listen to them, in
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order to learn about the terms on which others make sense of their lives..." 
(p.47).
As one might suspect, anything that allows us to navigate and build is
a powerful tool indeed. Arguments have been forwarded (here by Bruner,
1987) that narratives may even be tied to the way we think:
But logical thought is not the only or even the most ubiquitous mode of 
thought... I have been looking at another kind of thought, one that is 
quite different in form from reasoning: the form of thought that goes into 
the constructing not of logical or inductive arguments but of stories or 
narratives. What I want to do now is to extend these ideas about 
narrative to the analysis of the stories we tell about our lives: our 
"autobiographies" (p. 11).
Moreover, Burner instructs that the
... memesis between life so-called and narrative is a two-way affair: that 
is to say, just as art imitates life in Aristotle’s sense, so, in Oscar Wilde’s, 
life imitates art. Narrative imitates life, life imitates narrative. ’Life’ in this 
sense is the same kind of construction of the human imagination as ’a 
narrative’ is. It is constructed by human beings through active 
ratiocination, by the same kind of rationcination through which we 
construct narratives. When someone tells you his [sic] life... it is always 
a cognitive achievement rather than a through-the-clear-crystal recital of 
something univocally given. In the end, it is a narrative achievement (p. 
13).
Further:
I believe that the ways of telling and the ways of conceptualizing that go 
with them become so habitual that they finally become recipes for 
structuring experience itself, for laying down routes into memory, for not 
only guiding the life narrative up to the present, but directing it into the 
future. I have argued that a life as led is inseparable from a life as told... 
a life is not ’how it was’ but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told 
and retold (p. 31).
Thus narrative is not only the sea in which we swim, but the very way 
we view that sea, make sense of it, explain it to others. Naturally, any tool
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this powerful is open to challenge, to manipulation, to exploitation, and stories 
are indeed powerful.
Stories create: In “Family narrative as political activity” (Ochs & Taylor, 
1992), the “work examines how the family is constituted as a political 
institution through conversational interaction” (p. 301), in this case, the stories 
families tell around the dinner table.
Stories implement power in the school room:
...the anti narrative bias can also be traced to issues of classroom 
power. Rosen (1984) suspects that narrative discourse may be 
devalued largely because they are of such common currency: While 
everyone comes to the classroom with a gaggle of stories to tell, 
narrative is discouraged among the masses, leaving only one 'chief and 
privileged story-teller' -  the teacher (p. 18). Hymes (1980) argues that, 
given narrative's status as a perfectly acceptable mode of pursuing and 
expressing knowledge among co-members of a group, this suppression 
of students' story telling must be seen as an indication of their lesser 
status within the school community. The traditional dichotomy of 
technical/formal versus narrative language thus finds its roots in social 
stratification rather than solid evidence from cognitive psychology...[It 
becomes a] hegemony of exposition (DiPardo, 1990, p.86).
For those who are in a position to control the stories, narratives
themselves are instruments of power:
Stories are narrative devices which do not exist independently of the 
ideological meaning formations and power relations within which they 
are structured. They are produced by and reproduce these relations, 
helping to position subjects within the historical and institutional context 
of the material conditions of existence . . .  In other words, narratives 
punctuate and sequence events in such a way as to privilege a certain 
reading of the world... (Mumby, 1987, pp. 125 - 126).
Thus we can see that, beyond the theoretical underpinnings, the 
"hows" and the "whys", the one connecting and unbroken thread is that
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narratives are important. Stories are central to what it means to be human, 
and stories are fundamentally a discursive, creative, communicative act.
That given, how can we look at narrative theory in a way that makes 
sense of all the "Narrative is this" and "Narrative does that" assertions, 
assumptions and arguments? Ricoeur’s theory of narrative has much to offer. 
The purpose of this paper is NOT to present an in-depth theoretical analysis 
of Ricoeur’s incredible(ly large) corpus of philosophy. It has a far less lofty 
ambition: to appropriate from Ricoeur three key concepts: appropriation, 
distanciation, and narrative identity. These become tools for sharing meaning 
across and through differences, and for looking at narratives constructed in 
the real world, narratives dealing with domestic violence, told by or about 
current or former victims, and by entities engaged in struggles to “own” public 
issues.
Ricoeur and Narrative
Ricoeur is a hermeneutist: his concern is with interpretation, and 
ultimately, how hermeneutics informs our knowledge of what it means to be 
human, and how narrative (in)forms what we know to be real. Narratives are, 
in effect, our connection/reflection of our own historicity on many levels: from 
the grand history that we call "History," to the stories of a culture, to the 
stories we tell of ourselves and our lives -- our individual placement in 
relationship to the world, others, and our past. Historicity is important 
because it "signifies the fundamental and radical fact that we make history,
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that we are immersed in history, that we are historical beings"(Ricoeur, in 
Thompson, p. 274).
Ricoeur’s concern with historicity underlies his three-volume work
discussing the relation between narrative and time. More important for the
argument of this project, however are Ricouer’s uses of narrative, as informed
by his philosophy, for executing hermeneutic analysis. Appropriation,
distanciation and narrative identity inform and create Ricoeur's methodology,
and are central to his theory of narrative. In brief, narratives are examples of
both text and discourse; narratives, as authored communications, form a text.
The objectification of discourse in a structured work [text] does not 
abolish the first and fundamental feature of discourse, namely that it is 
constituted by a series of sentences whereby someone says something 
to someone about something (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, p. 138)
The text-as-discourse is addressed, referential, and purposive.
Ricoeur spends a great deal of time theorizing historical truth and narrative 
fiction in terms of "the text." Ricoeur does not differentiate between historical 
and fictive narratives: both have the same structural features, both are subject 
to the same interpretive regime. Thus the three interpretive categories of 
appropriation, distanciation and narrative identity are as appropriate for the 
analysis of historical narratives as imagined ones. On Ricoeur’s grounds, 
then, the stories of those who have been subjected to domestic abuse are 
texts open to analysis via the analytic categories of his theory.
As indicated above, Ricoeur posits two essential steps to 
understanding the text (sharing the world/view of the author): distanciation 
and appropriation. By distanciation Ricoeur refers to the act of incorporating
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and concerning distance in communication, especially between author and
text, text and original audience, and reader/audience and reference world of
the author. In Ricoeur’s view, the
text is much more than a particular case of intersubjective 
communication: it is the paradigm of distanciation in communication. As 
such, it displays a fundamental characteristic of the very historicity of 
human experience, namely that it is communication in and through 
distance (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, p. 131)
Further,
distanciation is not the product of the methodology and hence 
something superfluous and parasitical; rather it is constitutive of the 
phenomenon of the text as writing. At the same time, it is the condition 
of interpretation (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, p. 140).
Thompson describes four principle forms of distanciation. The first 
involves the surpassing of the event of saying by the inscription of meaning 
in writing. The second form concerns the relationship between that inscribed 
expression and the original author. Thirdly, distanciation exists between the 
inscribed expression -  the written text -  and the original audience, for “written 
discourse is addressed to an unknown audience and potentially anyone who 
can read” (Thompson, 1992, p. 15). Finally, distanciation encompasses the 
“emancipation” of the text as it moves to a referential dimension of a different 
order “a dimension which is unfolded in the process of interpretation” (p. 15).
In sum, distanciation is a recognition of the reality of communication: 
that communicators -- in this case, author and reader, both active participants 
in discourse -- are separated, temporally, experientially, and in terms of the 
historicized world/view they inhabit. This distance makes possible the act of 
interpretation, the act of sharing/understanding a(n)other world/view.
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Distanciation is a function of our being as communicators in the reality of 
space/time: if we were not distanciated by space, time, and our 
historicity/worldview, there would be no need for interpretation, since we 
would be occupying the same space/time/historicity and worldview. We can 
only communicate because we ARE distanced.
The counterpart to distanciation is appropriation:
... appropriation is dialectically linked to the distanciation characteristic 
of writing [it is parallel to the distance between communicators, 
represented in the separation between author and w o rk ]. Distanciation 
is not abolished by appropriation, but is rather the counterpart of it. 
Thanks to distanciation [in this case, by writing, or the creation of a 
appropriation no longer has any trace of affective affinity with the 
intention of the author [we are not required to second-guess and 
psychologize the intention of the a]. Appropriation is quite the 
contrary of contemporaneousness and congeniality: it is understanding 
at and through distance" (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, p. 143) [italics 
and explication mine]
Further:
Ultimately what I appropriate is a proposed world. The latter is not
behind the text, as a hidden intention would be, but in front of it, as that 
which the work unfolds, discovers, reveals. Henceforth, to understand is 
to understand oneself in front of the text... It is not a question of 
imposing upon the text our finite capacity of understanding, but of 
exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged self, 
which would be the proposed existence corresponding in the most 
suitable way to the proposed world. So understanding is quite different 
from a constitution of which the subject would possess the key. In this 
respect, it would be more correct to say that the self is constituted by the 
'matter' of the text (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, p. 143) [italics Ricoeur's]
Appropriation is a matter of textual interpretation and understanding, 
but, even more, appropriation is that which allows us to engage in the process 
of expanding our own narrative, of self-interpretation, of increasing our 
understanding of our own condition. In sharing the world/view, we come to
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know the "other". We come to appreciate other modes, other ways of being: 
"... appropriation is the process by which the revelation of new modes of 
being ... gives the subject new capacities for knowing himself [sic]” (Ricoeur, 
in Thompson, 1992, p.192).
Ricoeur links this understanding of self to understanding of the other:
"It is always through some transfer from Same to Other, in empathy and
imagination, that the Other that is foreign is brought closer" (Ricoeur, 1988,
p.184). We bring this Other closer in the act of appropriation:
By 'appropriation', I understand this: that the interpretation of a text 
culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth 
understands himself [sic] better, understands himself [sic] differently, or 
simply begins to understand himself [sic]. (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, 
p. 158).
Appropriation has an additional, important feature: "One of the aims 
of all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance...In this sense, 
interpretation [through appropriation] 'brings together', equalizes', renders 
'contemporary and similar', thus genuinely making one's own what was 
initially alien." (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, p. 159)
Thus, appropriation enables us to enlarge ourselves, to bring together 
our individual world/view, our individual narrative, with that of a(n)other. 
Through appropriation -  and its counterpart, distanciation we recognize
and acknowledge the distance separating us, but have the means for 
narrowing that distance, for interpreting, understanding, and enlarging our 
own world/view and narrative through Ricoeur's methodology. “To understand 
is not to project oneself into the world of the text; it is to receive an enlarged
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self from the apprehension of proposed worlds which are the genuine object
of interpretation” (Ricoeur, in Thompson, 1992, p. 182)
This is especially important when the key characters are people
considered somehow distasteful and/or marginalized: for example, stories told
wherein the main character is a victim of domestic violence. If there is ever to
be understanding of socially ostracized or undervalued "others", it is Ricoeur's
appropriation and distanciation that will enable and facilitate that learning.
The final piece I am "appropriating" from Ricoeur is the concept of
narrative identity. At its simplest, narrative identity refers to the act of
knowing ourselves from the narratives we tell: "We equate life to the story or
stories we tell about it. The act of telling or narrating appears to be the key to
the type of connectedness that we evoke when we speak, with Dilthey, of the
'interconnectedness of life'" (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 77).
Through the stories we tell, through the act of narrativization we
engage in when we create (or the act of appropriation across distance we
participate in when we read) a story, through these discursive,
communicative, dialogic actions, we come to learn of ourselves and of others,
of our reality and the reality of others. The path to self-knowledge and
understanding -  the way we create and re-create our identity -- is through
narration and the narrative:
The notion of a history or narrative seems to be necessary in order to 
make sense of the notion of 'self; for we make sense -  or fail to make 
sense -  of our lives by the kind of story we can -- or cannot -  tell about 
it (Dunne, 1995, p. 146)
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This narrative identity -- our creation and re-creation of our self through 
the stories we tell about ourselves, or the creation and re-creation of the 
characters in the stories/worldviews we appropriate and are appropriated by - 
is a discursively constructed, changing, yet essential aspect of our humanity: 
“The identity of human subjects (individual or collective) is recognized as a 
perpetual task of reinterpretation in the light of stories we tell ourselves and 
others” (Kearney, 1995, p. 181). Consequently, and significantly, "... we 
cannot understand what we do (or what happens to us) apart from our ability 
to tell stories about it" (Pellauer, 1991, p.59).
We change our view of ourselves -  our constructed-in-narrative 
identity -- as we appropriate the world/views of others and grow in 
understanding. Dunne (1995) asserts that as we appropriate narratives, as 
we come to a new understanding, we change: “the new understanding... to a 
considerable extent is constitutive of us, is what we are. The stories we tell 
ourselves make a difference” (p. 152).
The stories that we tell, then, like ourselves, are historicized: they are
interlocking, woven like a tapestry, into our historical/historicized world.
Further, as we read and appropriate the stories of a (particular) other, we
engage in a particular dance: we appropriate, and distanciate, and as we do
so, we enlarge ourselves, perhaps changing our own narrative as we accept -
- or reject -  the narrative offering of another:
The narrative self is a product of the stories we tell about ourselves and 
one another from within a living tradition, manifested in a particular 
historical present, where a narrator and reader configure and refigure 
these narratives by intervening with the power to speak, hear, tell, record
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and recount... For the narrative self of Ricoeur meaning is always 
emergent as we learn to be the narrator of our life stories (Muldoon, 
1991, p.264)
This is of critical importance as we attempt to study how narratives 
become accepted and adopted by others: as we accept the narratives of 
others, we change. In sharing our/their narratives, we mutually influence 
each other. This acceptance of another’s story, this appropriation of their 
narrative and worldview, is practical persuasion in action: it is the act of 
becoming consubstantial with that Burke theorized.
Finally, for the purposes of analysis, narratives are not fixed, nor is the 
narrative sense of self: "Narrative identity is something which perpetually 
makes and unmakes itself" (Kearney, 1995, p.183). As our stories change, 
our (view of our) self "changes," thus allowing, again, for the view of 
ourselves as "subjects in process". This has important consequences, 
philosophically and practically, both for victim/survivors of domestic violence, 
and for an audience which reads/hears their stories: Ricoeur, theoretically 
and methodologically, focuses on, and seems to revel in, change. While each 
individual story might -  indeed must -- have some form of beginning, middle 
and end, the ability of the reader to appropriate and distanciate -- and 
change as a result of those actions (by changing his/her own identity) -- 
means that writing, analyzing, and disseminating the stories of 
victim/survivors allows for, not only increased understanding of each, but, 
more profoundly, the possibility that both may read, and in the reading, grow 
and change. That is indeed a powerful and empowering potential.
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It is at this point, the intersection of narratives, power, and voice, that 
feminist theory, and feminist organizations, become important to this project.
Concerning Feminist Theory and Feminist Organizations
Although a feminist critique of Habermas has already been presented,
and feminist concerns with power imbalances are well documented and will
be further discussed in the evolution of domestic violence as a public issue,
the notions of voice, representation, and feminist organizations intersect in
the public performance of Boulder County Safehouse. In addition to
providing a public forum for victim/survivor voices in the city and county of
Boulder, and the state of Colorado, Safehouse also has an organizational
voice. For further discussions of feminist organizations, see Ashcraft (1998,
2004), Ferrere and Martin (1995), Marshall (1993), Mogen (1994), Rodriguez
(1988), Acker (1990), Buzzanell (1994), Calas and Smirchich (1992), Clair
(1993, 1994), Dervin (1987), Ferraro (1981), Fraser and Nicholson (1988),
Maguire and Mohtar (1994), Martin (1990), Mills and Chiaramonte (1991),
Natalie, Papa, and Graham (1994), Steeves (1988), Taylor and Conrad
(1992) and Wood (1988, 1992).
Key to understanding feminist organizations is that they are inherently
and unashamedly ideological and political cites. Mansbridge tells us that:
The organizational imperatives of the feminist movement and the ways it 
works with the state, with other progressive movements and with men 
differs in every contrry and evey locale. Strategies differ by widely 
varying shades of class, ethnicity, sexual preference, religion and past 
experience. The only thing we can expect to unite feminists across 
these differences is internal accountability to a discursively created, self­
transforming, internally contested feminist movement (in Ferree and 
Martin, p. 32).
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Reinelt, in her “Moving onto the Terrain of the State: The Battered 
Women’s Movement and the Politics of Engagement” refers to the “politics of 
engagement” as
...based on a belief that long-term social change depends on mobilizing 
and educating women in their communities by creating autonomous 
institutions, and on establishing relationships and structures of 
communication with those who work in and set policy for mainstream 
institutions, (in Ferree and Martin, p.85)
Clearly, Boulder County Safehouse’s vigorous and active outreach, 
education, and support services, exemplify this effort.
Reinelt also asserts that “Radical feminist ideology profoundly 
influenced the politics and practices of many early shelters. It defined violence 
against women not as a personal or family issue but as a political issue”(p.
88).
As we shall see in Chapter 4, it was the radical feminist and grassroots 
movement that heavily contested for control of the issue of domestic violence 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, this challenge resembled, indeed still 
resembles, what Katzenstein (in Ferree and Martin,) has described as a 
discursive politic:
Discursive politics requires greater elucidation. Most succinctly, it is the 
politics of meaning-making. It is discursive in that it seeks to reinterpret, 
reformulate, rethink, and rewrite the norms and practices of society and 
the state. It is about cognition. Its premise is that conceptual changes 
directly bear upon material ones. Discursive politics relies heavily but 
not exclusively on language. Its vehicle is both speech and print — 
conversations, debate, conferences, essays, stories, newsletters and 
books, (p. 35)
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Again, Safehouse exemplifies these vernacular, discursive attempts to
frame the issue. Moreover, its current actions, as we will examine further in
Chapter Six, reveal its radical roots, as exemplified in Arnold’s description:
The more radical activists advocated fundamental change in the social 
and material conditions that support male domination andviolence 
against women. They held that battered women’s movement programs 
should foster alternative feminist communities based on grass-roots, 
self-help activity, both to challenge existing social relations of power and 
to enable women’s own self-empowerment and autonomy. The radicals 
articulated multiple demands, including not only improved services for 
battered women but also economic equality for all women and an end to 
the racism , anti-Semitism, and homophobia from which women suffer. 
As part of this broad-based program to improve the condition of all 
women, the radicals advocated and actively sought alliances with other 
dispossessed social movement groups (in Ferrer and Martin, p. 279).
In Chapter Six we will see how Boulder County Safehouse initiates
dialog and attempts to extend ownership to the issue of social justice which
includes active resistance to other social injustices including, but not limited
to, racism, heterosexism, ableism, ageism, ethnocentrism, discrimination
against “illegal” aliens, and class discrimination. Their voice as advocate
attempts to create discursive space for a majority of society’s victims,
extending beyond the parameters of domestic battery.
Summary and Conclusion 
This dissertation, then, stands at the intersection of rhetoric, publics, 
feminist and narrative theory. It is informed by the insights of Bruner, Fraser, 
Gusfield, Hauser, Ricoeur, and diverse feminist organizational scholars. The 
employment of the various perspectives allows for a rich view of the ways 
narratives are used to provide voice, create identification, call a public, 
present arguments, and, ultimately, establish ownership of the contested
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issue of domestic violence as it is constructed, and reconstructed, in the 
forum of publics and public opinion.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRESENTING THE “PURE VICTIM”
Introduction
Rhetoricians, and other observers, view the formation of public issues 
and publics as contentious. While it may seem simpleminded and redundant 
to speak of the journey from private to public problem as long and difficult, 
what does hold interest is the development of the issue: what are divisions 
which occurred as claimants fought to establish the issue and “own” it? To 
that end, this chapter will look at the beginnings of the domestic violence (or 
“battered women’s”) movement; those parties who clearly fought for control of 
the issue; attempts to socially construct the “victim” and assign responsibility 
and blame. For that we will rely heavily on Gusfield. We will also look at an 
artifact, an Oscar winning documentary, which debuted in 1994, but is still 
widely used by Safehouse and shelters as an educational tool that presents 
domestic violence to new publics: to those who seek information. Finally, we 
will examine the tactics used to call a public into being around the issue of 
domestic violence: the ways women’s stories construct “good reasons” for 
acceptance and action.
A Historical Retrospective of Issue Definition and Ownership
As previously mentioned, concerns over the presence and 
consequences of domestic violence arose out of the 1960s and 70s women’s 
movement and consciousness raising. These were the first groups to name
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the issue, and the issue continues to be viewed by many as a women’s or 
feminist concern. Part of the action that followed -  making the personal 
political? -- was to establish shelters. The earliest shelters were staffed by 
volunteers, and funded by donations. Much of the “counseling” which took 
place was peer counseling: by women who had been abused, or who were 
members of the women's movement particularly supportive of battered 
women. The goal was “empowerment” -  allowing and encouraging women to 
free themselves from their abuser and the abusive situation. In many 
analyses, this group and time is referred to as the “grassroots” movement.
In short order, the need for services soon outgrew the volunteers and 
donations available. More light was being shed upon the problem, and public 
involvement required public accountability. Davies (1998) states: “The 
tensions between the volume and complexity of battered women’s needs and 
available institutional responses have also highlighted debates and conflicts 
among advocates and other practitioners that have existed since the 
beginning of the battered women’s movement” (p. 11). As supporters turned 
to local governments and organizations for funding sources, requirements for 
fiscal accountability, along with the concurrent bureaucratic rules, often saw 
“trained” staff replace volunteers. The “trained” staff members were 
frequently social workers, counselors, and mental health professionals. These 
individuals brought different insights, expectations, and theoretical 
perspectives into the shelters and the movement. Of more critical importance
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is that they had a different picture of the victim, and different explanations of 
causality for domestic violence. The contest for ownership had begun.
Of Grassroots and Professionals
Davies describes the split in the movement as between “grassroots,”
and “professionals”:
The grassroots approach emphasized supportive, “empowering” 
responses offered by counselors or advocates who saw themselves as 
the battered woman’s peers. The professional approach was closer to a 
familiar, office-based, individual counseling or therapy model; it was 
often seen by advocates as more judgmental and less egalitarian than 
the grassroots approach. (1998, p. 13)
An immediate consequence of the struggle for control could be seen in 
the impact on the individual battered woman, as those who viewed domestic 
violence as relational dysfunction often called the battered woman to 
account: ” ...a woman’s decision to remain in the relationship with her abuser 
was often regarded, particularly by professionals, as an indication that she 
was unable to make decisions in her own interest” (Davies, p. 14). In these 
lights, not only is a woman abused, she may be subtly complicit in her own 
victimization. Further, and of critical importance to battered mothers, she 
might also be judged mentally incapable of making decisions to benefit 
herself, and thus deemed unfit to care for her children.
The importance of this division, and the ramifications of the outcome 
as both parties attempt to control the issue, cannot be understated, for the 
division echoes still-contentious efforts to control the issue and assign 
responsibility. Even in 2003, there are those who argue that domestic 
violence is a function of interpersonal relational dynamics and dysfunctions,
119
thus locating responsibility for solution in the individual and his/her 
relationship, in counseling and under the assumption of individual 
responsibility. Others, and this includes feminists and supporters of the 
battered women’s movement, argue that the cause is societal, often labeled 
“patriarchy” and that the problem needs to be confronted and remedied on a 
societal level -  it is a public problem. Clearly the locus of the problem is 
critical to the remediation required.
In the society of the 1970s and 80s, when shelters were being formed 
and advocates were demanding action, the “sides” that fought for control of 
the issue were becoming more clearly drawn. On one “side” were the 
empathic volunteers and peer counselors, most of them drawn from the 
women’s movement and, as a result, at least partially politically motivated. 
Their claim, of societal cause and thus societal remediation, defines the issue 
as a public problem. On the other “side” were mental health professionals, 
social workers, and administrators, whose causal attribution was personal 
dysfunction, and whose remediation was firmly lodged in the private realm: 
individual counseling and personal responsibility.
While the volunteers had passion and commitment and belief on their 
side, the professionals had credibility, visibility, status, and the advantage in 
that they were already part of the system: they were the people who made the 
diagnoses that counted, who could refer, who could speak with authority on 
funding matters. While both groups rightfully focused on the severity of the
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issue and the need for treatment, the “winner” would shape the issue in the 
court of public opinion.
The clinical/professional interpretations of the issue gained traction as
the issue commanded more public attention:
Shelter programs relied on dedicated volunteers and staff who did not 
demand large salaries for their work. Most operated from self-help, peer 
support models of intervention. From the beginning of the work with 
battered women, however, approaches espoused by more 
therapeutically oriented professionals were also advocated. As time went 
on, these clinical understandings of battered women’s behavior and 
decision making gained popularity both within and outside the 
movement. (Davies, 1998, p. 14)
Schecter (1982, in Davies, 1998), provides examples of the
development of the “mentally ill” victim:
In approaching funders and community groups, activists encountered 
charitable and professional values that emphasized helping the “needy” 
and often unwittingly assigned to women the permanent status of 
helpless “victim.” The pervasive influence of psychological explanations 
for social problems was seen as funding agency after funding agency 
defined battered women as a mental health issue, (p. 15).
At this point, advocates had to aggressively attempt to take control of the
issue:
... advocates needed to focus some of their energies on convincing the 
public and policymakers that battering was a serious problem that 
affected many women from all walks of life. Supportive resources were 
limited; policies did not recognize that battering was a social, not 
individual “family” problem; and popular understandings often cast 
battered women as masochists who “asked” for the violence they 
experienced. Advocates needed to construct a public image of “the 
battered woman” who was more sympathetic. (Davies, 1998, p. 15).
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The Rhetorical Construction of the “Battered Woman”
With growing public awareness of the issue of battered women, and 
with public attribution focusing on mental illness as a cause, it became 
imperative that battered women not be blamed for their victim status. Mental 
illness was, and remains, a social stigmatization. Chief in importance for 
many of the women was the very real concern that, as both “victim” and 
“mentally ill”they would far more likely be judged unfit to raise their children, 
and for many women concern for their children was, and remains, a reason 
for leaving an abusive relationship. Davies tells us that, “As part of their 
effort to generate broad-based support, advocates publicly emphasized a 
model of battered women as ‘pure victims’” (1998, p. 15).
Of central importance here is that there was “public emphasis” on a 
model of battered women, a model designed to construct the women in a 
particular way: not just as “victims” (because, after all, the mentally ill can also 
be “victims” but not necessarily sympathetic ones), but as “pure victims,” as 
victims who are somehow blameless in their victimization. The model has 
four parts, as presented in Davies (1998). We will examine each in terms of 
the rhetorical exigence to which each attempts to respond.
While violence is traditional and socially acceptable “only” in response 
to physical threat and injury, violent actions performed by women are 
arguably less commonplace and/or acceptable, and a mother who murders 
the father of her children might widely be held to be “crazy.” To answer that 
charge, and assert that the woman is indeed sane, not the “mentally ill” 
designation assigned by health-care professionals, Davies tells us that the 
model holds “First, abused women are not themselves violent, unless driven 
to violence in self-defense” (1998, p. 15). Thus, the woman is acting sanely,
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to protect herself, and not irrationally, or in response to imaginary slights: She 
is sane.
Another question presents itself: what justifies her violence? Does one 
“mistake” on the part of the husband allow women carte blanche to perpetrate 
violence? Again, the “pure victim” model answers that question as it asserts 
that women have experienced repeated, gross physical violence, as well as 
emotional abuse. Davies cites the model: “Second, battered women are 
characterized as having experienced extreme physical violence separated by 
periods of emotional abuse” (1998, p. 15). The “pure victim” not only acts in 
legitimate self defense, but she has been subjected to intense abuse, both 
emotional and physical. She is sane, although she has suffered beyond 
“normal” experiences.
Still another question presents itself: why couldn’t the couple just work 
it out? Isn’t it, after all, just between intimate partners? Proponents of the 
model point out that “[Thirdly] the abuse is presented as a pattern of events 
that necessarily increase in severity and frequency, and that will only get 
worse unless someone intervenes” (Davies, 1998, p. 15). Lenore Walker 
(1979, 1984) widely cited as an authority on Battered Women’s Syndrome 
and expert on the “Cycle of Violence” has argued repeatedly from her 
research that barring intervention, violence escalates, often to the point of the 
abuser killing the abused. Moreover, intervention must usually be on the part 
of police and the courts, as marital counseling is seldom successful once 
physical battering has begun. Thus the assertion is made that there is an 
inevitability about the (escalating) violence, that the woman herself is 
incapable of stopping it; it requires third-party intervention. The inevitability of 
escalation and the requirement of intervention once again serve to assert that 
there is nothing the woman herself could have done. Any rational human in 
this situation would face the same results. It is not that she is insane, just a 
victim.
One final commonly asked question remains: well, didn’t she ask for it? 
If she doesn’t somehow enjoy the situation, why does she stay? Since
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physical violence and emotional abuse are involved, most would agree that 
any woman who “enjoyed” the situation could be labeled as mentally ill. 
Perhaps to counter this charge, Davies reveals the fourth and final 
component of the “pure victim model;” “Finally, battered women are described 
as terrified by this experience” (1998, p. 15). Thus it is their terror, not their 
mental incompetence or desire for suffering, that keeps them in the situation.
In sum, the “pure victim” model was a public presentation, on the part 
of the grassroots activists, to gain and maintain control of the issue of 
domestic abuse. Specifically, there was a public attempt to rhetorically 
construct the battered woman as a “pure victim” who was neither insane nor 
complicit in her victimization. Rather, she is a woman who engages in 
violence only in self-defense; one who has experienced severe physical 
battery and emotional abuse; who cannot break free of the cycle of inevitably 
escalating violence without outside intervention; and one who is terrorized by 
the life she lives with her abuser.
A documentary film, which premiered in 1993, provides an excellent
example of the presentation of victims of domestic violence who meet the 
model's criteria and presents graphic public evidence of "pure victims." The 
video is still used, in 2004, by Boulder County Safehouse, in educational 
outreach presentations.
The “Pure Victim” Enacted: Defending Our Lives as Text
In 1994, a 42-minute video won the Academy Award for documentary. 
The movie was titled Defending Our Lives. It is about battered women, and 
the state of domestic violence in America. The focus is on the state of 
Massachusetts, and the voices of six women, five of whom provide narrative 
accounts of their experiences and actions, the sixth serves to read a list, or 
chronicle, of murdered victims. From narratives provided by the five, the
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viewer can appropriate "good reasons" offered for accepting victims’ view of 
the issue and its consequences.
The documentary itself consists of three “threads.” The first thread
begins with the opening credits: A woman’s voice narrates a series of black
and white photos of beaten women. We later learn that the narrator is Sarah
Buel, “Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County Domestic Violence Unit.”
She is presenting data and information to an audience at Harvard Law
School. Ms. Buel provides expert testimony, as she is the primary source for
statistics, education, and organizational credibility in the film. She also tells
stories. Her chilling opening speech sets the mood for the film:
They are punched, kicked, they are beaten while trying to hold on to 
their babies. They are strangled, choked, burned with cigarettes; doused 
with kerosene and lighter fluid and set on fire. They are run over by cars 
and trucks, they have their teeth knocked out with hammers, they are 
raped with hot curling irons and large objects; they are stabbed with 
everything from knives to ice picks to screwdrivers -anything that 
penetrates. They are forced to watch the torture of their family 
members; their children are forced to watch their assault and torture, 
and they’re often tied up and forced to watch the torture and molestation 
of their own children. Am I describing atrocities committed in some 
foreign country? By soldiers in a country at war? Am I describing 
atrocities about which Amnesty International and other human rights 
organizations are writing to you and pleading for money? I’m describing 
domestic violence as it occurs in America. Yes, there is a war against 
women and children in this country.
After the opening credits, we are introduced to a woman who 
personifies the second thread. Meekah Scott, credited with being a 
“Community Educator, Battered Women Fighting Back!” is speaking to an 
audience in the “Battered Women and Self-Defense Conference” at Harvard 
Law School. Scott is a black woman, dressed somewhat informally in what
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looks to be a sweat suit. She reading a chronological lists of names and 
dates: “January 7, Lana Gilbert...February 13, Regina McGee...”
Interspersed with her naming of the victim, and the circumstances of her 
death, are videos of police and ambulances, of men being lead away in 
handcuffs, of bodybags being removed from houses. Scott tells no stories: 
she simply lists victims, perpetrators, and sometimes details of the crime. 
Scott appears four times, and hers is the last voice we hear before the closing 
credits.
The third thread is the most obviously narrative as we meet four 
women, two black and two white. They tell us stories of their abusive 
relationships. They are neither strikingly beautiful nor ugly. They appear 
well-groomed, and are, for the most part, soft-spoken. Each woman is 
apparently speaking from a different room: none of the women are shown 
together, the camera focuses on their faces as they relate their narratives. 
Their names are Patty Hennessey, Shannon Booker, Eugenia Moore, and 
Lisa Grimshaw. The audience learns, near the end of the film, that all four 
women are in prison in the state of Massachusetts, for the murder of their 
abuser. What follows are successions of stories from each of the four 
women: how she met her abusive partner; the progression of the relationship; 
the beginning and scope of the abuse suffered; her attempts to respond to the 
violence, including actively seeking intervention from police; the eventual 
murder of her abuser; the legal ramifications, including the sentence handed
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to each woman by the Massachusetts court system; and finally what "society" 
should learn from her tale.
The documentary has two motifs; the first is the interweaving of the 
threads: narrative, list, statistics; narratives, list, statistics; narratives, list. The 
second is the focus on first-person narrative accounts offered by victims who 
survived the abuse. The stories offered by the four women, and later by Buel, 
provide a picture of the reality of domestic violence that serves to present the 
victims as suffering but sane, and at the same time, offer universally 
understandable good reasons for their behavior, reasons that are still 
advanced today by Safehouse volunteers. They also, through the prisoner’s 
stories and Buel’s ethos, are a clear attempt to claim ownership and assign 
political responsibility. Finally, from beginning narrative through concluding 
silent presentation of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the 
metaphor of war -  war on women and children, women as prisoners, thus 
women as prisoners of war -  is an awesome rhetorical construction.
The interspersing of the four women's tales is masterfully contrasted 
with Scott's matter-of-fact listing of dates and victims, with corresponding 
crime scene coverage. Buel is the uber-weaver as she provides the perfect 
link between Scott's lists and the stories of the women. At some point, we 
become aware that the four women are indeed in prison for the murder of 
their abusers. We are not given that information at the beginning. Scott's 
credentials are present, as are Buel's, but the women's stories speak for 
them.
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Asserting Claims and Ownership: The Pure Victim
Remembering the model Davies provided, as constructed and 
publicized by grassroots advocates, and its list of four characteristics of the 
pure victim, it is immediately apparent that the four prisoners, and to some 
extent Buel, are almost made-to-order examples of pure victims. Criteria one 
is that abused women are not themselves violent, unless driven to violence in 
self-defense. Each woman’s story makes clear that violence was her last 
choice. Each had attempted to leave, sometimes successfully, but the abuse 
continued until she fought back, defending her life.
Shannon shares the battery she experienced at the hands of her abuser:
Jose used to punch me. He would stomp me, drag me, drag me to the 
point where the meat in my knees was dug out of my kneecaps. He 
would beat me with billy-clubs, any type of object that he could put his 
hands on he would beat me with. And it didn’t matter where it was, he 
would beat me...
She continues the description and offers a “good reason” that she 
tolerated the violence: “...so I never thought of turning him in because from 
my background, I come from an abusive background I’ve always thought it 
was OK for me to accept this type of abuse, you know, as a child.” Thus 
Shannon is not only a victim, but one who was predisposed, because of her 
childhood experiences, to expect that kind of treatment as “normal.”
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Eugenia similarly reveals examples of abuse at the hands of her 
abuser:
When I told him that he couldn’t ride, all of a sudden he was standing 
over me, looking down, talking and he spit in my face. And I took and I 
wiped, and I said “Look what you doing --why are you always doing this 
to me?” And so after this, after I wiped that off, I got ready to stand up 
because he was hitting me again, and that’s when I tried to grab him. I 
tried to grab him and bring him to me, that’s when he took and he 
punched me in my stomach...
Eugenia continues, immediately offering evidence that she could not 
have stopped the violence herself: “I mean there was like five or six of us 
trying to hold him: he was wild, all over the place, throwing blows at people: 
they were ducking they couldn’t hold him.”
Patty graphically describes the last time she was abused by her then-
husband, prior to leaving him:
So I just gathered myself together and I ran, kept running to my mother’s 
house, and I finally got up the driveway and he was right behind me. And 
I got in the house and I shut the door and I just slid down the door and 
my mother was in the standing in the kitchen and she started screaming.
I guess there was blood all over the wall -  all over the door, I had blood 
all over my face from goin’ through the bushes and stuff and him hitting 
me.
The story continues with Patty offering her own “good reasons” for 
leaving: “I never went back after that. That was the last night. When it came to 
he almost killed my son, too, I just couldn’t deal with that. For the next seven 
years it was a constant everyday struggle to keep him away from me.” She 
left for the sake of her son, but even leaving did not stop the abuse.
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Lisa talks about beatings while she was pregnant, and her attempts to 
protect herself:
I got pregnant with Chad, he would hit me but I wouldn’t, I just wouldn’t 
let him hit me in the stomach. I really would try not to let him hit me 
anywhere near the baby. So at different times there were a couple of 
teeth knocked out from punches...
Thus all four women were victims of battery, victims who did nothing to 
initiate the violence. Rather, each woman narrates incidents which allow the 
viewer to see her as rational, as having reasons for her action, as attempting 
to avoid victimization.
The “Pure Victim” Criteria Two: Physical and Emotional Abuse
Criteria two of the “pure victim” is that battered women are 
characterized as having experienced extreme physical violence, separated by 
periods of emotional abuse. Again, the women’s narratives detail examples 
of physical torture, and the resulting emotional devastation.
Lisa describes how, beyond the physical torture, her husband would 
leave her imprisoned. After sodomizing her “He left me tied up on the bed for 
hours, leaving me there...” The helplessness and isolation can not help but 
speak for the added emotional devastation of such treatment.
Shannon shares examples of public humiliation and isolation that went
beyond even the physical beatings:
He would beat me up in front of his friends to impress his friends. It got 
to the point where he started isolating me. He wanted to know my 
whereabouts and a lot of the time he didn’t want me to go nowhere 
unless he was there.
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Eugenia adds to the pictures painted by Lisa and Shannon when she 
tells of abuse that occurred at her place of employment, and the emotional 
pain she felt:
I couldn’t believe what was happening. I was so embarrassed, I was so 
ashamed. This was on my job. This had happened on the streets before 
and people had intervened, but this was on the job I didn’t know if I was 
going to get fired or what...
Finally, Patty poignantly describes the emotional devastation of
continued abuse. She explains how the continued abuse erodes self-esteem,
and that love for her son was her salvation the night that she left Brian:
At that point my attitude was: Do whatever you want to me, but don’t 
touch my kid. My kid meant everything to me. So the night I left, that was 
a lot with it. I know I should have been caring about my own life but I 
didn’t, at that point I didn’t. They get you to the point where you feel like 
you’re not worth anything and you don’t even deserve to live...
In other words, the pure victim’s physical abuse extends to control, 
separation, and isolation that present a combination of violence altering with 
emotional abuse. The unwritten subtext is that they, again, did not provoke 
the violence, nor did they deserve the emotional assaults. As Patty indicates, 
sometimes “they get you to the point where you feel like you’re not worth 
anything...” That, however, is not necessarily a less-than-sane response to 
continued emotional deprivation and abuse. Even feeling worthless did not 
stop Patty from leaving her abuser.
Criteria Three: Increasing Violence
Thirdly, according to the “pure victim” model, the abuse is presented as 
a pattern of events that necessarily increase in severity and frequency, and 
that will only get worse unless someone intervenes. The women tell stories of
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that escalating severity, beginning with their first, positive impressions of their 
batterer. It is particularly disturbing when pregnancy is involved.
Patty describes her initial meeting with Brian, and the ensuing start, and 
escalation, of violence:
While we were dating everything was fine, he was sweet, he was kind -- 
everything I thought I wanted a man to be, someone I wanted to spend 
the rest of my life with. After we got married, everything changed. He 
became a completely different person, and for 10 long years he abused 
me. Sexually, physically, emotionally....
[Later]: When I told him I was pregnant he punched me in the stomach, 
started slapping me, shoving me up against the wall, telling me he didn’t 
want this responsibility, how could I do this to him. He just became very 
violent all the time. Slapping me, pushing me calling me names.
Notice that, even though Brian became violent, it was a violence that 
began after they were married. Here we see the beginning of “good reasons” 
offered for becoming involved with a batterer: he wasn’t one when she fell in 
love with him. We will see similar stories from all the women, which, while the 
examples still serve to highlight the increasing cycle(s) of violence, also 
present compelling arguments that the women did not knowingly become 
involved with abusive men: they were neither abnormal, nor mentally deviant.
Eugenia’s story is similar to Patty’s. Alfred seemed to be the answer to 
a somewhat lonely woman’s dream. Note that Eugenia was aware that the 
sweetness might not last. Nothing in her story, however, indicates that she 
“asked for” or courted abuse, yet she was still caught in a cycle of escalating 
violence:
When I met him it was just like the answer. He was polite, he opened 
doors for me, he catered to me, he waited on me, it was just so sweet. I
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knew that it was a lot of put-on, too because we had just gotten 
together....
[Later]: And one day when I didn’t expect him --we had been arguing, he 
had fought me in the street just prior to that, the day before, --he would 
take and he showed up at the train station one day and it was no 
surprise because he was popping up everywhere and I didn’t realize at 
the time he was tracking me, so when he showed up and says “well can 
I go to work with you?” and I said “no look at what you just did to me this 
morning, look at what you did to me last night. All this violence 
everywhere we go and making a big scene everywhere we go.”
Shannon also tells a story of love and romance. If one were to read
only the second sentence (“I met him...) it would seem like any woman’s
romance. Again, it moves from romance to escalating battery:
My batterer’s name was Jose. I met him in 1987, and as our 
relationship started out it was nice, you know, he sported with me, 
escorted me with nice pretty cars and jewelry and clothes, buying gifts 
for my daughter and everything. For about six months the relationship 
was fine until one day, we was at the Gallery, which is a club in Boston, 
came home from the Gallery and that’s when the abuse started. He 
socked me in my face. I had a black eye, and from that day the abuse 
became —frantic.
Finally, Lisa tells a tale of escalating jealousy and violence. In her 
case, the timely intervention of a third party might well have saved her life -  
this time:
With Tommy, it was fine at the beginning, and then he started being 
obsessive and jealous, and then accusing me. I was trying to work two 
jobs, and I was working two jobs, he was going to school. He would say 
“you’re going to work to look good for somebody else” that’s what he 
would accuse me of...
[Later:] I just was hammering my windows closed because I thought he 
was going to come in the door and he did, he busted through the door. 
He came through and took the hammer off of the table because I ran, 
and he started hitting me with it. There were some teeth knocked out, I 
was hit in the back, I was hit in the— I don’t really remember where I 
was hit but there was blood everywhere. His friend was there and I’m 
lucky that his friend was there because if he wasn’t, he would have killed 
me that night there was no doubt in my mind I would not be here.
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The “Pure Victim” Criteria Four: Terror
And finally, as “pure victims” the battered women are described as 
terrified by this experience. Some of the four refer to the terror and name it, 
while others provide narrative examples of the experience.
Eugenia tells her abuser “...I know you aren’t here to ride the bus, 
you’re here to terrorize me and to show me you can do this because this is 
public transportation.”
Shannon describes routine acts of terror that escalated until the acts
that occurred immediately before she killed her abuser:
I started packing my stuff and he came upstairs and me and him started 
tussling and arguing and stuff and I told him, I said “just let me pack my 
stuff I’m gonna leave and I won’t come back.” And he told me he said 
“Bitch, before you leave, I’ll kill you.” Now he had threatened me several 
times. He has put guns in my mouth, guns to my head, and played like 
Russian roulette with me, putting the gun in my mouth and clicking the 
trigger and stuff. And anytime he told me that he was going to kill me I 
believed him to a certain extent, but this night it was more fearful than 
ever. You know the expression on his face was like a real cold 
expression...
A pregnant Lisa describes her fear as Tommy threatened to kill her
baby. Remember that Lisa has been brutalized by Tommy before, even while
pregnant, and has reason to believe he will hurt her and the baby:
One time, I think I was about 6 months pregnant, and he threw me down 
on the bed we had been arguing and he said he was going to cut the 
baby out of my stomach because he just wanted to do it. And I really felt 
he was going to do this to the baby, and I was very scared.
Patty describes a form of terrorism that any mother could relate to. 
Previously she described that, even though she left Brian, she spent seven
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years trying to keep him out of her life, and protect her son from his abuse. At
this point in time, Brian had received permission to take Timmy out of state:
Brian told me that I’d never see Timmy again. He told me that he’d kill 
me if I didn’t give him Timmy. I was afraid for my life and for Tim’s life. 
Brian showed up early. He came up the steps and he was laughin’. He 
said “You better kiss Timmy goodbye, because you’re never gonna’ see 
him again.” And I went in the house and I just started freakin’ out. I didn’t 
know what to do. I knew if I came back outside and told him “No, Tim’s 
not here, you’re not getting him” he would kill me. I knew he was going 
to kill me that day. I mean, he had told me so...
Of Pure Victims’ Good Reasons
All the women’s stories offer good reasons to accept that these women 
are not abnormal, that they are not violence prone, that they did not seek out 
their victimization, that they did meet charming men who led them to believe 
that they were entering into “normal” relationships, that physical battery and 
emotional abuse escalated, and that they were terrorized and in fear for their 
lives. In short, while we might not applaud all their choices, they are not 
“mentally ill.”
Moreover, the women’s stories correspond to already-public theories of 
domestic violence (Walker’s aforementioned “Battered Women’s Syndrome,” 
the cycle of violence, as well as the “pure victim”) which allows them to 
symbolically plead and make an argument for the reality experienced in this 
country, by battered women. Lisa, Shannon, Patty and Eugenia become 
representatives of any and all victims.
While it is not apparent in the aforementioned analysis, which did not 
follow chronological order, the four women’s narratives in the movie begin 
with each telling the story of meeting and becoming involved with their
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abuser. The stories themselves move in order, from meeting, to commitment, 
to the beginning of violence, to attempts to understand it, to pleas to law 
enforcement for assistance, to terror and ultimately murder. In the course of 
the telling, the viewer begins to see each woman as unique, as individual, as 
very real, as rational.
They not only voice their stories, but become, for us, the individual 
faces that personalize statistics: they illustrate the tragedy of the individuals, 
not the facelessness of the masses. They present narratives that make their 
experience real, tangible, poignant, and allow us to potentially understand, if 
not approve of, the reasons they acted to murder their abusers. They are not 
mentally ill, and to accept their narratives is to accept the grassroots framing 
of the women as, indeed, ’’pure victims.”
Thus, in degrees great and small, the four women present themselves, 
in their own words, as confirming to Davies (1998) description of “pure 
victims.” But that is not the end of the claims advanced by and in the movie.
Claims Supported: Statistics and Evidence
Buel provides statistics and evidence that further support the grave
danger faced by victims:
The Center for Disease Control has even come to understand, through 
their Violence Epidemiology Unit, that more women now seek treatment 
in our nation’s emergency rooms as a result of domestic violence 
injuries than from the combination of muggings, rapes and car 
accidents.
...That domestic violence constitutes the number one cause of injury to 
women in America. They also tell us that women are in nine times more 
danger in their own home than they are in the street.
... The FBI tells us one out of every two women will be in a violent 
relationship in their lifetime.
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... A Texas study recently showed that 75% of the women currently in 
shelters had left at least several times previously. It is a myth that we do 
not leave. We generally leave many times before we are finally able to 
leave and stay away.
... The New York Legal Aid Society documented, in their study of New 
York state, that battered women who kill are mistreated at every juncture 
in the criminal justice system: they have higher initial bails set, they are 
detained longer, and ultimately have higher sentences than any other 
kind of defendant, including serial rapists and murderers.
In short, the evidence from the testimony of victims and narrator not 
only supports that the women are pure victims, but also provides good 
reasons, through statistics and studies, that they rightfully perceive 
themselves to be in danger, and that the resources available to them are not 
sufficient protection.
Additional Claims and Assertions of Public Ownership
As aforementioned, the movie presents several claims, each with 
public and rhetorical significance. Good reasons are provided, through 
narratives, that frame the women as, quite literally, tortured but sane, pushed 
to extreme action after all other courses of action have failed, motivated by 
the necessity of survival, or for the love of their children. Many of these 
claims are also claims asserting ownership of an issue: we will look to 
Gusfield to see how these claims meet his criteria. Further, these claims, 
when used as educational resources, can be viewed as vernacular discourse 
attempting to call and respond to a public.
Remember that in Chapter Three we discussed Gusfield’s theory of 
public problems; a problem exists only when it is brought before the public. 
Owners are those individuals (or sometimes groups) who are seen in public
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and by the public, as authorities on the issue: their voices are heard, they 
carry weight; they can assign causal responsibility. In short, owners frame 
the issue, they rhetorically construct the salient parameters, causes, blame, 
and remediation. We have seen that there was a marked and important 
struggle waged between grassroots advocates and professionals, over, 
literally, the face of (victims of) domestic violence.
Gusfield tells us that, in its relationship to power, the ownership of an 
issue has four similarities to the ownership of property. Those qualities are 
control, exclusiveness, transferability, and potential for loss. We can see in 
the struggle over construction of a “pure” victim how claimants attempt to 
exercise those characteristics.
The Battle for Control
The battle for control can be seen in the attempt to portray the victim 
as “not mentally ill. The women are not violent, except in self-defense. They 
are not insane: they have endured extreme physical abuse AND emotional 
abuse. They are rational enough to be terrified by their experience. These 
women have endured horrific abuse, but are not themselves abusive; they are 
truly “victims” trapped in a pattern that they cannot break. This portrayal 
becomes crucial for, if grassroots advocates cannot control the presentation 
of the victim as sane but suffering, two serious consequences result: the 
locus of the problem moves from societal to interpersonal, and women are 
deprived of what any would list as their primary reason for leaving the abusive 
situation—their children.
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Controlling the issue is absolutely imperative for the grassroots 
advocates. They must be able to assert the reality of the victim’s experience. 
If the issue is seen as intrapersonal, as mental illness, it then becomes 
societal only in that society might feel responsible to provide more individual 
counseling. The problem itself would remain in the private realm -  within the 
family, or between a woman and her therapist. Similarly, if the issue is a 
function of interpersonal dynamics, of dysfunctional relationships, the issue 
again remains “private” as the cherished ideals of democracy and freedom 
preempt government intervention in the most sacred and private of places: 
the home, between a man and his wife. It would be hard to imagine a hotter 
political potato than advocating governmental interference between a man 
and woman.
Finally, and by no means least in importance, advocates have 
experienced women staying in horrific situations because the women know 
that their children will be negatively impacted, at the barest minimum 
financially, by the consequences of their leaving the (usually primary wage 
earning) spouse or partner. If the victim is perceived as mentally unstable, 
one of her primary reasons for leaving -  to protect the children from an 
abusive situation -  becomes moot as courts tend to frown upon awarding 
custody to mentally ill parents, especially when the mentally ill patient may 
have no marketable job skills, etc. Make no mistake, those advocates fighting 
for control of the issue are literally fighting what they believe to be a life-and-
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death battle for the women and children. We will see later that they even go 
so far as to adopt the war metaphor: it is a war against women and children.
The Battle for Exclusiveness
The struggle for exclusiveness persists as one group attempts to 
“own” the issue to the exclusion of competing viewpoints. In this case, the 
grassroots/feminist claimants are attempting to preempt the growing 
“professional” view of domestic violence as a personal problem, as an internal 
mental illness. The victim must be seen as sane and a victim, not as a 
masochistic incompetent. The discourse must be vernacular, not the 
jargonistic language of the clinician.
Having asserted that the narratives were vernacular, let me 
immediately cast them in the opposite discourse, that of the clinician: Four 
women, two African-American and two Caucasian, present symptoms of 
depression and anger. All four of the clients showed marked lack of self 
esteem pursuant to engaging in relationships where one-up dynamics favored 
alleged perpetrators...
Compare that discourse with the narratives shared with the audience, 
recall the stories of Lisa, Eugenia, Shannon and Patty.3 Each woman 
presented first-person accounts of what was, quite simply, her life, her 
experience of reality. Each woman led us through a portion of her 
autobiography, each begins as any story: Once, long ago, “I met Brian when I 
was 11...” We walk with each woman through the deterioration of what had
3 For further exam ples, please see appendix B, transcript of dialog.
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seemed a wonderful and exciting relationship. We see the joyful event of a 
pregnancy turned into a nightmare of assaults and pain. We see women who 
reached out for help, who called police, who left their abuser, who attempted 
to end the relationship, only to be hunted, haunted by one who had seemed 
the light of their lives. We see women who did everything “right” to end their 
waking nightmare, to protect themselves and their children, only to find that 
the police didn’t help, the courts didn’t help, and that they all -  from police to 
courts to family to the women themselves -- seemed powerless to stop the 
pain, to make the terror go away. As we walk each step, from dream to 
nightmare, we come closer to understanding the terror the women felt. We 
cannot deny their reality.
No clinical jargon is used to explain their pain. There is no attempt to 
rely on psychological mechanisms to explain the everyday terror of a woman 
-- of these four women -- struggling for power over her own life, for safety and 
protection for herself and her child. Instead, we — men and women alike --- 
follow that narrative, and by virtue of the shared discourse enter into a world 
whose condition threatens, by its empirical realities, to render women 
powerless. Having entered her world, we are asked to accept, both 
empathically and rationally, that the women were forced to act, to respond to 
violence, to protect their children, to defend their lives.
Thus narrative reaches to persuade in a manner that clinician’s jargon 
cannot. And accepting the good reasons and rationality presented, we can 
conclude that the women were, indeed, not mentally ill, not insane, not
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grossly deviant. There is logic and rationality present in the victim. She is 
victimized by circumstances, not her own incompetence or personal failings. 
She is, indeed, a “pure victim.” And that is what she must be, what she is 
rhetorically constructed to be. There is no room for compromise on this 
picture because the stakes are high and the goal is the exclusive right to 
speak as owner: the grassroots version must triumph and the clinical analysis 
must lose its right to address the issue.
Moreover, the feminist involvement usually does not go unopposed, as 
competing claimants attempt to deny that it is a societal problem, specifically 
responding to the feminists attributions of patriarchy as causal. Once again, 
unless the problem is seen as systemic -  as societally encouraged and reified 
notions of patriarchal control -  the issue will be adjudged a “private” one and 
again disappear into the protected realm of the home.
Transferability and Potential for Loss
The issue of transferability, at this point, assumes importance as the 
grassroots organizers challenge a view that is already ahead and gaining 
traction: the therapeutic model. The grassroots advocates must make sure 
the public perception of ownership is transferred to their model of domestic 
violence.
The potential for loss is the shadow that haunts the advocates as their 
mission is to save lives. Should they lose, should their position be seen as 
invalid, not in control, not able to speak, to assign responsibility and blame, 
should domestic violence continue to be seen as private realm....it is a battle
they must win and over which they must retain control. Also , in classic 
debate and argumentation terms, that status quo has presumption. They 
literally must move the issue from the shelter of the private, and overthrow the 
current view of domestic violence as a familial issue. These women are 
seeking to push a very large boulder up a very steep hill, and once they attain 
the summit, they cannot afford to lose control of the issue, or it, and they, and 
the women they represent, will once again sink into a valley of obscurity, in 
the realm of the private
Making the Issue a Public Issue 
For Gusfield, an issue becomes a matter for public concern when key 
elements have been met. First, the issue must be seen as “real”: it must have 
both facticity and remediability before it will be of public concern. The issue 
must also have moral consequences that are apparent to the greater public 
as congruent with his/her/their moral beliefs. The aforementioned statistics 
and studies provided by Buel contribute to the audience’s awareness of the 
real existence of the problem, but perhaps even more immediately impactful 
is Scott’s straightforward recitation of lists: the list of the deceased women, in 
chronological order, with their age, hometown and murderer’s name provided. 
The lists are intercut with videos and pictures of the victims being removed in 
bodybags or ambulances, of their accused murderer being led away by 
police, and, in one instance, pictures of a funeral procession and a victim in a 
coffin. The pictures presented also serve to give “statistics” a face. They 
serve as a visual narrative to make the compelling argument: this is real, this
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is life in Massachusetts, these are the real-life casualties in a war against
women and children.
Facticity and Remediability
Gusfield posits that it is not enough to merely accept that a situation or
problem exists. It must also be remediable: there must be a potential for a
cure. As he describes in The Culture of Public Problems, both old age and
racial injustice can be viewed as “real” issues, but racial injustice can be seen
as potentially remediable in a way that old age cannot. Buel represents the
fact that there is a possible hope for the victim, for Buel survived and,
moreover, she serves as a credible source of information:
It has been fifteen years now since I found myself a battered woman on 
welfare, at a time when there were no abuse prevention laws, no 
shelters, DA s, judges, police that I could find that were at all concerned 
about my safety, the safety of my then-infant son and the two foster 
children I had.
She has redeemed herself, moved from victim to survivor, and her 
constant presence not only asserts the potential for remedies, but offers some 
concrete steps. When confronted with the reality of women being unfairly 
treated by the judicial system, she points out that we can demand better 
service for victims before they become murderers: “We need to do a little 
more of the up-front work, we need to demand that of our police, our district 
attorney’s offices and certainly parole, probation — anybody that has contact 
and works with battered women.”
Buel’s call is buttressed by the fact that we have seen four specific 
women, heard four compelling narratives, which give the victims a face, and
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heard a recital of serial death statistics, which give the issue material
significance. Her commentary presents a framing narrative. She speaks with
the voice of a former victim, and thus she proves the of the
issue. More than that, she is a person in a position of social responsibility:
she is an “Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County Domestic Violence Unit,”
thus she speaks credibly of facts and statistics. Further, her personal
narrative, as we shall see, amplifies the call to moral action.
The Imperative for Moral Action
The attempt to portray the issue as a moral responsibility of concern to
the public, is present in the individual women’s stories, in Buel’s own story,
and in the attempt to make the public responsible for the damage to women:
...we’ve come a little ways in 15 years. There are now 1200 battered 
women’s shelters across this country. But you need to keep that in 
perspective: there are about 3800 animal protection shelters. No matter 
how much you love animals it seems to me our priorities are a little 
skewed when we have three times the number of shelters for homeless 
animals then we have for battered women and their children
While acknowledging the statistics that say one out of every two
women will be involved in violent relationships, Buel asserts that the reason is
“Not because 50% of all men are batterers, but because we as their
community and society, completely fail to hold them accountable. They are
free to move on to the next victim.”
She later adds:
Do you know how many battered women tell me about assaults in front 
of their building, out in public, or in apartments with thin walls, or in 
summer with the windows and doors open? And nobody can be 
bothered to call the police...
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Most tellingly, her final message in the film is a direct call to citizen 
involvement and responsibility:
If you have not been victimized, if you have not been stalked, if you 
haven’t been stabbed, beaten, chased across state lines, tracked down, 
kidnapped, taken back, beaten again, feared for your life, you have truly 
been blessed. And this is an opportunity to thank God that you have 
been spared that. But I would argue it means you have a greater 
responsibility to try to empathize and understand with those of us who 
live with that, who don’t know what it is to sleep through an entire night 
because you jump at every noise, yes, fifteen years later.
Buel continually refers to “we” as she presents the reality of domestic
violence. She is the voice of accountability and accusation. Her own story is
of terror and alienation:
When I talk about fear, one of the stories that I will share with you that I 
hope I will never forget is having left New York, gone to a small rural 
town in New Hampshire where I thought I would be safe. I was in a 
Laundromat on a Saturday morning, my son was playing around, there 
were people over by the cash registers and my husband walked in the 
door. And I yelled over for the people to call the police. But he said “No 
this is my wife. We’ve just had a little fight. Nobody needs to do 
anything.” And I still had bruises on the side of my face. I said “no this is 
the person who beat me up. You need to call the police.” But he said ” 
No this is my wife. We’ve just had a little fight. I’ve come to pick her up 
and take her home.” So nobody moved. And I thought as long as I live I 
want to remember what it feels like to be terrified for my life and nobody 
could even pick up the phone.
And yet Buel survived, and returns to tell the tale and call for political
responsibility and moral accountability. Her ethos is present as she
confidently recites statistics. She speaks clearly, firmly, slowly, never failing
to make eye contact, to make connections with the audience. She speaks as
an authority before a classroom of men and women who raptly listen. She is
a teacher, instructing at Harvard Law School, no less. She possesses the
experience, and has managed to move from victim to survivor. Her
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credentials are unimpeachable, her ethos is strong. Buel can speak to, and 
for, all of Gusfield’s criteria: facticity (via statistics); remediability (via her own 
presence) and moral responsibility. The movie provides strong ownership 
claims, and Buel is the spokesperson.
Other claims: Prisoners of War 
As ownership is asserted, other claims are made; the aforementioned 
“there is a war on women and children” and women are pure victims. There 
is evidence provided that women can’t escape, that indeed they are 
“prisoners of war.” All four victims, and Buel herself, attempted to leave their 
abuser. In each situation, the women were unable to successfully free 
themselves. At one point, Lisa even directly uses the prisoner of war 
descriptor:
I was arrested for first degree murder. And then I went to ATU, awaiting 
trial. It was a unit with this long hallway. There was 21 rooms. I was in 
room 201. They brought me there in the middle of the night. And I spent 
three and a half years up there, in that one hallway, in that one room. I 
was locked 22 hours a day, awaiting trial. I spent many hours crying, 
wondering what was going to happen to me, facing life in prison. And I 
don’t know how I did those three and a half years up there. I mean, it 
was a prisoner of war camp, so to speak, locked up in this 8x 15  room.
Indicting the Police
Not only were the women real-life prisoners of the war on women and 
children alleged by the documentary, they are also victims of the system, as 
police fail to protect. Their narratives serve to place blame on, and demand 
accountability from, the police and the entire judicial system. It is a clear 
attempt to frame and own the issue.
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Each woman reached out to the police, but was not protected. Their 
narratives provide empirical evidence of the failure of the system to protect, a 
telling indictment which places responsibility on the shoulders of the police. 
Lisa tells of an instance where her batterer almost killed her: “I had called the 
police for them to come and they never came. It was one of those times 
because they just got real used to me calling they never bothered coming 
anymore.”
After being attacked while at work, and assisted by members of the
public, Eugenia relates the following:
So the police came. I said “Arrest him! Arrest him! he just attacked me” I 
was in hysterics. The guy says “Wait a minute. Wait a minute. He says 
he’s your boyfriend” I said “My boyfriend? what that has to do with it? 
The man just attacked me.” I said “what does that have to do with it?” 
“Urn well we didn’t see anything.” They didn’t see anything? They’re the 
police. There was witnesses who held him there, there was the 
bystanders. . “No” they told me “you have to go down and get a 
restraining order” sometime this was like 4:30 in the afternoon,
“tomorrow morning you have to go out and get a restraining order.” I 
said “restraining order? Arrest him. I’m an employee. You’re supposed 
to protect me. Arrest him.” “No” he said. “Listen to me: calm down. “ In 
the meantime Alfred is standing back jumping [sic] around, laughing— it 
was a big joke to him.
Patty echoes the same sense of frustration as she describes the failed
results of her attempt to have the police help her, and then describes the
brutal personal consequences:
Right before I did leave him one time he had beat me so bad I had a 
broken nose, a fractured nose. I called the police. The police came, 
and he was standing in the doorway and I was in the driveway covered 
in blood and I said “I want him arrested” and they says “well we didn’t 
see him do it, we can’t arrest him. “ And I’m like “well what, do you think 
I did this to myself?” And he was laughing. After the police left I got a 
worse beating.
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Shannon details the treatment she received from police when, bruised
and bleeding, she was taken into custody:
And in the police station, nobody never asked me how I was: I was 
bruised very badly. Jose had beat me so badly that the muscles in my 
knees were moving. You could see the muscles flexing in my kneecap. 
My head was busted open.
Their individual and combined narratives make powerful presentations 
that call for accountability on the part of the police departments for their failure 
to act, their failure to obey their own oaths: to serve and protect. But the 
police are not the only component of the judicial system that failed these 
women.
Indicting the Courts
In the instances where the women were able to provide enough 
evidence to satisfy police that battery had occurred, the judicial system still 
failed to hold the abusers accountable.
Lisa shares what happened after Tommy broke in and beat her with a 
hammer:
When I tried to kick him out, at different points I’d tell him I had 
restraining orders. One time I had a restraining order against him and 
he was living with his mother but he would be at my house all the time 
for hours, trying to get in the door.
...And the police came. There was charges brought against him: assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon, attempted murder, B&E in the 
daytime many charges which nothing happened with.
Thus not only did Lisa “do the right thing” and obtain a restraining
order, even multiple charges failed to result in her abuser being held
accountable for his actions.
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Patty shares her experiences with the failure of the system: “They get, 
it makes them worse when the cops show up and they tell you we can’t help 
you. Then they get mad: Oh, you gonna call the police on me? Oh, OK fine,
I’ll kill you now...’”
Later:
Brian’s attitude was “well if I can’t have you and Timmy then you’re not 
gonna have Timmy. If I can’t have Timmy, no one’s gonna have Timmy.” 
Brian somehow got a court order, another judge to say that he could 
take Timmy to Florida...
This particular failure of the system was a direct precursor to her 
murder of her abuser. Her narrative impeaches the ability of the system to 
protect the most vulnerable members of society: mothers and children.
Eugenia reveals the court’s failure to allow her lawyer to present an
adequate defense:
My attorney, urn, he introduced the battered women’s syndrome. But 
they wouldn’t allow it into the courtroom. The judge heard it and asked 
him “What was this? Who says so? Where did you get this thing from, 
battered women’s syndrome?” So the jury was dismissed and we went 
through like two or three hours of expert testimony. When the jury came 
back the trial resumed without the expert testimony...
Not only do the police and courts fail to protect, they also circumvent 
the foundational principles of our judicial system: the defendant was denied 
the right to present an adequate defense. The women were victims of 
domestic violence, and they become victims of individuals and agencies that 
should protect them.
Perhaps Shannon puts it most poignantly: “I’m the victim, I’ve been 
victimized by Jose and now I’m being victimized by the system.”
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And finally, Buel, again the voice of reason, tellingly indicts the system:
The very DA’s offices, who somehow do not have the time, money, 
resources, people to help battered women when we come in as the 
plaintiffs in these actions or as witnesses in criminal cases, somehow 
have all the prosecutors, all the police investigators, they can possibly 
need when we are the defendants. This is nothing short of misogyny. 
This is nothing short of a criminal justice system that is dealing very 
differently with women as defendants, and in particular battered women 
as defendants, than any other kind of defendant.
But Why Don’t They Just Leave? Claims Of Rationality
Good reasons were also provided, in narratives, for why women don’t
leave their abuser. It is, again, not because they are insane, irrational,
infatuated with violence, or desirous of punishment. Note that Buel is facing
society-wide systemic blocks to leaving her abuser as she explains choices
she made and her good reasons for making those choices:
At first when I left, I went back it was because he said he was sorry. It 
would never happen again. And then it was because I would leave, the 
first time after that I left I got a job in a shoe factory, but by the time 
you’ve paid your rent and daycare, there’s no money to eat. You 
probably can’t even pay your rent. So you go back because you decide 
that it’s more important to feed your children. That you will figure out 
magically how to stop that abuse.
Similarly, Patty shares her bewilderment and emotional pain as she
attempts to make sense of the abuse. Like Buel, she uses a vernacular
narrative format to express her good reasons for staying, in the form of
universally understandable hopes and desires:
I didn’t know what was wrong. I didn’t know what I was doing wrong. 
Now I realize that, at that time you feel like it’s you, something you’re 
doing to provoke his behavior, so you try to do everything right urn but 
nothing seems to work. It just doesn’t change the way they are...You 
end up staying because you really want to believe that the person you 
love loves you back. Every person, human being needs to believe that
151
they’re loved and needed and because you hate what they’re doing, it 
doesn’t mean you hate them. And you believe they’ll change. When 
they’re crying and telling you that “I love you. I need you. I can’t live 
without you.” I’m a human being, my heart goes out to that person, if 
they’re sin[cere]--l believe that they’re really sorry. I’d cry with him.
Thus Buel and Patty both present and profoundly
understandable good reasons for returning to an abusive relationship. They 
stake their claim to sanity, necessity, and compassion.
When H o p e ,Effort, And The System Fail, There Is No Other
Claims Of Desperation
After believing themselves abandoned by the system and the police,
the women viewed themselves as having, in the most literal sense, no other
option. Patty tells viewers:
I knew my life was on the line here. So I went in the house and I 
grabbed a, I went in the cabinet and I grabbed my father’s gun because 
I didn’t know what else to do. I had called the police, I had done 
everything in my power to leave this man and to get the police to help 
me and they wouldn’t. So I had to protect myself. It was me or him. I 
guess I didn’t know if I even wanted to live up until that moment. 
Whether I should kill myself —I didn’t know.
Shannon came to the realization “But I had to defend my life. It was 
either me or him, and that night I felt it was going to be me. You know I urn 
I’ve been tortured all my life but being with Jose was the worst, and I just 
couldn’t take any more.”
Eugenia asserts succinctly: “I didn’t murder no one...he came to 
murder me, it just so happened I put the final blow to him instead of him 
putting the final blow to me....”
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In everyday language, in vernacular discourse, in narratives that 
provide good reasons, these individual and no longer faceless women tell of 
making horrible and virtually inescapable choices. They assert claims, and 
provide empirical evidence, that they rationally had no other choice but to 
defend their lives.
The Women’s Final Claims
Finally, the women share what they want society to know:
I just hope that no other woman has to defend her life like I had to. If 
anybody learns anything from me telling my story I hope it’s that: that 
you do have rights, and demand them, because they HAVE to protect 
you. The police should have protected me, the courts should have 
protected me and they didn’t, and here I sit and it shouldn’t have to 
happen... If a stranger had been doing this to me, they would have 
helped me. But because it was my husband and my ex-husband they 
won’t help me and I don’t understand it. I don’t understand....[Patty]
The whole situation with this, it didn’t have to be. There didn’t have to be 
a death, and there didn’t have to be ME in prison. And my son didn’t 
have to lose his mother for how many years, and he doesn’t know me 
anymore... It didn’t have to be this way. [Lisa]
Their narratives and reasoning assert that “It didn’t have to be this
way.” We are led to the inescapable conclusion that the women did not fail to
take action, we as a society failed them. Had we accepted the moral
responsibility to protect these victims, they would not have been further
victimized, their abusers would not be dead, families not disrupted, women
not made into prisoners of a war they did not begin.
The last spoken words in the film are those of Meekah Scott. As she
finishes her recitation of names of victims, she concludes: “Twenty women in
11 months. It’s crazy. I could have been one of these statistics...but I fought
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back.” The accompanying text tells us that “Meekah Scott was sentenced to 
8 - 1 2  years for killing her batterer. She is currently out on appeal.”
Absence Noted
While the women make poignant and persuasive claims for ownership 
of the issue, there are parties whose absence, Gusfield would counsel, is 
important to note. While both Buel and Booker are speaking before a law- 
school audience, there is no official representation on the part of the police, 
the criminal justice system, the courts, or legislators. In fact, there are no 
men’s voices at all, and the only visual evidence we see is of alleged 
perpetrators being led away by male police officers.
Similarly, there is no sense of voice or presence of religious or spiritual 
community members. While Patty, Shannon, and Lisa mention living with, 
running to, or calling mothers and (in Shannon’s case) a grandmother, there 
is no strong sense of a supportive family for these women. No neighbors, no 
allies, no community. Strangers, bystanders, and acquaintances sometimes 
intervene, and many incidents take place in public, but there is no sense of 
community or neighborhood support for the women.
Shannon mentions being hospitalized, Lisa mentions having teeth 
knocked out, Buel cites statistics from the Center for Disease Control, but no 
medical workers are present as supportive of battered women. No one 
apparently reported the instances of abuse, thus the medical establishment is 
silent. There are no social workers, there are no counselors, there are no 
advocates in the welfare or mental health system.
Men, the courts, the legal system, the police, the religious community 
and the professional medical establishment are all absent or silent. While 
their absence can surely be traced to choices made by the director of the 
documentary, that choice itself is telling. It presents an argument. It is a 
rhetorical construction that further sheds blame on those (patriarchal and 
largely male) institutions. Those institutions are silent. They make no 
defense. The present no claims. The experts are the women, the victims, 
themselves, and empowering advocates like Buel and, to an extent, Booker. 
Who speaks for the women? Who claims ownership of the issue and assigns 
responsibility for remediation? The women themselves, and grassroots 
advocates.
Thus the movie, Defending Our Lives, can clearly be seen as a public 
attempt to control the issue of domestic violence. Most specifically, it 
attempts to move perceptions from the “victim as mentally ill” to the women as 
“pure victims.” Along the way, claims are made that indict the legal system, 
the police, and those members of the public who stand by and allow abuse to 
happen. Good reasons are provided, through narratives, to support those 
claims and, moreover, to answer the unstated question “Why didn’t she just 
leave?”
Finally, the silence of others who might reasonably be expected to 
have a stake in the resolution of the issue, namely the church, the 
medical/therapeutic community, and the courts, makes even more 
persuasive the voices of the victims, and allows their presentation as sane but
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suffering, alone but not “other” and, ultimately, as human beings who present 
the audience with clear and compelling moral imperatives to act.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MAKING IT PERSONAL 
Between the Movie and the Book: Historical Context
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was introduced in 1990 and
ratified in 1994, reauthorized in 1998, and again in 2000. The public had
apparently been convinced that there was facticity and remediability in the
issue of domestic violence, and tales such as those presented in Defending
Our Lives also argued persuasively for moral accountability and moral
responsibility. The federal government, through the VAWA, was providing
grants to combat domestic violence. There were more and more localities
funding studies, supporting increased awareness, and taking stands to
prosecute domestic violence. According to Gusfield’s (1981) criteria, the
public dollars and governmental actions directed towards combating domestic
violence indicate it could be seen as an established public problem. The
question of ownership, however, was still contested, as was the concept, or
“face” if you will, of the “pure victim.”
In their attempt to present that “pure victim,” those from the grassroots
perspective who advocated on behalf of victims had, to an extent, presented
a rhetorical construction that needed fine-tuning. Remember that this
construction featured four characteristics:
First, abused women are not themselves violent, unless driven to 
violence in self-defense. Second, battered women are characterized as
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having experienced extreme physical violence separated by periods of 
emotional abuse. Third, the abuse is presented as a pattern of events 
that necessarily increase in severity and frequency, and that will only get 
worse unless someone intervenes. Finally, battered women are 
described as terrified by this experience. (Davies, 1998, p.15)
While many women did, indeed, meet the criteria of “pure victim” there
were two main disadvantages in that rhetorical construction. First, many
victims of abuse are not “pure victims”: they are not violent toward their
partner: they did and do not experience “extreme physical violence” (which is
the end spectrum of a continuum of abusive behaviors); and not all victims
would necessarily deem themselves “terrified.” In essence, the “pure” victim
did not fit the reality of abuse as experienced by many women and those who
advocate for the abused. While the model certainly rings true for those who
experience debilitating violence, it hampered the activists, who wanted to
expand the definition of domestic violence to the following:
Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive control in an intimate 
relationship which may be characterized by physical, emotional, verbal, 
sexual, or financial abuse or isolating and controlling behaviors on the 
part of the perpetrator (Susan Schecter, cited in the Safehouse 
Speakers Bureau training packet, 2002).
Thus, the “pure victim” constrained the definition of domestic violence, 
limiting it to severe physical battery. Further, it did not allow for expanding the 
concept of “abuse” to include emotional, verbal, sexual or financial 
mistreatment, all of which advocates maintain are real, consequential, 
dangerous, and worthy of public censure and remediation.
Secondly, because the “pure victim” is such an extreme presentation 
(in Defending Our Lives the majority of the stories were from women
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imprisoned for murder, while grim obituary-like statistics enhanced the picture 
presented) it enabled the public to maintain a safe distance from involvement 
in the issue. There still remained a distance between “those women” or “those 
people” involved in domestic battery, and the perception, necessary for 
battered women’s supporters, that victims of domestic abuse were/are not 
“other” but rather, potentially, “everywoman.” The women remain distanced 
and, while perhaps pitiable, clearly “not me.” In this respect, the notion of 
“pure victim”, so necessary in wresting issue control away from the clinical 
professionals, and asserting ownership for the grassroots advocates, actually 
worked against making victims capable of personal identification.
The Rhetorical Challenge
Thus the issue for rhetors and would-be owners of the problem is to 
present the face of domestic violence, the reality of the victim/survivor, in 
such a way that a public will be formed, one that will engage in discourse and 
attempt to mediate the problem by authorizing action. The rhetor’s problem is 
that the shoe -  narrative, in this case — no longer fits: The pure victim is not 
adequate to represent the multifaceted nature of the problem nor does it 
reflect the “reality” of abused women nor that of the general public. The 
obstacle to be overcome is that the victim must be someone with whom 
potential members of the public can identify. The victim/survivor must be 
personalized. S/he must be made real, complex, identifiable, non- 
stereotypical. In short, she must be made “normal.”
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In addition, there is a very significant constraint that remains: while 
battery is a crime, to much of the public violence between intimate partners 
remains a matter of “other people’s business.” To overcome this obstacle, 
the personalized victim must also represent a call to conscience; she must 
speak to citizens and must, by virtue of identifying the victim/survivor as 
potentially being a friend, family member or neighbor, command an 
acceptance of personal moral responsibility on the part of a newly formed 
public. Unless people accept that identification and responsibility, they will 
not be motivated to act as a public, to engage in the discourse that can create 
change and remediation. This chapter will look at one attempt to make 
personal, to “normalize,” the face of the abused.
The Text
When this research project was first conceived there were overarching 
considerations. The research question concerned presentations made in 
public, for public consumption, and available to the public, about the issue of 
domestic violence. Care had also to be given to the presence of narratives.
A final concern was the presence — or absence — of the women’s voices. 
The movie Defending Our Lives met those criteria.
There are many books available to the general public on the issue of 
domestic violence (a June 2003, search for “domestic violence” on 
Amazon.com resulted in 422 titles). They tend to fall into categories, however, 
that do not adequately meet the needs of this study: self help; theoretical 
texts; fiction (including romance!); sociological studies and reports. Although
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many of these do incorporate the voices of victims, they are quite often 
secondary in importance to a theoretical perspective or argument.
That is not the case with A Woman like You (Anderson, 1997). The 
text is comprised of pictures of women and their first-person narratives. One 
cannot help but notice that this is not a factual report. Its rhetorical design is 
explicitly to engage the reader by answering the question “what does a victim 
look like?” This book is, moreover, narrative-focused and available to the 
general public through local bookstores and the ubiquitous Amazon.com, 
where it is ranked at 145,486 (June, 03). Because of its narrative focus, 
availability, and strong presentation of victim’s voices, this text meets the 
main criteria of the research project.
Anderson’s book presents the audience with narrative, vernacular 
discourse, not syllogistic logic or Habermasian rationality. It is an appeal to a 
particular public; one concerned with answering questions about the 
victims/survivors of domestic violence. Who is she? What makes her different 
from me? How did this happen? It is clearly an attempt on the part of the 
author to give a very personalized face to the victims and survivors of 
domestic abuse, in all its many facets.
Of Good Reasons and The Natural Procedure of Argument 
Hauser (2000) has argued for the validity of good reasons as 
persuasive tools in vernacular public spheres. An analysis of these narratives 
will be an attempt to ascertain what “good reasons” are presented for the 
actions, or inactions, of the women in the book. This is particularly important,
as in traditional argumentation terms, the burden of proof is upon the women. 
They have been judged “victim” “outsider” and “other.” They must prove that 
they are not (still) victims, and deviant from recognizable norms. They must 
present compelling reasons to accept their inclusion in the world of the public. 
Their narratives, and the good reasons contained therein, can be seen as a 
subtle attempt to answer anticipated questions, including the most frequently 
asked: why? Why didn’t you leave?
There is, however, another perspective that is of importance: 
identification. Remember that the challenge for advocates, survivors, and 
spokespersons is to move the perception of the victim from “pure” and 
therefore “other” to “person-able” especially in the sense of being a 
recognizable person, someone “like me” or “like you” or “like Sarah, or cousin 
Sue, or Bill’s wife.” Moreover, that person must be “normal.” The “pure 
victim” is an attempt to present the woman as not mentally incompetent or 
evil. That demand remains: the woman/victim/survivor must not be viewed as 
freakish, or deviant or mentally unstable. In short, she cannot be seen as 
somehow “deserving” of abuse. Members called to participate in vernacular 
discourse about the issue of domestic violence, those who will form a public, 
must be able to identify with the reality and person-hood of the victim/survivor.
While there is certainly precedent for using Burkean audience arousal 
and satisfaction as a framework for analyzing the narratives, one other 
theoretical perspective presents intriguing opportunities for examining the 
process of identification. Gladys Murphy Graham (1925) re-presents Bernard
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Bosanquet’s “Natural Procedure in Argument.” The procedure she describes 
is linear: it is a presentation of reality such that the “inevitable progress” of the 
reader/interlocutor is an acceptance of a “situation.” The situation is 
compellingly presented, layer upon layer, so that it becomes familiar. Once 
familiar, it fits within a person’s worldview, such that they are compelled to a 
conclusion, or else must change their understanding of reality.
It must be noted that while the situation is specific, the worldview is 
antecedent. Thus, in a culture where women are viewed as expendable, as 
chattel, and the man given liberal permission to inflict corporal punishment at 
will and to the degree he desires (up to and including death) the narrative of 
situation described by Anderson would not present compelling reasons for 
identification. In a society such as ours, governed by laws and an acceptance 
that battery is not acceptable, and violence to children to be condemned, the 
worldview is compatible with the situation described.
Once the situation has been made familiar and accepted, an 
identification of sorts has taken place and there is no other logical, rational, or 
moral outcome than that presented/advocated by the rhetor. According to 
Graham:
Its plan is simply to portray a situation which gradually, of itself, without 
compulsion or contention on the part of the speaker, through the 
compelling power of a developing situation makes evident to the mind of 
the hearer the necessity of one certain solution, (p. 321)
This natural procedure has all the hallmarks of a vernacular, narrative 
argument in that it is a rhetorically constructed, emplotted and descriptive 
unfolding which leads to an inescapable, morally imperative conclusion:
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The method is not in the orthodox and generally accepted sense 
argumentative; rather it is that of exposition with a goodly dash of 
narration and description. Technically it does not argue; it merely sets 
forth — yet slowly, definitely as it proceeds, the lines of descriptive 
development begin to converge and it becomes compellingly evident to 
each thinking mind that such a set of conditions implies, necessitates, 
one thing, the conclusion toward which an approach has been from the 
beginning, being made. It is argument in a very true sense, its aim is to 
convince and persuade, yet it is argument of which exposition, narration 
and description are handmaidens, (p. 321)
Graham uses the example of one speaker’s “argument,” narratively
and compellingly presented to an audience:
It was not emotionally done; it was simply fact piled upon fact, picture 
put up beside picture, until the very pressure of it demanded the 
conclusion. The situation being what it was, one thing must come. The 
speaker’s conclusion, which at the beginning would have been foreign to 
the audience, hostilely received, was at the close but the result of its 
own thinking. It fairly rushed ahead of him to it. Because it had 
accepted the non-contentious background situation, it must accept the 
conclusion which that situation implied (p. 322, italics Graham’s).
And later, Graham points out that, once having seen, having accepted 
a given situation, there was a natural conclusion: “...having accepted the 
situation, the mind could not consistently refuse the move implied” (p. 322). 
Thus, having accepted the scene, situation, or narrative set forward by the 
rhetor it would be logically impossible to reject the consequent action called 
for. In this case, if a suitably compelling situation is set forth by Anderson, 
then the attendant action — recognizing that domestic violence could happen 
to Everywoman, that she is sane, normal and not “other” —  would be 
logically and morally impossible to ignore.
Anderson’s task, then, is to simply and compellingly present fact upon 
fact, narrative after narrative, picture put up beside picture, leading the reader
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to one inescapable conclusion: the faces and stories represent real persons, 
normal women, women, in short, like “us.” If they are normal, real, 
recognizable and their actions consistent with understandable good reasons 
( Fisher’s narrative coherence and fidelity) then the reader cannot escape the 
call to his/her conscience to see that they are not “other” deviant, freakish, 
and deserving of cruelty or punishment. The reader’s moral register must 
resonate to the call for fundamental human rights: respect, protection, safety 
of person. Thus, if the reader accepts the collective and individual stories as 
representative of a morally coherent and acceptable worldview, if the reality of 
the victims’ narratives and faces are identifiable, recognizable, no longer 
“foreign” or “other” then acceptance of that worldview extends moral 
responsibility. The women are no longer “them” but rather they are “one of us 
-  mother, sister, aunt, cousin, neighbor, friend, co-worker.”
Examination of the Text 
The examination of the text will begin with a brief look at the 
overarching narrative provided in the text, followed by a teasing out of 
common themes present across the different narratives. We will examine the 
questions the narratives seek to answer. Finally, we will examine how those 
combined reasons and narratives present a view of world and situation, and 
the consequences of accepting that view.
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Introduction to the Text
The book A Woman Like You was published in 1997. The title clearly 
identifies a potential audience: women. The author and photographer, Vera 
Anderson, is herself a former battered woman. Hers is the first face, and the 
first story, in the book. The book consists of seventy pages of black-and- 
white photographs, and first-person stories that accompany each: the 
photograph of each victim/survivor is on the right page, and on the left, facing 
it, is the “subject’s” story. Beneath each story is a caption, italicized and 
placed at the bottom of the page [see Appendix C]. The caption, in 
Anderson’s voice, serves to summarize/benchmark the story. In some cases, 
the caption provides information not present in the narrative itself, material 
which adds to the richness of the combined story and photograph (e.g. There 
is no mention of cultural differences in Yoshi’s story, but the caption at the 
bottom of the page reveals: “When she was growing up in Japan, girls were 
encouraged to marry young and be obedient wives” [p. 8])
The book serves as an illumination of the faces and stories of women. 
It is important, however, to note that there is no overt denunciation of men, no 
calls to end patriarchy, no strident political call to action. While the book may 
rightly be considered “pro-woman” it is not a text that is “anti-man.”
There are, including the author, thirty-six stories. Some accounts are 
only a paragraph long; the longest one — the last one — is spread across 
four pages: two with text, and two of pictures.
Most of the faces are of women. One is a photograph of a blond 
toddler. The audience sees only his back, as he snuggles against the body of 
a woman on crutches. We cannot see the woman above the waist, as the 
focus is on the young child. We can see that the woman has a broken leg.
There is also a picture of two teenaged girls. They are sisters. They 
stand together in front of a Christmas tree.
The book represents the voices of thirty-seven different speakers, all 
but Anderson identified only by his/her first name.
The demographics of the storytellers reveal a varied lot. Twenty-five of 
the voices are from whites; seven are Black; three are Asian; one appears 
Hispanic. Daniel and his toddler brother are the youngest; Marion died in 
prison. There are women from every conceivable age bracket from teenaged 
sisters to sixty or seventy year old women. Their backgrounds indicate they 
are from diverse social strata: professionals, blue collar, from the projects, 
wealthy. One woman identifies herself as Jewish, another as Catholic. Most 
of the women were married to their abusers. Two have successfully remarried 
non-abusive males. Another divorced an abusive male and then married a 
“completely different” man who also proved abusive. Three women were in 
unmarried heterosexual relationships. Two are lesbian. Nine of the women 
were, or are, in prison for the murder of their abuser. A tenth, the mother of 
the two teenaged sisters, is a silent presence.
While the majority of the stories, and certainly the stories told by the 
imprisoned women, deal with physical battery, often up to and including
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hospitalization, there are other stories which reflect emotional and financial 
abuse: women who were constantly belittled; whose very sanity was 
questioned; who were kept isolated and literally penniless, trapped within their 
own homes.
The purpose of the book, according to Anderson, grew out of her own
experience. When friends found out that she had been involved in a violent
marriage, they said “You don’t look like a battered woman.” Her response:
I agreed. I didn’t think of myself as a battered woman. But then, what 
did a “battered woman” look like? I started studying the faces where I 
had been volunteering at a domestic violence shelter, looking for the 
answer to that question. What I saw were the faces of my neighbors, 
my mother, my sister, my daughter. I saw myself. The truth is, battered 
women are all around us. We just don’t recognize them, because they 
look like us. And so I began my journey with my camera to explore the 
“face” of domestic violence (1997, p. 1)
The stories, and the captions, are text that pose and answer questions.
They allow the audience to hear the voices, see the faces, and enter, at least
partially, the world(s) of the battered women. Those women are young, old,
of varying degrees of physical attractiveness. There are half-smiles on some
of the faces: some smiles seem tentative. A few pose with pets. The next to
the last picture, of Brenda with her daughters, is the only picture where there
is a full-blown smile on any face.
Of Narratives and Visuals
The pictures are portraits of the faces of women, but they are as
different from the portraits of Diane Arbus (1972) as it is possible to imagine.
While both women are photographic artists, and both deal in black and white
portraits, Arbus attempts to use her lens to make an artistic statement which
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startles the viewer with images of the unusual, the freakish, and discarded 
segments of society. There is a shock value to Arbus, as she portrays, in 
everyday situations, people and objects which would be judged as socially 
deviant: a giant— literally— adult male, standing in a living room, head tilted 
to avoid touching the ceiling, while his dwarf-sized parents gaze up at him.
Anderson uses her black and white photos to focus attention on the 
faces of the women. She, portrays, like Arbus, everyday situations, and 
people who might be judged as socially deviant, but Anderson’s purpose is to 
soothe rather than shock, to attract rather than repel. With no color to 
distract, Anderson’s women are both very recognizable and surreal at the 
same moment: There is a sense of serenity and timelessness to the portraits. 
Almost every woman gravely, perhaps even bravely, faces the lens of the 
camera.
Most photographs are centered on the faces of the women, “head and 
shoulders” shots, they show them from the waist upwards; few are full length 
poses. Some women have minor but visible scars. Some faces are partially 
shadowed, some are interior-shot, others are clearly taken outside. Some 
women wear suits, others sweater/skirt combinations, and a few wear what 
might be called a “housedress,” or more informal t-shirt and jeans 
combinations.
Other than describing the women as profoundly normal-looking, it is, 
perhaps, easier to say what the pictures do not represent, than to make a 
generalized claim about what they do: they do not represent glamour; they do
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not show pain; they are not unrecognizable or overly stylized; they are not 
limited in terms of race, age, class or ethnicity.
Were there no text, and merely pictures, one might conclude it was 
simply a photo-essay on the faces of some (somewhat serious) women in 
America. They are the faces of women from the neighborhood, from church 
and the dentist’s office and the soccer field and the PTA. They are 
grandmothers and young women and professionals and teachers and choir 
directors. Absent their narratives, they are --- us. They are as different as the 
neighbors on the block, and as similar as members of our community.
When narratives are added, we see the great commonality: that each 
woman/storyteller has been touched by domestic violence and has, in some 
way, responded, changed, altered her life or the lives of her loved ones. 
Almost every women thought she was the “only” one to experience the 
violence. Almost every woman was afraid, and felt isolated. And every 
woman has very, very old eyes.
Thus narratives combined with photographs allow us to see more richly 
those things that separate and individualize each woman, as well as the 
common experiences and potentially common worldview that they share. 
Absent pictures, a strong component of the narrative package would be lost. 
The faces provide an added ethos to their words, they silently testify to the 
reality and authenticity of each. And while there remains some debate about 
whether pictures can make arguments, (Blair, 1996; Birdsell and Groarcke, 
1996; Fleming, 1996) there seems to be little doubt that pictures (and art, and
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sculpture, and buildings...) can present claims. These portraits make claims 
of normality, and difference, and recognizability. They are the ethos for their 
narrative.
The World o f A Woman Like You
As aforementioned, the text presents a view of the world, a meta­
narrative. Anderson slowly, deliberately, layers narrative upon narrative, 
picture upon picture, and the resulting overarching story is that any woman, 
every woman, can be touched by domestic violence and abuse. The fact that 
every story, as every face, is different, yet every one similar, makes it difficult, 
if not impossible, for the reader to conclude that there is a “type” of woman 
who “deserves” or “asks for” abusive treatment.
There are no masochists in this world: no woman who entered into a 
relationship aware that her partner was an abuser, and stayed because she 
enjoyed the treatment. The women have survived. They escaped. But the 
world they reveal, the world of their abusive relationships, is a world of 
isolation, fear, confusion.
Common themes in the individual narratives, serve a dual purpose. 
First, they offer answers to universal, if unarticulated, questions: why did you 
become involved with your partner? What happened in the relationship? What 
happened to you? Why did you stay? What made you leave? How did you 
leave? Those answers can be seen as providing “good reasons” for actions 
and inactions of the storytellers. If we accept those reasons, we have been, in
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some sense, persuaded as to the validity and credibility of the womens’ 
experiences.
The second purpose the narrative/picture combination serves is to, as 
Graham suggests, present to the reader, unfold before us, a situation. A 
reality is revealed to the reader as s/he moves from story to picture to story 
to picture. If the readers accept the inexorably revealed, inescapable reality 
of the narrated world, s/he must then accept the logical and coherent good 
reasons of the women. Having done that, s/he cannot logically and morally 
deny the existence of that world. An audience, a potential public, is called to 
action because the rhetor’s goal has been accomplished: reader’s identify 
with the reality of the women, and accept that they are no longer “other” but 
“us.” And the audience cannot escape the moral imperatives to action 
extended by the text.
We will begin with an analysis and examples of common threads in the 
narratives. We will then notice how the narrative themes present answers to 
questions. And finally, we will compare the “world” of the survivors, to the 
world of romance and relationships in America today.
Common Threads/Themes in the Stories
M eeting^ courtsh ip  and mariage.Many of the women share how 
they met their mates, and the stories are quite pedestrian: 4 “I met him when I 
was 14 and we got together 10 years later” [16] “He was the successful 
professional, I was the artist, the loving wife” [15]. “I was financially
4 Note: each different page number represents a different story, a different speaker.
independent and owned my own home when I met Bob” [12]. “I was 16 when 
I met Tom, 18 when we got married. Six months later my first baby was born, 
and four months after that I was pregnant again” [50]. “We met in college, in 
my radical liberal days” [46]. “...this was my first real relationship. I was 
young, I thought I was in love” [26]. “I met him at a church garage sale”[52]. 
Diverse stories, yet each linked by the very common, everyday nature of the 
tales.
One common thread: the men were charming: “...when I met this 
knight in shining armor, I was completely swept away...He was charming, 
romantic, incredibly passionate, and he was madly in love with me, all these 
things I had never experienced from a man”[58]. “I loved him, he was my 
mentor, he was my best friend....” [16]. “I knew him, Mr. Wonderful, for three 
years before I even dated him, and then I lived with him for eight months...He 
was a Southern gentleman and he had all the right things to say” [66]. “He 
was a ‘nice Jewish boy’ and as a single mother, having someone so eager to 
be a real dad for my son was attractive”[38]. If the women were guilty of 
anything, it was the common desire to meet a wonderful man and live happily 
ever after.
Love is blind .When there were signs that there were problems in the 
relationship, women often didn’t see, or interpret, them correctly: “Looking 
back, there were signs from the beginning....” [58]. “He was the only man I’d 
ever slept with, so I didn’t know how it was supposed to be” [46] and, from 
another “I know now that there were signs from the beginning, but I certainly
172
didn’t have the knowledge to identify them” [48]. Commonly, women 
misinterpreted actions: “I didn’t see the warning signs in his possessive 
behavior; I thought it was cute, I thought it meant he loved me” [68]. Or, in the 
words of another: “When he started telling me what to do and what to think, I 
didn’t see it as a control issue, I just thought it was his way of telling me to 
take care of myself”[16].
Many times the women were unsure that they had valid reasons to 
complain. At times, it was because the women came from an abusive 
background, although only one of the 35 narratives reported “That’s all I ever 
saw growing up, battering and abuse. So that’s what you think a relationship 
or family /s” [36].
The end_ o f the honeym oon .Much of the abuse happened once the 
courtship had ended and the marriage had begun: “The abuse started almost 
immediately after we were married” [42]. “After we were married, out 
relationship went from ‘You’re amazing, Jane” to ‘You’re worthless’”[16]. “It 
was like we got married and now he had me and could do what he wanted to 
me” [42]. “When he hit me on our wedding day, he cradled me in his arms 
and begged my forgiveness” [68].
For a few, the abuse began with anger: “But as his anger turned to 
violence, I became confused. And then eventually it was me he was throwing 
around” [28].
“A lo t in my world.”  Often, the women report being shocked, as
though domestic violence was foreign to their world: “I knew there were
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women that were beaten, but I thought it was a rare occurrence and only 
happened to so called low-class people. I certainly never thought it happened 
to women like me” [12]. “The first time I guess I was in shock, I didn’t believe 
it had happened” [42] “After the first time he hurt me, he promised me it 
wouldn’t happen again, and he agreed to get counseling” [52]. “ ...after that 
there was little incident after little incident” [26]. “I was afraid of anybody 
finding out, and still not really believing it was happening to me and always 
thinking it wasn’t going to happen any more” [42]. “I thought this just didn’t 
happen to people in my class” [58].
In many cases, the violence and abusive behavior increased so slowly 
that the women weren’t even aware of it: “It progressed so slowly, I just 
became accustomed to the ridicule, the condemnation, the constant 
mistreatment and verbal assaults” [60].
One reason a majority of the women reported staying was because 
they believed things would change: “for a long time I thought things would 
change, and of course they never did” [46].
Many of the women reiterate the now-common notion of spiraling and 
increasing violence: “the first time it got out of control, he started crying and 
said ‘I am so sorry, it’ll never happen again’ and that was the start of it, it 
never did finish after that” [32]. “...but during my pregnancy his anger began 
to accelerate”[28]
Excuses and conditioning.Very often the abuser provides excuses
that women are only too eager to accept: “She would say, ‘I’m sorry, I didn’t
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mean to do it. You bring out the worst in me; that’s why I do the things I do. 
Obviously I must love you, I care enough about you to get that angry”’[26].
“He kept making excuses for his behavior, and I kept listening”[28]. “ ...but 
when the man you love puts his head in your lap and cries and tells you how 
sorry he is, that he didn’t mean to do it, you want to believe it will change”
[30]. “I didn’t like some of the things he said, and how he said them to me.
But I made excuses for him” [14].
“People always ask ‘Why didn’t you leave?’ Some women have just 
been conditioned”[36].
“I had been a missionary...so it’s my natural instinct to reach out, and 
his stories about childhood family rejection and reform school made me feel 
compassionate” [52]. “I grew up in a sheltered, upper middle class 
environment and married a boy I grew up with...I always knew there was a 
passion missing” [58]. “ ...searching for understanding of this insanity, I see 
clearly that I had always glossed over his abusiveness towards me to salvage 
the love”[60]. “I saw him as a scared little boy and it touched this motherly 
thing in me, that’s what kept me in the relationship for so long”[62]. “But it 
happened because I feared for my life and I believed I had no other choice” 
[68],
Reaching out: fam ily  friends a relig ious .Once actual physical
abuse occurred, many of the women reached out to friends and family: “When 
I told my mother what was happening, she didn't want to hear about the 
abuse, because he was supporting her, too” [18]. “Everyone kept telling me
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how lucky I was to have a man like him, he was so good to us” [20]. “My 
partner at work was the only one who knew, but after the first episode she 
said to me ‘He only hit you once, and look at how much he has going for him, 
he’s a great catch...’”[14], Her relationship with an abuser “sounded good to 
me because it sounded good to my family...it was important to make my life 
acceptable to them” [38]. “I went to my parents...but they felt uncomfortable 
talking about something so unpleasant” [38]. “My family said I should just try 
and make my marriage work” [50]. When one woman was beaten on the 
evening of her wedding, “His mother said ‘It’s just the stress of the wedding” 
[68].
Religious factors seemed to complicate attempts to receive advice, 
support and help: “...but I’m very traditional, and in my religion sleeping with a 
man was making a commitment to spend your life together, and I took that 
seriously” [46]. “I got married at 16, and when my husband blacked my eye 
three days after the wedding, my minister told me I needed to learn to be a 
better wife and not talk back” [48]. It was not that women did not reach out, 
but that they perceived avenues of support to be nonexistent or limited.
Women and.“the sys te m ”The police were not always allies for the 
women: “ the police were always at my door” [54]. “ ...and every time I called 
the police, they would come to the house, and they would recognize my 
husband from the papers, or they had gone to high school with him. So they 
wouldn’t arrest him” [10]. “ The last time he was arrested he pleaded guilty to 
15 counts” [54].
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The women express justified fear of the criminal justice system: “My 
entire life had changed because of what he had done to me. But my husband 
only went to jail for four hours” [48]. ”1 was very guarded, afraid that if I said 
what had happened to my son, by allowing it would be considered a crime” 
[38]. For some women, that fear was justified: “[I]...was in the room with my 
two year old daughter -  and he threw a photograph of us on the floor, took 
out his gun, and shot it...by not having reported it myself...I committed felony 
child endangerment. So my job was threatened, I had to take a two day 
suspension without pay, I got punished for what he did” [50].
One third of the women had spent, or were spending, time in jail for the 
murder of their abuser(s). Sentences the women served were severe: “I got 
life without the possibility of parole. The judge told me that 24 hours after I’m 
dead, I could be released” [44]. “And then the state comes in, and they make 
you ashamed for saving your own life. How is it a crime to save your own 
life?” [22]. “...And then they threw my life away in court”[24].
Sometimes drugs and/or alcohol were factors: “My partner was much 
younger and she sometimes drank and took drugs, and at those times she 
would get crazy and that’s when she would jump on me” [64].
Trying.harder.Isolation, confusion, and fear contribute to women 
doubting themselves. But many reported that, rather than leave, they would 
try harder to make the marriage work: “In the beginning, I just kept trying to 
make it better...” [16]. “I didn’t understand and I tried harder to make the
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marriage work” [28]. “So I tried to be a better wife and stayed with him for 12 
years” [48].
Social and cultural factors also contributed to the women feeling 
silenced: “I got out 20 years ago, and in those days no one talked about 
things like abuse. I didn’t tell one person in my life what was going on” [34],
“We didn’t have a name for it, we always knew it wasn’t right, but you didn’t 
talk about it then” [36]. “I never told anybody. In my culture, you keep these 
things to yourself” [20]. “No one knew” [1]. “ ...I didn’t know what was going 
on, I didn’t have anyone in this country.” [8]
On being alone.Part of the isolation was caused by the abusers: “I 
didn’t have friends, I couldn’t have friends, I couldn’t go out” [54]. “I just 
stayed at home, my whole life revolved around him walking through the front 
door” [16]. “the thing is, you’re so cut off from the real world” [22]. “I felt so 
isolated and confused, and every time he raised a hand to my kid, I became 
dead inside, much deader than when the abuse was directed at me”[38]. “I 
thought I was the only one, the only one in the world this happened to” [42]. “I 
can still close my eyes and remember that feeling, the fear, the isolation”[44].
“I had no one to tell me it wasn’t right, that it didn’t have to be that way” [48]. 
“you get scared, and so you don’t talk about it. The more I emotionally 
separated from him, the more he’d close in on me. I felt I had no support
anywhere, and I felt completely alone” [50].
On fear.Often accompanying the isolation was fear and terror: “I 
needed help, but I was so scared to tell anyone” [8]. “I knew it wasn’t right, but
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I was afraid to say anything to anybody, because he was so well liked in the 
community” [20]. “I lived with terror for so long that when my apartment 
caved in around me during the earthquake, I wasn’t that scared” [46]. “I was 
so afraid to express myself for so long” [42]. “but even after so many years, I 
still have lingering fears left over from those days when I was a battered 
woman” [44]. “I didn’t even call my mom, I was afraid if they knew anything it 
would somehow endanger them” [58]. “And I had never had any reason or 
experience to cause me to really fear anyone, before that exact moment 
when Ron threatened my life and I knew he meant it” [60].
On children, and violenc.Very often the abuse extends to the
children: “He started getting abusive with the kids...They had seen to much 
violence, it breaks my heart”[54]. “ ...when I told Tom I wanted a divorce, he 
locked himself in the bathroom and said he was going to shoot himself...he’d 
call me at work and tell me he didn’t want to live anymore, and he’d be at 
home with our kids, and I would panic that they were in danger”[50].
From the story provided by a nine year old boy: “It was July 1st when 
my dad broke my mom’s leg. While I was on the phone to 911 my 
grandfather, he’s about 87 I think, he hobbled over and tried to stop my dad 
but my dad punched him in the face. I tried to stop him again and then he 
punched me about 5 or 6 times” [56].
Sometimes, obviously, the battery is severe: “My husband had beaten 
me for 10 years and once burned my face with an electrical hair-straightening 
comb”[44]. “I didn’t hear any sounds again for 2 1/2 years” [48]. “I had these
big bruises on my face, and I had to go to the hospital later because I kept 
getting dizzy spells and bloody noses”[56]. “...two and a half years later, my 
face literally collapsed on day at work”[66].
Planning to leave.The women did try to leave, to end the 
relationships, some many times: “he started being verbally abusive to the 
point where I got scared and broke off the engagement, but then he started 
calling me” [66]. “I moved out a couple of times. But he would make these 
promises, and I really wanted to keep our family together” [4], “...I tried to 
break it off many times. But he would always try to control me. He would push 
me, grab me, lock me out, he would spit on me...”[62]. “I left with my three 
daughters several times, but he’d always track us down”[68]. “I thought 
leaving him would end the problem, and so I had a girlfriend help me secretly 
move all of my things out of our storage unit...but it wasn’t over, it was only 
the beginning. He just wouldn’t let go” [46]. “even after he remarried he 
wouldn’t leave me alone” [1].
The great escapes Some women made elaborate preparations to 
escape: “I waited for him to fall asleep, and at two o’clock in the morning, in 
sweatpants and a nightgown, I tiptoed out of our condo with a quarter in my 
hand, walked three blocks down the street to a pay phone and called the 
police...”[4], For some, the children provided the reason to finally leave: “So 
that day, we weren’t fighting, I wasn’t mad, I just looked at their faces and 
knew it had to come to an end. I got up and told him to leave. And he did, 
that was the last time he lived here”[54]. For another, it was the voice of a
180
181
beloved grandmother, urging her to leave; “I kept hearing my grandmother’s 
words, and the next morning I quietly told my daughter to go get in the car. I 
took almost nothing, and I just started driving north...I ended up about four 
hours away, at a friend of my father’s who was a lawyer. I filed my divorce 
from there” [58].
For yet another woman, the escape was literally a life-saving rescue: 
“He took me to the emergency room and then stood by me so I couldn’t tell 
the nurse what really happened...and while he was gone I told her ‘He did 
this to me...’ And she called the police” [62].
It doesn’t end.Even leaving did not stop the abuse: “It wasn’t over,
but it was the first step. He still called, he threatened, he broke in” [4]. “and he 
kept harassing me until I moved out of the area and he no longer knew where 
to find me”[48]. “He stalked me for years after he left, I’m talking major 
stalking. He would get on the roof of my house, cut my electricity off, cut my 
phone lines. He put gasoline on my front lawn. He superglued all my doors 
locked” [54]. “...for the next two years after I left him, he terrorized us, he 
stalked me, he broke in, he tried to poison the dog, the police were always 
being called” [32].
Scars remain.One common theme is that the impact of domestic 
violence is long lasting, whether the battery is physically devastating, or not: “I 
was so emotionally paralyzed that I couldn’t open my mail” [1]. “ ...my whole 
adult life has been a chain reaction to that relationship, that fear. It takes 
away your ability to trust, it takes away your innocence”[2]. “But more than
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your bones, it’s your innocence, your trust, your spirit that gets broken. There 
isn’t any surgery to fix that”[66]. “And now the death of my husband is one 
more horror I have to live with the rest of my life” [68].
Emotjonal consequences.Women’s ability to feel emotions is
sometimes warped and stunted: “The prisoner I interviewed had been
battered for 31 years. She couldn’t even look us in the eye, she was so
embarrassed, and still blaming herself for being abused” [34]. “I was really
ashamed of what was going on”[42]. “I recall vividly the searing pain of
rejection, of feeling inferior, unwanted and incredibly isolated, constantly
stifling my emotions to avoid conflict, fearing the loss of his love” [60]. “when I
first went to the lawyer, I was so ashamed, I could only whisper it, ‘He’s been
hurting me’”[28]
Lack o f understanding. Lack of understanding is another theme.
Sometimes the lack is on the part of the victim, sometimes in society: “Why
didn’t I know about it until it happened to me?” [12]. “It kept getting worse, but
I just didn’t know how to get out” [4]. “I couldn’t understand the nightmare it
became” [30]. “looking back...I feel sick. I can’t explain how it could have
gone on for years” [38]. “I don’t know how it happened...”[42]. “At least with
the earthquake I could understand what was happening and why. With my
boyfriend none of it ever made any sense” [46]. “By the final year of our
marriage, my life had deteriorated into a nightmare of fear, pain and despair,
and I didn’t know how to help myself” [68].
It’s difficult for someone on the outside to understand the isolation, 
hopelessness a battered woman feels. Sometimes looking back, it’s
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difficult for me to understand it myself because I’m in such a different 
state of mind today. Even when I went to trial, I didn’t know I was a 
battered woman. [70]
“But the court said my brother has to see my dad. I don’t understand,
if it’s not safe for me, how can it be safe for a little baby?”[56].
“I hadn’t reported it because I was so afraid of what he’d do, but no
one seemed to understand” [50]. “People who haven’t experienced it
themselves just don’t understand what it does to you” [44]. “You can’t reason
with somebody about this when they say ‘well, you can just leave...’”[22]. “But
people think you can just leave and its over, and it doesn’t work like that”[32],
“There doesn’t seem to be any easy answer” [32].
“I’m angry at myself that I didn’t wake up sooner. Why didn’t I leave
and stay gone? Why did I keep coming back? I know the answers, but it still
doesn’t make sense to me” [4].
Marriage norm alcy and_hopes. Women attempted to give reasons 
for staying: frequently cited reasons were because they were married and 
they respected their vows [1], “If you get married, then it’s for life, and you 
have to take whatever is dished out to you” [20].
Yet another woman stayed because she wanted normalcy: “And you 
know you have to go logically, but you know that when it’s good he makes 
you feel beautiful and you love him. So you stay, you just want things to be 
normal'[2, italics hers].
Women stayed because they had hopes: “And I believed, once he’d 
stop drinking, he’d stop abusing me and we’d have a great life together...”[4].
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And because they were enculturated: “As an educated African- 
American woman you’re socialized to support your man...And so I went into 
my nurturing mode” [14].
Many stayed because of fear: “And he told me ‘If you try to go out that 
window I will kill you and I will kill your child.’ I stayed because I believed him” 
[18]. “I didn’t end it because I thought he would hurt me. I didn’t file a police 
report because I believed it would humiliate him in the department or cause 
him to lose his position, and that would put me at greater risk”[14].
One woman even poignantly reflects that victims don’t want to
acknowledge the problem:
I didn’t verbalize what was happening to me because that would make it 
real. The transformation you go through is so subtle, and it’s so 
progressive. I’m sure every girl when they're a teenager says ‘no man 
will ever hit me!’ And then, when it happens to you, you want to 
rationalize it and justify it, because you don’t want it to be so. What are 
you going to do if you’ve made a commitment to this man, this 
relationship, this life, and it isn’t what you thought it would be?...the 
thing is, you’re so cut off from the real world. I guess I had never 
honestly thought of myself as a battered woman. I thought of myself as 
not having the best marriage [22].
“I tried hard to maintain my home so that my own children could have 
the stability I didn’t have, growing up in foster homes” [24].
Answering, the question^“ Why?”  Perhaps the most common and 
significant question is “Why?”; why did you stay, why did you go back, why 
did you accept that treatment, why did you not leave? Almost every woman 
attempted, in some way, to answer that question. For many, emotional 
abuse, lack of self esteem, and a tendency to blame themselves were key. 
Thirteen of the victims directly reflect this type of abuse. “I didn’t see my self
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esteem being whittled away” [1]. “He tells you how stupid you are and then
when you confide in a friend they tell you how stupid you are for staying...and
every time you go back to him you hate yourself a little more. And then he
hurts you again, and it starts tearing you apart bit by bit” [2]. “My brain would
get numb, I would think ‘He’s right, something’s wrong with me’”[8]. “ ...so
when he’d slap me, I thought I was getting my comeuppance” [18].
In the beginning, I just kept trying to make it better. And then towards 
the end it was like waiting for a pat on the head. He had me reduced to 
a child, I was so brainwashed. I think it was the repetitiveness of hearing 
how stupid and useless I was, that I was never good enough. What I 
thought didn’t matter, what I wanted wasn’t important, I was never right,
I was always wrong...He kept saying this to me over and over and over. 
To the point where, towards the end, I really believed there was 
something wrong with me, that he must be right, I couldn’t function in the 
outside world without him...It was as though I had lost my personhood. 
[16]
“For a long time I believed that, I thought it must be me” [26].
“And there’s a prototype of a victim, and I could see that I was sort of 
that type, very nurturing and traditional, always willing to take blame myself 
rather than blame someone else” [34].
“After we were married, I kept making excuses for his anger and
thinking it was me. Because if it was me, then I had some control over it and I
could change it” [58].
After awhile, you see yourself through your batterer’s eyes and its not a 
pretty thing to look at. He made me believe it was my fault, that there 
was something wrong with me, that I couldn’t give enough or be enough 
to make my marriage work [42].
“He wasn’t from the projects, like I was, and I saw him as this good 
person who was better than me...but I had no self-esteem, when somebody 
is constantly telling you that you’re ugly, that you’re nothing...”[54],
“ ...there was so much shame and guilt and of course you have no self­
esteem anyway” [22].
“The ugliest for me was when it carried over into our intimate life, I was 
just something he owned and could use at will, and kick aside when he was 
done”[20],
“You don’t even think at the time about what you could do” [32].
“,,,that’s the state of mind I was in at that time, after being so 
physically and mentally abused by this man” [68].
From Pictures and Themes, Answered Questions
On a personal note once, many many years ago, I was a single 
mother, standing in a line to collect food stamps. I had talked to four or five 
counselors and social workers, filled out innumerable sheets of paper work, 
moved from line to line, clutching forms. I distinctly remember thinking that 
this was an alien and foreign world to me. I had a college degree at the time, 
and remember feeling inarticulate and lost, introduced to an alien reality. I 
thought, “I have a degree. I am an intelligent woman, and yet I am 
bewildered. What do you do if you don’t even know the questions to ask?"
In some life situations, especially when faced with something that 
seems literally, another world, the questions themselves can be difficult to 
articulate. This text takes the reader into another world: a world where
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horrors are committed in the name of love, where smart women can seem to 
be rendered idiotic, where the rules are so twisted that leaving or staying 
seems equally perilous.
The reader searches the faces of the women. They seem normal, they 
seem “like” rather than “other.” The reader knows, from the title and 
introduction, that the women have been in relationships where domestic 
violence was a reality. How can that be? What reasons could the women 
provide? How can the reader articulate all the questions?
In a sense, narratives solve that dilemma for us. Narratives outline 
the cast and characters and provide answers in the form of reasons. We 
understand the logic of stories. And the narratives offered by the former 
victims provide both an understandable framework for their reality, and an 
answer to questions the reader might not realize s/he wanted answered.
Thus from the stories offered by the women, the “real” victims and 
survivors of domestic violence, the reader is provided with a myriad of good 
reasons for literally any question skeptic citizens might ask:
• Why did you marry/become involved with this man/woman? [See 
narratives on pages 15,16, 12, 50, 46, 26, 52, 16, 58, 66, 38]
• When did this start? [Narratives on pages 42, 16, 28, 68]
• Why didn’t you realize what was going on? [pages 58, 46, 48, 68, 16, 12, 
42, 52, 26, 60]
• Why did you accept this treatment? [36]
• What made you stay? [16, 28, 48, 54, 44]
• Why did you not leave? [66, 4, 62, 68, 46, 1, 54, 50]
• Why did you go back? [46,16,28,48]
• Why didn’t you just call the police? [54, 10, 48, 38, 50, 4, 22, 24]
• Why didn’t you reach out to get help? [8, 20, 46, 42, 58]
o What about your family? [18,20,14,38, 50, 68, 56] 
o Your pastor? [46,48]
o Why didn’t you trust the system? [48,38,1,50,44,22,24].
• What made you finally leave? [54,58, 62]
• How did you escape? [4,54,58,62]
• How do you justify your behavior? [42,52,26,34,36,20,1,8]
• How did you feel? [38,42,44,50,8,20,46,58,60,1,2,66,68]
One of the most important questions is not even articulated: Who are 
you? And the equally important answer: I am everywoman. I could be you.
“Our World’’ and “Their World”
Insofar as the narratives provide answers for citizen’s questions, they 
provide good reasons for viewing the women as other than victims, as 
normal, as survivors. There is another way, as aforementioned, in which the 
narrative functions. The narrative reveals a world, the world occupied by the 
victim. What is both striking and rhetorically valuable is the similarity that can 
be extrapolated from the victim stories and the familiar de romantic
relationships in the world today.
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“Our World”
While much has been written about the “new” family, the dominant 
social narrative nonetheless favors the romantic grand narrative : courtship, 
love followed by marriage, children, and “happily ever after” or, at least, 
married ever after. Particularly in a world that still remembers a controversy 
sparked by Murphy Brown’s conscious choice to be a single mother, and 
where many leaders and average people steadfastly support and reiterate the 
necessity of the nuclear family, there is quite often a stigma against single 
mothers and broken families. Despite the very real knowledge that Ozzie and 
Harriet are an idealization of the 1950s, most citizens will acknowledge that 
an intact, nuclear family, is the norm.
Feminists are not the only persons who have focused attention on the 
transparent acceptance that women are wives-and-mothers, by virtue of 
social mores and biological destiny. Even romantic courtly love and notions 
of chivalry, passed down from the fourteenth century, presuppose the end 
result is marriage, and marriage is not an institution to be taken lightly.
Women in the world of the 21st century unarguably have more options 
than their earlier sisters. But there still remains the seductive allure of “doing 
it the right way” and submitting to a world of romance, courtship, marriage 
and family. How different, really , is the world of the abused woman?
“ Their”  World
From the reasons provided in the narrative, the world of the women 
was not substantially different from that recognized by any rational individual.
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First, every woman desired a relationship. They all believed in love. They 
accepted their relationship as normal, and they wanted very much to be 
normal. They wanted their relationship to work. They accepted blame. They 
made excuses. They tried harder when things did not work out. They did not 
want to be alone. They did not want to be without the beloved. They 
accepted their role as caregiver. They reached out for help. They bought the 
package.
The women in Anderson’s book present a subtle argument about 
betrayal. They are steadfast in urging that they should not be defined by their 
abuse, but by their humanity. In the context of intimate relationships, physical 
abuse is symptomatic of a more fundamental denial of respect for their 
human dignity by a partner with whom they have merged their lives. Their 
betrayal was an act perpetrated by the abuser: the women certainly did not 
seek or cause that devastation. They were, quite literally, victims, and the 
same respect, care, compassion and moral commitment should be extended 
to them as would be extended to victims of any other human tragedy.
Where the Worlds are Different...
The notion of the victim’s world functions on two levels, 
simultaneously. On the one hand, their narratives and pictures attest to their 
reality in the lifeworld of the reader. They are “modern American women” 
accessible, on some level, to most readers. Certainly they reveal emotions 
that are not unique to them or their situation; most readers have known love
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and caring, and fear and confusion, and hopes and dreams, and bitter reality. 
They have held jobs, borne children, participated in relationships.
At the same time, the women in the text present narratives that are 
largely past-tense. The world they reveal is the world of their past: of their 
abuse, and their abuser. The reader is led into this world through individual 
narratives. Although one might build an argument from laws and statistics 
about violence, that argument would neither engage a shared cultural 
narrative of romantic relationships that constitutes a world of hopes, acts and 
choices, nor would it achieve the stated, and imperative, goal of personalizing 
-  in this case, literally “putting a face on”-  victims of domestic violence. Their 
individual and collective narratives are essential to providing a compelling 
situation, to providing layer upon layer and picture put up beside picture, 
offering good reasons to answer readers’ questions, leading to an 
inescapable call to conscience: I am like you.
Another key, perhaps unexpected consequence, is that the very past- 
tense of the narratives (“I was”, “s/he used to”, “we planned”) indicates a 
movement beyond the state and identity of “victim.” These women are no 
longer victims, but survivors, telling of their former-selves, explaining their 
then-selves to a current audience. The world they wanted, the world common 
to all, is the world that can be accepted and shared. The world they lived can 
only be reached narratively because it is a world that no longer exists: they 
have left it. They have survived. They have emerged into a world where 
these stories can be heard, just as their previous cries, as victims, to family,
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friends, religious leaders, and the system, were ignored and/or silenced.
They were victims of domestic violence and abuse. They are now survivors. 
They are the bridges between that pain filled and silenced past, and the 
eternal present that the reader shares.
Two additional things allow for identification, beyond the good reasons 
and the compellingly presented narrative world. First: the women are very 
real bridges, able to translate their past experiences, by virtue of good 
reasons, into a narrative of compelling coherence and fidelity, thus allowing 
the reader to accept their vernacular persuasion. Their morally compelling 
tale of undeserved pain, and the call for remediation and change, are not 
diminished by their no longer being victims. Indeed, that may be the very 
reason that their narrative compels.
Secondly, they have survived. They are current residents of the world 
known by you and me, by the reader, by potential publics. They have been to 
a world of terror and returned, perhaps bloodied and certainly bruised, but 
they exist in our collective world. Their answers are spoken in our language, 
in our present reality. It makes sense because it is the language of current 
experience. “We left. We survived.”
There is a sad, but almost inescapable conclusion: There cannot be a 
voice of the victim. She could not provide reasons we accept. She didn’t 
leave. She is not one of us.
Conclusion
The chapter is titled “Making it personal,” which reflects the dual nature 
of the rhetorical task: first, the need to move from “pure victim” to a more 
accurate, and at the same time more complex, presentation of the victim and 
her experience. This move is necessary if the definition of domestic violence 
is to be expanded beyond the limitations of extreme physical battery, to 
include physical, emotional, verbal, sexual, or financial abuse. The women in 
the text span age, race, ethnicity, economic, education and class boundaries, 
just as their suffering was physical but also emotional, sexual, financial, 
spiritual, psychological.
Secondly, the advocates must present a victim who is not “other” 
whose very ordinary face, personality, hopes, fear and experiences, will serve 
to explain, justify and demand a call to conscience on the part of the 
audience: “I am like you. I am not deviant, I did nothing to warrant cruelty.”
Anderson’s A Woman Like You serves as a rhetorical artifact that 
accomplishes those goals. The text and pictures provide a meta-narrative 
exemplified by the title: these women are very normal. Their faces, their 
situations, and their stories serve as a doorway into a world where 
mistreatment and abuse is vastly more complex than “mere” physical battery, 
just as the women are far more complex than the one dimensional picture 
presented of the murdered victims in Defending Our Lives.
The nature of their response to mistreatment is also significantly 
different from that of the “pure” victim, who might engage in violence as
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a response to severe and escalating violence) and whose whole experience 
is categorized as extreme abuse and terror. While some of the women did, 
indeed, experience violence that led them to kill, the clear majority did not.
Their experience of abuse was as varied as their faces. While the 
abuser’s exercise of power and control remain a central and common theme, 
most of the women -  often not without great hardship and pain -- left their 
abuser. Quite a few of them went on to healthier relationships, and to fulfilling 
lives. In this respect, they are living testimonials to the continued existence, 
diversity and complexity of the issue of domestic violence, and of the 
women’s lived experiences with abuse.
Their stories, presented very much as Graham outlined, follow a 
natural procedure of argument: a linear sequence of fact upon fact, picture 
beside picture, that inescapably lead the reader to the situation of the victim. 
The very ordinary quality of the woman, their recognizability, leads to 
identification. Further, their individual and collective narrative provide a host 
of good reasons to explain their actions, to make sense of their experiences, 
to issue a call to conscience, to exert a moral call for action.
One perhaps unexpected result of this presentation, and one which will 
need to be examined at a later date, is that, ultimately, these are not stories of 
victims, but of survivors. To be sure, they were victims, and their transition to 
survivor does not lessen the validity of their multiple claims. It does, however, 
provide another set of questions. These women, and their stories, are stories 
of former victims, and of survival. They have all moved beyond “mere”
victims. What then, of the stories of the victim? Where is she? Can she be 
heard in a public space, or is her voice only available when she has moved to 
the status of statistic (Nicole Brown Simpson) or survivor?
The narratives and pictures, together, provide an ethos, a credibility, a 
situation, a worldview, and a call to a public that cannot be escaped. In 
reading their stories, studying their faces, we come to the inevitable 
conclusion: they are like us, and if it could happen to her....
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SAFEHOUSE STORY: EXPANDING TERRAIN 
Introduction
In previous chapters, we have seen the “evolution” of the public face of 
domestic violence. We have seen an attempt to control the issue in terms of 
establishing facticity, remediability and moral obligation, characteristics 
Gusfield (1981) deems central to ownership of an issue. We have also seen 
a shift in the image of the victim from a “pure” victim, to a “woman like you.” 
One key question remains: where do survivors, feminists and activists go 
from here? After all, the VAWA (Violence Against Women Act) is now law. 
More and more communities are enacting legislation and procedures to deal 
with domestic violence perpetrators and victims. It’s a done deal, isn’t it?
Yet the facts, figures and statistics indicate that domestic violence is 
still a problem, still an issue, and still involved in ownership contestation. As 
recently as 2000, letters to the editor appeared in the Boulder Daily Camera 
challenging the feminist attributions of patriarchy as causal. The economy, 
poor communication skills, feminist lobbying, general male frustration and 
justified fear of "the system" -  other reasons, other scenarios are being 
offered to account for, perhaps even to cure, the problem of domestic 
violence. And while the feminists and activists still argue eloquently for the 
causal combination of patriarchy and power interrelationships, there still
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remains the specter that haunts every speech, every presentation, every 
training session: Why didn’t she do something? What went wrong with their 
relationship? It could never happen to me... In other words: why is this a 
social and not an interpersonal relationship problem? Answers provided do 
not necessarily mean answers accepted.
To assume that the issue, by virtue of public awareness and legal 
consequences, has been “resolved” in any way is to oversimplify the complex 
dynamics at the core of the issue. While the crime of battery may indeed be 
more frequently sanctioned, and while a spade is indeed being more often 
called a spade where violence is involved, there remain a spectrum of harmful 
behaviors and attitudes that victims, survivors, and their advocates still see 
present and looming in today’s social climate.
Moreover, as we have seen in Chapters Four and Five, the “face” of 
the victim has changed, and issue owners were the ones who engaged in the 
struggle to make that change. There are material, consequential benefits to 
the altered presentation of “the victim” -  placing the issue under the control of 
grassroots activists instead of clinical therapeutic challengers; demanding the 
issue be seen as a moral, public problem deserving of remediation; “proving” 
that the women are not mentally ill, but normally, eventimes heroically, 
responding to an abnormal situation; broadening the definition of victim and 
allowing a personal identification. Much has, indeed, changed. However, like 
riding the infamous tiger: what do you do next? How does an agency respond 
to ongoing changes in public perception? How is ownership maintained over
198
an issue that many would still like to see disappear from public 
consciousness? You said you wanted laws: now you have them. What more 
do you want? This chapter will look at the ways Safehouse continues to 
manage the issue, and represent the faces, and voices, of victims.
Managing the Public Face of Domestic Violence
To a very real extent “the public” has a memory as short as the most 
recent — or last — scandal. The general citizen accepts changes with a nod, 
and moves on to whatever is next in his/her busy and conflicted lives.
Drinking and driving is a “reality” they all “know” about. Periodically the 
“owners” of the issue might have to remind them of how important it is, on 
holiday weekends, near graduations and proms, because they surely might 
forget lessons learned at cost, unless, of course, the cost is borne by them, 
personally. Quite often, those reminders are also punitive in tone: drink, drive 
and pay the price.
Such, to an extent, is also the case with domestic violence. Most 
probably tend to forget about it until they hear of an incident that might touch 
close to home: a local murder/suicide, or domestic violence-related kidnap 
situation. In Boulder County in 2002, for example, five of the six homicides 
were domestic violence related (Safehouse information packet, 2003). Each 
time another one happens, the previous tragedies are trotted out to remind 
the community of the reality of domestic violence. But that is certainly a 
“negative” campaign to keep domestic violence as a current and serious
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problem in the minds of various publics. It is, quite literally, a "dead end" 
where the most powerful witness is often a murdered one, far beyond the 
reach of intercession or remediability. All that remains is for the perpetrator to 
"pay" for his or her actions.
Boulder County Safehouse advances proactive research and 
education as a "better" alternative to after-the-fact legal remedies. It has 
committed a considerable portion of its resources to just that: between 16 and 
18 per cent of operating costs (year end reports, 2000, 2001, 2002). Its 
community education program is consistently and visibly active in attempting 
to engage a public and challenge existing concepts of domestic violence. 
Increasingly, its focus is to end all forms of violence. To that end, it adopts a 
public, political-activist stance. The challenge is to keep the issue, the 
women, the agenda, in front of a jaded and media-bombarded citizenry; 
bringing the pathos of reality into lives already stressed by economic, social, 
political and personal woes.
The Rhetorical Challenge
Control of public perception, indeed of any perception, is fundamentally 
a rhetorical issue: that dimension of discourse that frames the world in a way 
that invites assent, influences choice, judgment, and reality. To that end, 
problems with perception, with ownership, with social change, are rhetorical 
problems.
In the case of Boulder County Safehouse, the structure of the 
organization impacts attempts at formation of an engaged public. This
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feminist organization is located at the boundary of public and private spheres: 
it has both a public face and presence (as it attempts to assert and maintain 
ownership of the issue of domestic violence), and it has a private identity, as it 
shelters, responds to the needs of victims of abuse, and attempts to empower 
those victims. The organization also sponsors and runs two buildings: the 
Shelter, and the Outreach (Administrative) building, which correspond to the 
private and public functions, respectively.
As described in Chapter Two, there is a symbolic and symbiotic 
relationship between the two physical structures. While the shelter provides 
the raison d ’etre for the outreach building, it also represents an emotional and 
ethical boundary whose parameters cannot be breached: people who visit are 
sworn to secrecy, narratives engendered or shared cannot cross into the 
public -  no matter how persuasive and helpful an appeal it might make -- 
because the shelter is as it is named: a haven. Women must be protected 
there. Women are heard in that protected space.
In a sense that is both ironic and paradoxical the shelter is one 
[admittedly quasi-] public place where the voice of the victim is heard -  but 
the “voices” and their narratives stay in the shelter. The voices of victims are 
heard and validated, but to make the transition into the public, the narrative 
must be carried by another (with all key details disguised to protect the victim) 
or must be the first-person narrative of a survivor. Come to shelter to be 
heard, but know that no-one outside these walls will hear story unless 
you change yourself from victim to survivor. For those advocates and
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volunteers who have committed their lives and time to combating domestic 
violence, there is a wealth of rhetorical opportunities inaccessible to them: 
they are bound by ethics to protect the vulnerable and thus are an ironic part 
of silencing them.
And while the Outreach is actively engaged in public contestation for 
issue ownership, control, definition and framing, a great deal of its public 
ethos comes from work done in the Shelter. That work, however, is presented 
to the public most often in the form of statistics; how many calls answered, 
how many women helped, how many turned away. If the organization 
presents narratives, so much detail has been changed as to render the 
storyteller faceless: “Rosa” or “Mina” or “Anike.” Their attempt to call a public 
requires, as we have seen in previous chapters, some use of narratives, but 
they are hampered in the narratives that they can use: they are most often 
forced to “fall back” to the metanarrative of patriarchy because the wealth of 
interpersonal narratives shared in Shelter are off limits.
In part because of the two physical structures (and their corresponding 
“public” and “private” aspects), but more often because of the symbolic and 
ethical considerations, resulting in its nature as a boundary spanning entity, 
Safehouse must address multiple audiences as it attempts to shape 
perceptions of domestic violence, and calls its public into existence to affect 
change.
In sum, the rhetorical problems facing the organization of Safehouse 
include: 1) providing public identities -  face and voice -  to victims as they
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transition from private to public; 2) maintaining ownership of the issue of 
domestic violence, while keeping the issue fresh and vital in the minds of 
public and private citizens (the move to “social justice”); and 3) redefining the 
issue and the face of the victim as new knowledge and theory presents itself 
(i.e. expanding the concept of “survivor”) keeping in mind that all these 
problems involve appeals to multiple audiences, interior and exterior to 
Safehouse itself, who are members of its public.
Data Set Information
In examining Safehouse “public” documents, the aim was to assess 
those documents which were 1) generally available to the public (newsletters, 
brochures and the “ 20-Year Herstor]/’booklet) as well as 2) documents used
to influence its public, to assist in the construction of a public face, and voice, 
of domestic violence. To that end, documents in category two include training 
materials for the general “volunteer” (now referred to as “paraprofessional”) 
training, held twice a year, and a training packet used by the Speaker’s 
Bureau.
Data Descriptions
Newsletters.Newsletters are seasonal, published four times a year. 
The winter issue is primarily a “Year in Review” presentation of the previous 
year’s activities. It includes a chronicle of events presented by the Director; a 
page of statistics (see Appendix); and a graphic which displays, in pie-chart 
format, the revenue, expenditures and expense by program.
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Regular newsletter features include the page one highlighted event or 
news item; page two, with the exception of the “Year in Review” issue, is 
dedicated to a “Letter from the Director” (Anne Tapp). Page three is the 
quarterly report; page four contains “News & Views,” which includes an article 
in Spanish and updates pertinent to presentations/education; page five is 
dedicated to Volunteers, and includes recognition and news for volunteers; 
pages six and seven are usually “Community Funding and Events.” The final 
page is a foldover: half is the mailing and return address, and the other half is 
the “wish list” of items the Shelter and Administrative offices could use.
Brochures.While there are a great many brochures available at 
Safehouse, most of them tend to be event-specific. For example, there are 
multiple brochures advertising the Social Justice series, and individual flyers 
advertising each month’s offering. There is a volunteer newsletter, geared 
exclusively to (primarily recognition of) internal volunteer audiences featuring 
pictures and names of members of different “teams” along with information 
specific to that team. The Volunteer Application form is a four-page 
application with accompanying flyer describing volunteer opportunities and 
expected date and time commitments. There is also a Community Education 
Forum flyer, offering “community training on a variety of topics related to 
social justice and violence prevention” to “share with your organization, 
business or professional group” [cite]. The trainers are Safehouse paid staff.
There is also, for public consumption, a brochure -  a booklet -- of 
which the organization is extremely proud. Put together by volunteers in
204
1999, it represents an essential piece of Safehouse’s history, or, as they 
name it, the “herstory.”
Boulder County Safehouse^ A 20-Year HerstorvThis 1999 
publication opens with “A Resident’s Story,” which is followed by “The 
Safehouse Story.” The booklet is 8 x 11 inches, on glossy paper. Pages are 
unnumbered. Pictures are black and white, the accent color is peach or pale 
terra cotta. Articles are sometimes framed, sometimes placed on a block of 
the peach color.
On the outside margin of each page runs a timeline of key events from 
1972 through 1999. Within the borders of the timeline is a running narrative 
of the development of Safehouse. The booklet also contains black and white 
pictures of events, scenes, and key individuals in the development of 
Safehouse. There is also a boxed article called “A Safe Place” whose 
descriptor is “this is a story of Marta....” The narrative is written in Spanish.
There are sections titled “Thoughts from the Architect;” “Programs” 
(including Emergency Shelter, Advocacy, Outreach Services and Education); 
“Volunteers;” and “Funding.” The next three pages include a poem, entitled “I 
Didn’t Run Away” by “Maria, 1993;” another poem familiar to many women, 
entitled “Comes the Dawn” by “Anonymous;” and a “Letter to a Battered 
Woman” from “Suzanne.”
The booklet ends with a section “Envisioning a Future Without 
Violence,” and another poem “Thank You Clarissa” by “Robin, 1993.” The 
final page is an almost full page photograph of a blond woman, suitcase in
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one hand, toddler in a cowboy hat on the other, apparently entering a lighted 
room. She is walking away from the viewer, through a doorway, into a lighted 
room. Behind her is darkness, and a porch covered with fallen leaves. 
Volunteer Training Information
Paraprofessional Tijinig.Safehouse conducts an intensive
volunteer training in the winter and summer of each year. The training 
requires pre-screening of candidates: a four page application must be filled 
out, and an interview scheduled with the volunteer coordinator. Volunteers 
must be “accepted” before being allowed to commence training. Part of the 
interview attempts to assess whether volunteers who are survivors of 
domestic abuse have sufficiently recovered from the experience to avoid re­
traumatization during the training.
A time commitment to attend all three weeks of sessions is also 
required. There are 10 sessions in all: Tuesday and Thursday evenings, 7 -  
10 p.m., and Saturdays from 8:30 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. -  approximately 50 
hours of training.
The first two weeks are generalized training, followed by a week of 
specialized training in the area the volunteer has chosen. Areas include 
shelter volunteers (staff the crisis line and assist counselors in the shelter); 
victim advocates (provide “immediate, in-person response at the scene of a 
battering incident” ); court advocates (accompany clients to court hearings, 
help in the process of obtaining a restraining order, advocate on behalf of 
clients during interactions with court officials); children’s volunteers (“provide
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a safe place for kids to play and ‘be kids’ by facilitating individual and group 
activities for children at the shelter...); tri-city volunteers (who work on the 
crisis line in Lafayette) and administrative volunteers (who work at the 
Outreach Center, and for whom the 50 hour training is optional5).
Topics covered in training include recognizing violence; the cycle of 
violence; training to counsel victims; barriers that prevent women from leaving 
abusive relationships; public presentations on the issue; viewing the movie 
Defending Our Lives; presentation of statistics about violence nationally and 
locally; a visit to the shelter; and a day where related social problems 
including ageism, heterosexism, classism, able-ism, and racism are 
presented as contributing to the maintenance of a society that tolerates 
domestic abuse.
The training packet, titled An Introduction to Domestic Violence: Fact 
sheets compiled by Boulder County Safehouse, contains the following: 
Safehouse Mission; Boulder County Safehouse Fact Sheet; Safehouse 
Services -  Brief Overview; A Philosophy of Empowerment; Barriers to 
Leaving; Questions to Ask Yourself About Your Relationship; The Cycle of 
Violence; Early Warning Signs of Potential Abuse; Types of Verbal or 
Emotional Abuse; The Impact of Witnessing Violence on Children [which 
would more accurately be titled: witnessing violence: the impact on children]; 
Hints That Child Abuse May Be Occurring; Frequently Asked Questions; Age- 
Specific Indicators; and Safety Planning.
5 All inform ation from current, 2003, “Volunteer and Internship Opportunities at Boulder County 
Safehouse” brochure and volunteer application.
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Volunteers are also asked to commit to actually working for the shelter 
or outreach program: the training is to create educated workers, not merely to 
educate the general public. There are other services which focus on public 
education, including the Speaker’s Bureau.
Speaker’s Bureau.The Speaker’s Bureau is a subset of volunteer
training. It was revived in 2002, and its purpose is “to end domestic violence 
through education and social change. We engage the public in dialogue 
about the issues, Safehouse services, and volunteer and employment 
opportunities through Booths, Fairs, Special Events, Lecture, and Interactive 
Workshops” (Safehouse Volunteer Newsletter, Spring 2002, p. 5). The bureau 
involves people who, as the name implies, are providing personal interface 
with various populations who want to know more about the issue of Domestic 
Violence, and Safehouse in particular.
Volunteer speakers address diverse groups, including schools, clubs, 
and community organizations. They also regularly staff booths at such events 
as the Boulder Creek Festival, the 9News Health fair and various nonprofit 
fairs; provide resources for a special NGO (nongovernmental organization) 
Summit and Conference Reception; create and offer workshops for the 
University of Colorado at Boulder’s International Women’s Week; and deliver 
police briefings to the Boulder Police Department on links between animal 
abuse and domestic violence. While there is an active school-based 
educational component operating through the Outreach center (called
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Choices and Change educational curriculum), the Speaker’s Bureau is a 
more broadly based community outreach program.
Many of the participants in the Speaker’s Bureau are themselves 
former victims of domestic violence. To that extent, they, and their narratives, 
serve as a/the “face: and “voice” of domestic violence. Like volunteers for the 
paraprofessional training, they must interview and be accepted to the bureau. 
To the extent that they have experienced domestic violence, or ‘intimate 
partner violence’ they must be self identified as survivors, or attest that they 
“were once victims” of domestic abuse, again, to discourage re-traumatization 
of women and/or exploitation.
The Speaker’s Bureau Presentation Packet includes the following: a 
general presentation outline, followed by expanded data, exercises, 
suggestions, and options for presentation [See “DV101 Presentation Outline” 
in Appendix E]. The expanded information section includes a section from 
Safety Planning with Battered Women: Complex Lives/Difficult Choices 
(Davies, 1998) which outlines Batterer Generated and Life Generated Risks.
I will examine how these data sets, and Safehouse public 
presentations, act to solve the rhetorical problems of redefining the issue, 
maintaining ownership of the issue, and providing voice to the victim.
Changing the Identity of “The Victim”
If attempts to create social change can be seen as a “macro” level of 
activity, Safehouse also has a “micro,” perhaps more private, side and 
agenda: empowerment of victims. This involves focus on individual women
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and their children: community members and shelter victims who rely on 
Safehouse for individual assistance. This agenda involves helping victims 
move from a private persecution to a public life; from a downtrodden and 
silenced existence to a public identity as a survivor. While the mission of 
empowerment has not changed, the terms and material conditions of that 
empowerment have evolved.
I had noticed, from my first involvement with, and observation of, the 
battered women’s movement in 1994, that there seemed to be an 
inescapable dichotomy in perceptions of battered women: women were either 
“survivors” or “victims.” There never seemed to be an intermediate ground: 
no “recovering but still in the relationship;” no “I’m almost ready to leave for 
the final time, as soon as Billy finishes college.” There were clearly 
established definitions: leave = survivor; return = victim (with the 
understanding, based on the “cycle of violence,” [Walker, 1979] that violence 
always escalates, barring outside or systemic intervention, thus many victims 
make the transition to statistics, as murdered partners...). I sincerely doubt 
that anyone, in 1995, who heard of a woman who returned to her abuser, 
would consider that woman to be anything but a potential statistic: 
increasingly broken, beaten, hopeless, lost...
In 2003, however, the open acknowledgment that returning to an 
abuser/abusive situation might be an option a coherent, rationally-thinking 
woman could choose, marked an obvious change. Over the past few years, 
Safehouse has come to rely on a text which, according to Lisa Olcese,
210
Director of Education, has "radically changed our outlook and ways of dealing 
with victims" of domestic violence. The book is titled Safety Planning with 
Battered Women: Complex Lives/Difficult Choices (Davies, 1998). It is 
presented as a key, recommended reference for any and all activists and 
volunteers.
Prior to adoption of the Davies book, the recommended text was Next 
Time She’ll Be Dead by Jones (1994). Jones’ book was the “bible” of 
Safehouse training in 1995: it was one of the first mass market, trade-sized 
paperbacks that attempted to outline, define, and assign responsibility for the 
issue of domestic violence. Written by a former victim, it presented statistics 
and stories. It also, as we shall see later, presented an attempt, much like 
Defending Our Lives, to present the issue as though arguing for the facticity 
and remediability of domestic abuse. It was very much like the earlier “pure 
victim” narrative, in that it dealt with severe violence and victims severely 
debilitated by that violence, torture and terror. Indeed, there is a large section 
(one out of six chapters, and one of the longest at 32 pages) which deals with 
the “story” of Hedda Nussbaum, a women so severely debilitated that she 
was unable to stop her partner, Joel Steinberg, from murdering their foster 
daughter. Again, Hedda is almost a perfect stereotype for the pure victim 
model, which focuses on the physical torture and mental abuse suffered by 
victims.
By virtue of the presentation in the Jones’ text, victims who left shelter 
and returned to relationships were often viewed as women to be pitied, lost
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souls, helplessly disappearing into the mist of pain and punishment. In many 
respects that is certainly true, as evidenced by statistics that women leave 
abusers multiple times before they successfully remove themselves from the 
abusive relationships. However, Davies’ 1998 book challenged that outlook: 
sometimes women make “rational” choices to return to an abusive 
relationship. Women are capable of making assessments of batterer­
generated and life-generated risks.
Batterer-generated risks involve seven broad categories: physical 
injury, psychological harm, risks to and involving the children, financial risks, 
risk to or about family and friends, loss of relationship, and risks involving 
arrest or legal status (Davies, 1998, p. 2). Life generated risks, often called 
social or environmental risks, include (and this is considered a partial list) 
"financial, home location, physical and mental health, inadequate responses 
by major social institutions, and discrimination based on race, ethnicity, 
gender, sexual orientation, or other bias" (p. 53).
Complexity and the Call for “Representative Thinking”
This presents yet another view of women involved in abusive 
situations. It broadens and makes exponentially more complex any attempt 
to generalize or categorize the women, their situations, and possible 
solutions. In earlier presentations of victim and survivor, delineations were 
[admittedly, overly] simple: survivors left the relationships, victims went back 
to their abuser, and victims often died, thus transitioning to statistics. This 
"new" face presents a rhetoric that refigures the battered woman as having a
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more complex set of choices than the reductionistic victim/survivor binary. It 
also asks a reader to engage in an act of what Hanna Arendt terms 
representative thinking:
Forming an opinion, as distinct from holding to blind prejudice, requires 
the ability to see things from the multiple perspectives of those who are 
present in the public realm, or what Arendt terms representative 
thinking (cited in Hauser, 1999, p. 94).
In Between Past and Future Arendt asserts:
The more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am 
pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel 
and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for 
representational thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my 
opinion, (cited in Hauser, 1999, p. 94)
The process of arriving at important political decisions requires more
than internal debate or reflection: it requires discourse and the presence,
perhaps even the narratives, of others. It is inherent in the formation of active
vernacular public spheres. Thus, Hauser concludes
The method for using representative thinking to arrive at political choice 
is rhetoric. Contemplation alone is insufficient to arrive at judgment of 
this sort; it requires deliberative conversations to explore the self- 
disclosing phenomenality of the event, to discriminate among conflicting 
phenomena within it, and to arrive at what Arendt herself regarded as 
the communal basis of the vita activa: a common sense of reality on 
which our judgment rests, (p. 99)
Thus as the rhetorical framing of battered women is changed, and the
portrait of survivor may include women who chose to return to a violent
relationship, the challenge to Safehouse also becomes more complex. Absent
satisfying, if static, binary concepts of battered women as “either/or” -victim or
survivor -  the potential public is asked to engage in a more complex level of
thinking: a representational mode that involves an increasingly active 
commitment to engage in discourse pursuant to opinion and judgment 
formation.
Practical Considerations and Organizational Actions
The radical nature of this rhetorical change cannot be stressed too 
keenly. Before, survivors were the “winners” because they escaped the 
relationship. Victims were the “losers” because they went back, often never 
to be heard from again, sometimes to be tragically remembered as a statistic. 
The binary frame of survivor/victim encouraged the perception that domestic 
violence was an issue that could be described ultimately as a matter of life 
and death: remember that Defending Our Lives referred to a “war” against 
women and children. Similarly, Next Time She’ll be uses both the war 
metaphor and battlefield statistics indicating that domestic violence takes 
more lives than recent military encounters, including the Vietnam war.
The continuing high numbers of women murdered by abusers testifies 
to the fact that it often is a matter of life and death. However, the new text, 
and the way Safehouse appropriates it, indicates a revision in the definition of 
the “survivor.” This redefinition of survivor is part of a ripple effect that can be 
seen in Safehouse’s current focus on not merely eradicating domestic 
violence, but in calling for even larger-scale social change, under the banner 
of a call for “peace for all women and children” and a new focus on the more 
broad topos of social justice.
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Of Risks and Justice
Remember that Davies’ (1998) “batterer-generated risks” was only half 
of the risk assessment. While probably more familiar to those who followed 
the earliest rhetorical constructions of domestic abuse (physical injury, 
psychological harm, risks to and involving the children, financial risks, risk to 
or about family and friends, loss of relationship, and risks involving arrest or 
legal status) these “batterer generated risks” can be seen as the strikingly 
similar to answers provided by many of the women in both Defending our 
Lives and A Woman Like You when asked “Why didn’t you leave?” They are 
most probably familiar to people who engage in discussion about the victim 
and the reality of domestic violence.
The other half of Davies’ risk assessment involved “life-generated 
risks”: Physical and mental health, and “inadequate responses by major 
social institutions and discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual 
orientation or other bias” (p. 53). Note that “life-generated risks” might 
reasonably be titled “societally-generated risks,” and once that association 
has been seen and/or accepted, it opens the door to the construction of social 
justice as central to remediation of domestic violence. Social justice for all, 
especially for women and children, becomes a prerequisite to the elimination 
of domestic violence as a social problem. A focus on “social justice” also 
allows an expansion of the ownership claims, which we will examine later.
Thus the evolving rhetoric of empowerment attempts to address the 
complexity of a woman’s choice by figuring her in a way that demands each
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woman’s case be considered sui generis. This also has the rhetorical efficacy 
of addressing the niggling why questions.
Further, as the rhetorical construction of the issue expands beyond 
“pure victim” its range of ownership claims correspondingly broadens. While it 
may not cover the full spectrum of reality, “black” and “white” are relatively 
easy to describe, and one term is often framed by its opposite (like “victim” 
and “survivor”). When the issue turns into presentations of many shades of 
grey, the issue becomes more complex, and so does the attempt to describe 
those shades. All battered women are not pure victims, all situations do not 
involve extreme physical battery, legislation alone apparently cannot 
eradicate intimate partner violence. How then to maintain ownership and 
control of the issue when shades of grey replace black and white? Is 
Safehouse riding the tiger, or controlling it?
The Exercise of Ownership: Expanded Terrain 
In Chapter Three we first discussed Gusfield’s (1981) presentation of 
ownership of public issues. He uses the metaphor of property ownership to 
describe public issue ownership. While the four qualities he lists as central to 
both forms of ownership (control, exclusiveness, transferability, and potential 
loss [p. 10]) remain important, one other aspect of property ownership 
becomes more visible: terrain.
In changing the face of the victim, in rhetorically reconstructing the 
binary simplicity and presenting a much more complex picture of the issue, 
Safehouse has arguably increased the terrain which they must manage as a
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problem owner. While there is no clear moment at which one might point and
say “This is the before and this is the after,” remember that grassroots
activists were primarily focused on framing the issue as one of societal
concern, societal responsibility: the cause was patriarchy, the responsibility
fell upon society, specifically through police, the courts, legislation and public
condemnation, to remediate the issue. The Boulder County Safehouse
mission statement in 1995:
The mission of Boulder County Safehouse, Inc., is to provide safe 
shelter, support, and advocacy for battered women and their children, 
and to work toward an end to domestic violence through educating the 
wider community and networking with other community agents 
(Safehouse training packet, Fall, 1995)
Although education and networking remain key priorities, much of that
work has been accomplished: there is a religious outreach ministry,
professional seminars, trained speakers, nationally recognized education
programs for elementary and middle-schoolers. The 2002 mission statement
is almost identical, but with a rhetorically telling difference:
The mission of Boulder County Safehouse, Inc., is to provide safe 
shelter, support, and advocacy for battered women and their children 
and to end domestic violence through education and social change. 
(Safehouse Paraprofessional Training packet, 2002, italics added)
While one could argue that social change was implicit in the Safehouse 
agenda, even from its foundation in 1979, explicitly labeling “social change” 
as a mission is significant. That wording implies an agenda beyond “stopping 
men from battering women” and a more active role than merely asserting that 
patriarchy is the cause. Moreover it reflects the changing terrain that their 
ownership oversees: social justice is now the umbrella, and underneath lie
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areas discussed in training on what insiders have been known to refer to as 
“ism-day;” able-ism, ageism, heterosexism, ethnicity and racism, class-ism.
Earlier claims of ownership may have been targeted merely — and I do 
use that word cautiously — at domestic battery, however now Safehouse is 
extending its scope to claim ownership interest in other issues. The physical 
and psychological safety of women and children are still the focus, but the 
argument has been expanded to indicate that there will not be true peace for 
women and children until all the “isms” have been cured. Indeed, under their 
logo on all newsletters are the words “Envisioning a Future Without Violence.” 
The same logo and words appear on fliers for the Social Justice Seminar 
Series, general Safehouse information brochures, publicity materials for 
fundraising, the Volunteer and Internship Opportunities application, and the 
“What every congregation needs to know about domestic violence...” 
brochure.
Thus Safehouse has managed to rhetorically construct social injustice 
as equated with violence to women and children. Patriarchy may still be the 
cause of social injustice, power and inequality are certainly at the root, but 
there is a different focus: the umbrella of ownership now arguably extends 
beyond battery to more subtle forms of social violence.
The Social Justice Series
One clear example of the extended umbrella of ownership is the Social 
Justice Series sponsored by Safehouse. As published in numerous individual 
fliers and highlighted in newsletters, the social justice series is a form of
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community education. In the Winter 2000 newsletter, “Year in Review” article,
by Safehouse director Anne Tapp:
Additional community education efforts occurred through the Safehouse 
Social Justice Series. These monthly lunchtime discussions included a 
gender analysis of domestic violence, women in prison, immigration and 
child abduction, feminist perspectives on mercy killing, intimate partner 
rape, and anti-racist activism, (p. 1)
And later in the same article:
In collaboration with the CU Law School and Latina/o service providers, 
Safehouse hosted “immigration Challenges in Boulder County,” a day­
long symposium which addressed immigration law, deportation issues, 
and domestic violence and its impact on immigration status. (p3)
Thus education and outreach on domestic violence now incorporates
issues such as immigration and child abduction, feminist perspectives on
mercy killing, deportation issues, and anti-racist activism. This seems to be a
far broader net of influence than was cast by the foremothers, who were
primarily concerned with removing women and children from situations of
physical violence and battery.
In the 2001 newsletter “Year in Review” article, Tapp describes the
education efforts:
The Safehouse Education Program, through the 2001 Social Justice 
Series and other community outreach efforts, provided opportunities to 
advance our understanding of and response to domestic violence. 
Substance abuse and addiction, gender differences in violence, health 
care and domestic violence, elder abuse, and art as a tool for healing 
were just some of the innovative topics...(Safehouse Winter 2002 
newsletter, p.1)
Note that, not only is the outreach an attempt to educate the public, it 
is an attempt to “advance our understanding of and response to domestic 
violence.” In educating the public and sharing their views, Safehouse not only
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advances its own institutional and individual understanding (which they would 
most likely describe as sharing stories with similarly concerned individuals) 
but they literally advance their understanding -  putting forward their view,
their argument, their narrative about the world -  by sharing it with individuals 
who may respond to the call and form a public which can authorize 
remediation of these [expanded] issues.
In the Winter 2003 issue, Anne Tapp begins the Year in Review article
with the words “The work of Boulder County Safehouse is fundamentally
about personal and social transformation” (p.1). She continues:
Throughout 2002, Safehouse served as a doorway to transformation for 
thousands of individuals impacted by domestic violence. 2002 was also 
a year in which social transformation was made possible through the 
numerous partnerships between Safehouse and other community 
groups working to ensure safety, peace and justice, (p. 1)
It does not require a gargantuan intelligence to grasp the rhetorical 
shift made by the organization: Safehouse now works with “other community 
groups” to “ensure safety, peace and justice.” We’re not just about battery 
anymore....
Yes, Chris, and that is all interesting, fascinating in fact. But what about 
narratives? Isn’t that part of the focus of your dissertation? Indeed.
Safehouse And The Use Of Narratives
There are two levels of narratives most frequently used by Safehouse. 
One level, the meta-level if you will, is a narrative that states there are horrible 
things that happen to women in this world; the world is a dangerous place to 
be for women, and sometimes the place that should be safest — the home —
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is the most dangerous. Because we care, we chose to be part of the solution 
and the solution requires social action...Here is the way we will enact a better 
world for all women and children...
This meta-narrative is framed and given life through the 
“paraprofessional” training program sponsored by Safehouse twice yearly. It 
is interesting to note that, in all the documentation provided in training, there 
are not specific narratives of victims, or survivors present. The presentation 
of the video Defending Our Lives is the closest official presentation of voices 
of survivors and, while certainly impactful, it is once again, a distanced and 
mediated presentation.
While the metanarrative is reinforced in the presentation of statistics 
and through the aforementioned “-ism” day in training (able-ism, age-ism, 
heterosexism, etc) where patriarchy is shown to impact many other subsets of 
discrimination, the only “narrative” in the training packet is of the cycle of 
violence (per Walker, 1987). This cycle describes (and asserts to be 
inescapably true) an escalating spiral of abuse and posits three consecutive 
phases: tension building, acute battering, and the honeymoon phase, during 
which the abuser attempts to apologize, woo, and court the victim.
The clear majority of training involves information: logos. Indeed the 
training packet is self-described as a “selection of fact sheets.” Questions are 
presented and answered: Why does she stay? (lists of reasons are provided). 
What happens when/if she leaves? (statistics are advanced about the danger 
to women once they have left the relationship). How does this affect children?
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(again, lists and statistics are offered). There are no individual narratives 
present in any of the training materials in the training packet.
A second level of narratives, personal stories, is, however, present in 
training. Remember that volunteers are screened. This is not a random 
audience of general public persons. These are people who have gone 
through some effort to be present. They have committed time and energy to 
being a part of the process. They have applied and been accepted. Many 
are former victims, or people who know victims from their neighborhood, their 
family, their close circle of friends. Many of those involved as trainers have, 
themselves, been victims, or close to victims.
In short, the audience is a very specialized group: one predisposed to 
hear information and share narratives. While the audience members may not 
know facts and figures about domestic abuse, facts and figures provided in 
abundance by the Safehouse training, they have experience with the issue. 
Their experience is solicited in training, during the 50 hours of group work, 
and their experience is oftentimes shared in narrative form. Narratives are 
shared at introductions, in workshops, over lunch on Saturdays. They are as 
common as a hello, and considered important, especially as there is almost a 
status to being a “survivor.”
Thus training not only provides volunteers with a specialized 
vocabulary and facts/figures/statistics to describe the issue of domestic 
violence, it also is a forum for the sharing of narratives. Those narratives, 
combined with rationally-impressive data, offer the volunteer not only
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arguments to offer the general public, but a mental warehouse of stories, 
presented by fellow volunteers, that attest to the reality and personal 
consequences of domestic violence.
Other Public Forums for Narratives
Two other special mediums exist for directly interacting, calling, and 
informing publics: educational outreach, through the Speaker’s Bureau, and 
the Safehouse publications, in this case the quarterly newsletter, and a 
special brochure: “Boulder County Safehouse: A 20-Year Herstory.” It is 
important to note that education director considers community building a 
mandate. The presence of venacular rhetoric, often in the form of narratives, 
can be seen in both venues.
Part of educational outreach and community building is the 
aforementioned Speaker’s Bureau. Comprised of volunteers, most of whom 
have directly experienced domestic violence, all of whom are activists for the 
Safehouse and the feminist perception of patriarchal involvement in the issue, 
the Speaker’s Bureau is both visible and vocal. The volunteers are trained 
and educated in the facts and statistics surrounding battery as an issue. 
Moreover, their own personal narratives are solicited in the “introduction” 
section of the presentation, and are used to establish credibility. Thus 
through the Speaker’s Bureau, first-person survivor narratives may make their 
way into a public.
Yet another very public outreach is in the form of newsletters. 
Newsletter and public reports are circulated quarterly to interested members
of the public. While narratives are not present in each issue, there are third 
person stories in almost every newsletter, often in the form of stories related 
by the Boulder County Safehouse director, Anne Tapp, in her column. 
Sometimes stories are related in articles written by volunteers. Most often the 
newsletter reports activities, asks for contributions, disseminates facts and 
statistics about domestic violence in Boulder County, and informs about 
upcoming events.
While the “reports” can be seen as topo/presenting Safehouse as an 
organization concerned with current societal events, fiscal responsibility, 
educational imperatives, committed to its volunteers and community, 
responsive and responsible, those topoiact at the metanarrative level: here is 
what Safehouse, the organization, is and does and stands for. It is virtually 
impossible to hear the voice or story of the/a victim. Individual narratives are 
supplemental, not the core, and those narratives which make it into print are 
almost always about someone else: there are very few first person accounts 
from survivors, and only occasionally a poem or verse credited to “Anna, 
aged 12.” Readers are unable to ascertain anything more about the status or 
credibility of the storyteller.
In direct contrast, the brochure “A 20-year Herstory” is, quite literally, 
story upon story, narrative upon narrative. As described in a previous 
section, the word “story” is sprinkled liberally throughout the booklet, from the 
“story of Marta” to poems by victims and survivors, and a “letter to an abused 
woman” from “Suzanne.” The narrative format is clear and compelling: not
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only does it blend the “narrative” of the organization, but the also
focuses on “her-story” highlighting a few individual women as a victim, or a 
survivor, of domestic violence. It is the single most obvious compilation and 
dissemination of narrative(s) in the Boulder County Safehouse collection of 
public documents.
Having said that, the “victims” remain faceless: they are indicated by 
first names only, they are represented by a picture of a woman walking from 
darkness to light, and while their narratives provide pathos, and perhaps 
insight, they provide only a one-dimensional picture of a victim: she is a 
name, or she is a symbolic photograph. There is not the sense that there is a 
real, touchable individual present. And while Safehouse does an admirable 
job of speaking for the victim, there is always the sense that they are 
speaking for, that the woman, herself, remains absent and silent.
Conclusions: From Domestic Violence To Social Justice?
We have seen how Safehouse, as an organization, attempts to 
manage and control the issue of domestic violence in a post-VAWA society. 
We have seen how the adoption of a particular text, Davies (1998) Safety 
Planning with Battered Women: Complex lives/Difficult choices, has had an 
impact on their perception, and representation, of the face of the battered 
woman. Women move beyond “merely” being victims of physical battery, or 
survivors who have left the relationship. They make rational assessments of
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complex risk factors and sometimes chose to return to an abusive situation, 
throwing the “victim or survivor” dichotomy into disarray. Empowering women 
may mean tossing cherished definitions out the window.
Moreover, as the picture of the abused woman moves from a binary 
simplicity, to a complex presentation of reality, the demand is made for 
representational thinking on the part of a public called to render judgment and 
actualize remediation on behalf of this increasingly complex face.
Moreover, the terrain over which Safehouse claims ownership has 
expanded. Domestic violence becomes reframed as interpersonal violence. 
When life-generated risks can be seen as societally generated risks, 
Safehouse’s self-decreed mandate to “protect women and children” can be 
seen as an expanded ownership terrain, as evidenced by its attempt own an 
issue that can now be reframed as “social justice.”
The original analysis of the rhetorical problem was three-fold: empower 
victims; maintain ownership; reconfigure the issue as appropriate. Safehouse 
has managed to mount a campaign of ownership that allows for a complex 
reframing of the face of the victim, re-charts the boundaries of the issue, and 
asserts ownership over an increasingly large terrain: from domestic violence 
to social justice.
A Silence
While Safehouse’s metanarrative advances its claims as socially, 
fiscall, and morally responsible; while statistics and data, facts and figures 
continue to argue for Gusfield’s facticity and remediability; and while third
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person individual narratives advance the pathos of otherwise invisible women 
victim/survivors and demand moral imperatives calling a public to act, there 
remains a silence.
There are people aplenty to speak for the victim. And there remains a 
-- perhaps inescapable -- conclusion that the victim remains, after all, 
silenced.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
When I first began this research I was certain of a few things: I was 
intrigued by narratives and their many uses, specifically as means of 
persuasion; I thought domestic violence was a social issue that I should and 
could write about (the apparent victim/survivor dichotomy niggled at me: why 
was there no “between”?); I was interested in public reactions to the issue of 
domestic abuse, including questions of who has access to “the public,” and 
how impressions are formed; finally, I wanted somehow to use narratives and 
public rhetoric together. From that came my research question:
How do feminist advocates, survivors of domestic violence and 
spokespersons for Safehouse use narratives to negotiate the 
public/private boundary in presentations of domestic violence in 
the public sphere?
What I didn’t know was that there was a viable project in that mass and 
mess. I had two texts that fascinated me, as a storyteller and story analyst: 
the movie Defending Our Lives which I had regarded from my first viewing as 
a rhetorical tourde force, and the book A Woman Like You, which also 
seemed to be a poignant way to bring the issue of battered women into a 
form of public focus. I had trained as a volunteer at Boulder County
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Safehouse in 1995, and recognized the organization as a prime stakeholder 
in the issue, so their views and public presentations were important to any 
analysis.
I began studying narratives in 1995, and publics theory shortly 
thereafter. I soon realized that there was no convenient “Public”—no 
behemoth to be wooed and courted. Instead, there were latticed and 
reticulate publics who, by means of sharing a common understanding, 
informed and enhanced by vernacular discourse, engaged in the practical 
business of critical publicity and judgment leading to social action. Who 
would have thought, back then, that my advisor would devote such a large 
part of his research to something I could personally use in my dissertation??? 
Dr. Hauser also introduced me to the work of Gusfield (1981), whose theories 
on public problems proved invaluable because he so brilliantly poses --- and 
conveniently answers — key questions to my own project: why do some 
issues become public problems, and not others? Who speaks for key 
stakeholders? How is the public terrain divided and controlled?
While Gusfield focused on the issue of drinking and driving, there were 
many undeniable similarities between that and domestic violence: both were 
championed by grassroots movements, both involved violence and life and 
death issues, both had alternative discourse available -  they were contested 
topics. Finally, both were issues that were, ultimately, recognized as owned, 
in the one case by MADD and in the other by grassroots feminist 
organizations, usually those affiliated with domestic abuse shelters.
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One key difference that I learned from my research is that, while the 
issue of drinking and driving seems to have reified in the larger forum of 
public opinion (new presentatios reinforce the already existing stereotypes of 
innocent lives lost because someone drank while impaired) that sense of 
solidification seems to be missing in the issue of domestic violence. As we 
have seen, the presenting “face” of the victim has evolved, the very definition 
of victim and survivor has changed, and the terrain over which issue control is 
exerted remains contested as Safehouse engages in an attempt to “own” the 
issue of social justice -  at least locally.
Questions And (Some) Answers 
How do feminist advocates, survivors of domestic violence and 
spokespersons for Safehouse, use narratives to reframe a “private 
matter/private issue” as a public and political responsibility?
To answer that question, we turn to Gusfield, who illustrates that any 
attempt to move an issue into the public sphere requires key ingredients: 
there must be an owner, (an often highly contested role, because it is the 
owner(s) who frames the issue, assigns causal and political responsibility for 
“fixing” the problem, and is positioned as an expert to whom members of the 
general public defer in addressing the issue). Moreover, the issue must be 
seen as being real (possessing facticity), it must be “fix-able” (possessing 
remediability) and there must be a sense of moral obligation, felt by the 
members of society, to resolve the problem.
Just establishing domestic violence as possessing those 
characteristics was a long and agonistic rhetorical struggle that involved 
contestation between grassroots and clinical-professional advocates, 
resulting in the “pure victim” construction of the battered woman, which 
presented the issue as real, as curable immediate social action is taken, 
made direct appeals to the conscience of citizens to intervene on behalf of the 
victim, and ultimately cast blame on the failure of the police, courts and 
judicial system to intervene and protect the women.
The “pure victim” was subsequently replaced by a narrative that 
included a more personalized victim/survivor, who has remained even as 
advocates attempt to increase the terrain over which they claim ownership.
At every step of the process, narratives were used to help frame and re-frame 
the issue as one worthy of public attention and remediation.
Historical Contextualization
Remember that at the earliest stages of the battered woman’s 
movement, the primary questions concerned recognition of the issue as 
worthy of public remediation: the struggle was to have domestic violence 
seen as more than just “normal relational difficulties.” It was a “private” issue 
that required and deserved “public” intervention.
Advocates demanded that domestic battery be treated as the crime they 
perceived it to be. They had to overcome the inertia imposed by the status 
quo, which clearly viewed as “private” those actions that occurred between 
husband and wife, or committed intimate partners.
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Domestic violence as an issue benefited from the consciousness 
raising movement of the early 1960s and 70s, which linked both domestic 
violence and sexual assault, and viewed them as being matters of intense 
personal, and political, concern to the growing feminist movement. In myriad 
small groups across the country, publics formed, concerned with the outlines, 
scope, presentation and solution of an issue that they felt mandated social 
involvement.
They did not, however, meet in a vacuum. As proponents argued for 
public remediation, the form and attributions of that remediation were 
challenged. Opponents, in the person of clinicians, mental health and social 
workers, were frankly more socially acceptable “expert” speakers than their 
grassroots feminist counterparts. They argued that the cause of domestic 
violence was interpersonal dysfunction, thus it was a problem between 
individuals, often seen as mental illness and amenable to interpersonal or 
couples’ counseling. Had that attribution been followed to its logical 
conclusion, the issue could not have been seen as a matter of public, social 
concern; it would have been born and died in the realm of the private.
In an attempt to illustrate that victims of domestic battery were not 
mentally ill, the concept of the pure victim was put forward as an alternative 
“face” of the victim. You will remember that the four characteristics of the pure 
victim placed her as suffering but sane, responding to violence only when 
violence was dealt her, caught in a spinning cycle of emotional and physical 
abuse, and (understandably, perhaps even rationally) terrified by the
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experience. The documentary Defending Our Lives provides an example of 
narrative(s) told by a number of “pure victims” four of whom were imprisoned 
for murdering their abusers, a fifth who was out on appeal, and a sixth who 
survived and represented the voice of reason (as she cited statistics) and 
righteousness (as she told her own tale of terror and demanded moral 
responsibility from the viewer).
Further, in the film, we saw presentations key to Gusfield’s criteria for
issues becoming public: presentations of facticity (the problem exists)
remediability (it can be “cured” or “fixed”) and moral responsibility (Buel’s cry,
in Defending Our Lives:
If you have not been victimized, if you have not been stalked, if you 
haven’t been stabbed, beaten, chased across state lines, tracked down, 
kidnapped, taken back, beaten again, feared for your life, you have truly 
been blessed. And this is an opportunity to thank God that you have 
been spared that. But I would argue it means you have a greater 
responsibility to try to empathize and understand with those of us who 
live with that, who don’t know what it is to sleep through an entire night 
because you jump at every noise, yes, fifteen years later...
Defending Our Lives won an Oscar in 1994 and is still used, in 2003, to 
illustrate the seriousness of the issue and the helplessness of victims in the 
face of systemic public failure to protect them. They tried to save themselves, 
but were unable to succeed. Their failure becomes our failure, and the failure 
of the social/judicial system.
Additional Research Questions
A second question concerned the balance between individual will and 
social culpability: How do advocates in the battered women’s movement 
use narratives to negotiate the tension between individual agency and
233
social responsibility? It may be seen to ask: who is to blame? Who must 
answer questions like: Why didn’t she just leave? Is it a societal failure, or 
individual responsibility?
This question is closely related to another: How do feminist 
advocates, survivors of domestic violence and spokespersons for 
Safehouse, use narratives to resolve the issue of “invisibility” (a “voice 
without a face”; the non-rhetorical private vs. a life in public)? The same 
rhetorical move, personalizing the victim, accomplished both goals.
Attempts to present the women as “not mentally ill” and the issue as 
one of systemic social failure to protect the women contributed greatly to 
altering the view that women somehow “asked” for abuse, that it was an 
interpersonal relational dysfunction, that there was an “easy” answer: leave 
the jerk. What was required, and offered, was a more personal narrative of 
the victim, one that, in effect, normalized her and offered a presentation of her 
[good] reasons for returning to an undeniably abusive situation. Along the 
way, these “good reasons” also assisted in the expansion of the definition of 
abuse to include such things as emotional terror, financial abuse, isolation 
and verbal abuse.
This question is primarily answered by looking at vernacular, first 
person narratives presented in the text A Woman Like You, as the “pure 
victim” is replaced by a more personalized victim/survivor, one who can 
provide answers to hard questions, one who presents the argument that “I 
tried [to leave, to make the relationship work, to have a normal life, to protect
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myself and my children] and I eventually succeeded, but of primary 
importance is that you understand this situation happens to women, to
women just like you...and this is not an issue that can be walked away from”
The narratives in the book, and the pictures that accompany those 
stories, assert many claims: they first present women and their 
autobiographical tales of experiencing domestic violence. Second, the 
presentation is of the women as profoundly normal. Thirdly, They are able to 
reach across the boundaries of race/ethnicity, class, age, and sexuality. In 
addition, they present compelling arguments, in everyday vernacular) 
language, 5 that domestic abuse is not about “them” but about “us.” Finally 
Their almost mundane tales of courtship, marriage, family resonate with the 
reader.
What Defending Our Lives did for the face of victims in construing 
them as not mentally ill, A Woman Like You accomplishes in terms of holding 
a mirror to the audience and encouraging the realization that the face in the 
book is not significantly different from the face in the mirror: hopes, dreams, 
attempts to live a good life, love, pain, sorrow, regret. They are women, they 
are survivors, who have overcome the death of important relationships, they 
have faced hardship, they have overcome obstacles, and they have returned 
to say “I am like you. Hear my story, see my face. Know that I could be your 
sister, your mother, aunt, girlfriend, co-worker, boss, neighbor. The distance 
between us is so small, because my story could be story. I am not 
‘other’ — I am, indeed, a woman like you...”
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In Context
While Defending Our Lives did an admirable job of focusing attention 
on victims of the system, on facticity and remediability and moral obligation 
surrounding the issue, it presented another challenge. The documentary 
might be seen as an attempt to establish ownership of domestic abuse as an 
issue, to frame the topic in terms of a favored presentation of cause and 
assignment of responsibility. Moreover, this framing issued a clarion call to 
public action. Thus, the movie can be seen an example of early contestation 
and assertion of ownership, but it did not solve the problem.
Perhaps because the feminists, who were the early issue owners, 
attributed essential causality to patriarchy, and because issues of “power 
over” and “control” are seldom cured by legislation, the protections enacted 
through legislation, and the education facilitated by the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994 did not “solve” or cure domestic violence. Indeed, it 
might be seen to have uncovered other problems that needed to be 
addressed.
For example, as previously stated, the original call was to legislation 
and legal sanctions to enforce social maledictions against battery, whether 
that battery took place in the corner bar or in the bedroom. While, in the 
scope of this dissertation, it seems as though feminists and advocates 
presented strong arguments, the arguments were accepted and voila — 
domestic violence is illegal! the actual process was agonizing and contested 
and slow. That process involved years of litigation forcing police and courts to
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take victims seriously; years of education concerning victim rights, recognition 
of symptoms of abuse, trial and error methods of prosecution.
While gains were made, women still died, indeed are dying as this 
paper is typed. Children witnessed abuse and re-enacted the cycles at 
school, at home, and in subsequent relationships. While legislation and 
enforcement were unarguably a step in the right direction, issue owners 
would certainly argue that it was not enough. Patriarchy, as causal, was not 
cured by legislation.
In a sense, domestic violence can be seen as a symptom of a more 
overriding cause, and while the symptom was, however slowly, being 
addressed, the “disease” was far from eliminated. If legislation is the 
prescription to cure the presenting symptom (battery) and incarceration or stiff 
sanctions the means of excising the visible sign (the batterer), there still 
remains the reality of the disease (gross injustice at the hands of a patriarchal 
society, directed towards women and children).
Moreover, or perhaps consequently, the issue remained distanced 
from the very publics that could be called to authorize real, broad, ideological 
societal change. The presentation of a pure victim did not succeed in making 
the issue personal. The women, while perhaps sane and suffering, remained 
“other”—not us, not from our neighborhood or social class or family or even 
circle of acquaintances.
While ownership was established, and domestic assault could be seen 
as a problem demanding remediation in the form of legal protection and
237
social/legal sanctions, it did not necessarily resonate individually as a problem 
of concern to me. Rather, as with victims of flooding in Bangladesh in the 
70s, there remained a critical distance: Yes we should assist the victims. Of 
course, money should be given. Indeed, there is a sense of moral obligation, 
but when all is said and done, I can sleep well at night because I never met 
anyone from Bangladesh, and never saw anyone starve and really, I have my 
own life to live.
In terms of domestic violence, legislate, by all means, and enforce that 
legislation. But it really doesn’t have much to do with me or my life. Throw the 
bums in jail and let me go back to sleep...
Personalizing the Face of the Victim
Had grassroots feminists, advocates and survivors of domestic abuse 
-  the loose coalition of “owners” of the issue -  named the cause of domestic 
violence merely a societal failure to view wives and children as legitimate 
victims of a crime, and had they solely attributed political for
remediation to the court system, this dissertation might not have been written 
because, like drinking and driving, the cause and responsibility would have 
been fixed, would have been reified into a form of the status quo, and there 
would be no more debate and agitation over the issue. Actually, when I 
started writing this dissertation, I would have wagered money that the issue 
was a similarly “done deal” — early feminists did all the work, and now the job 
remained to patch the occasional hole in the dam.
But as we have seen in Hauser (1999) real political change -  the way 
democracy actually works -  involves changes in, by, and on behalf of publics
who are called into being to address questions of importance. These 
localized, specialized and vernacular publics are fluid in their genesis and 
disbanding. They are called into being by rhetorical discourse; their purpose 
is to share understandings; they are of the substance of everyday encounters 
at work or at play. They are the enactment of civil society, invented and 
reinvented as issues change and demands for public action evolve. They 
form as individuals heed the call of moral responsibility to render judgment 
and authorize action.
When we look at the evolution of the face of domestic violence, we see 
the necessity for a personalized victim/survivor, the need for moral appeals to 
reach the individual citizen, in a form that can be recognized as vernacular 
discourse, and in a way that commands their engagement in changing the 
material social conditions of women and children. An example of that kind of 
appeal is present in the aforementioned book Woman Like You (Anderson, 
1997).
Had the foremothers of the battered woman’s movement limited 
remediation to personal identification, this dissertation narrative might, once 
again, have ended prematurely. After all, now I about domestic 
violence, I understand that laws must be enforced, I accept that any woman 
could be a victim, I can identify with the reality and suffering of sane and
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normal women, and I am willing to support attempts to protect women and 
children who are involved in situations of abuse. What more do you want? 
Still More Questions
In part, that can be answered along with another research question, 
one which focuses on the unique placement of Boulder County Safehouse. 
The question asks: How does an agency use narrative to negotiate the 
boundary between public and private: Safehouse as boundary-spanner.
Closely related is another query: How do feminist advocates, 
survivors of domestic violence and spokespersons for Safehouse, use 
narratives to help construct a personal “survivor” identity as a counter 
to a “victim” identity?
When Boulder County Safehouse advocates “discovered” the book 
Safety Planning with Battered Women: Complex Lives/Difficult Choices 
(Davies, 1998) it substantially affected the organizational view of victim vs 
survivor, a construction which posited that survivors = those who leave 
abusive relationships, and victims = those who return. The adoption of Davies 
text affected the way outreach workers presented the battered woman to the 
public, and at the same time, it changed the organizational response to the 
battered woman herself, realizing that previous views of the victim/survivor 
were a binary distortion of the complex and interwoven choices facing women 
in shelter.
Moreover, Safehouse’s unique boundary spanning and advocacy role 
allowed them to expand the definition of “survivor” to include women who
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rationally choose to return to a relationship, which before would have labeled 
her “victim.” Not only did this move increase the definition and presentation of 
survivor, it also increased the territory over which Safehouse could claim 
ownership, as we shall see.
In Context
Remember that Boulder County Safehouse, as an organization, serves 
as a bridge between the Shelter, where women and children flee from 
violence and pain in their “private” lives, and the Administrative building (the 
Outreach Center) where members of the organization go about the business 
of presenting public arguments on and about domestic (or, as they have more 
recently taken to calling it “interpersonal”) violence. This bridge is a well- 
traveled one, as volunteers and paid staff can circulate freely between the 
physical buildings. Moreover, lessons learned in the Shelter (that all victims 
are not severely physically battered; that there are more choices than stay 
and be saved, or leave and die) are carried to the Outreach, and vice versa.
In a move that somehow seems a logical outgrowth of the “pure victim” 
to “personalized victim” movement, this adoption of a “complex life” position 
exponentially expanded the possibility of a “survivor” returning to a 
relationship. It posits a woman as sometimes choosing rationally and in her 
own -  and/or her children’s -  best interests, a return to an abusive situation. 
Women as victims had earlier been absolved of mental defect if they did not 
leave their abuser. Women who did leave, came back and illustrated to a 
public audience that — as both victims and survivors — they were and are
not substantially different from any woman: they possessed the same dreams 
and hopes and love and relationship desires: they were neither alien or 
substantially other, their stories were recognizable and acceptable. Now we 
see that survivors may chose to return to a relationship. The picture of victim, 
as helpless individual in the face of overwhelming social obstacles, has not 
substantially changed, but the potential identity of survivor has, indeed, been 
expanded.
A question still remained, and one which was not specifically 
articulated in the dissertation: If a woman can choose to return to an abusive 
relationship, and if that rational choice and agency moves her from “victim” to 
“survivor, but still suffering,” has the very nature of the question of domestic 
violence changed?
The answer might have been made in the affirmative, had we not the 
benefit of Gusfield and Hauser. What those theorists tell us is that 
contestation for ownership still remains: remember that feminist advocates 
have, from the beginning, attributed cause to patriarchy, a stand from which 
they have not deviated. What these issue owners have done, however, is, by 
changing the rhetorical framing of victim/survivor, expanded the terrain over 
which they assert ownership. We can see them move from challenging 
patriarchy to framing the issue as one of “social justice;” laws and legislation 
can try to level the playing field, but demands for social justice include 
eviscerating the companions or daily manifestations of patriarchy: ethnicity 
and racism, able-ism, age-ism, heterosexism, classism.
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Social Justice
Recall that, from the beginnings of the battered women’s movement, 
attribution of causal responsibility was affixed to patriarchy: the social system 
itself mirrors a flawed organizing principle -  that men are somehow superior 
to women in a cosmic hierarchy. Laws and legislation and enforcement can 
attempt to equalize opportunities in employment and housing, they can 
command segregation and demand equal seating on the bus, but laws and 
legislation cannot cure racism. All the VAWA sponsored legislation and 
education cannot cure domestic violence, because the issue is bigger than 
men beating up on women.
Once the beating has stopped, once the perpetrator has been jailed, 
the experience is not magically “over” for women: they still cannot make the 
same money as a man (assuming, of course, that they have marketable 
skills); they are still the primary caregivers of minor children in a society that 
does not view daycare as essential and therefore affordable; they are single 
women/mothers in a world that valorizes intact nuclear families; divorce and 
separation may have alienated them from religious or cultural support; 
Safehouses offer only six weeks of shelter, and all the ongoing support in the 
world is not going to repair the rift in the family. The list goes on and, 
significantly, the problems just listed are experienced even more acutely 
when the woman is a person of color, or a “foreigner,” or physically 
challenged, or poor, or lesbian, or older.
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The rhetorical actions of Safehouse activists illustrate an apparent 
change in the way domestic abuse is framed. No longer is it merely a matter 
of “providing safe shelter, support, and advocacy for battered women and 
their children” but rather “envisioning a future without violence.” What a 
difference a few words make!!! While not to be seen as abrogating claims 
that patriarchy is the cause of a social system that allows vulnerable 
members to be demeaned and beaten, the target is now violence writ large 
and small. This is a matter of vital importance to everyone, it is a matter of 
social justice.
Thus, in the course of this dissertation, we have seen how feminists 
advocates, survivors of domestic violence, and spokespersons for Safehouse 
have used narrative to exert ownership claims, frame the issue, assign causal 
and political responsibility, and continue their efforts to maintain 
control/ownership over the face of domestic violence. We have seen the 
changing face of the victim/survivor. We have also found the theories of 
Gusfield and Hauser to admirably explain just how that issue ownership is 
created and maintained, in the light of multiple potential publics and against 
the backdrop of competing claims and calls for public involvement. In sum, 
the dissertation answered the questions posited and, in the best tradition of 
research, revealed and accounted for phenomenon not anticipated at the start 
of the project.
244
Limitations to the Study
While I present this work with pride and a subtle sense of surprise that 
it actually answered important questions, and might pave the way for more 
wonderful questions and answers, I must acknowledge some limitations. I 
purposely chose to keep the study on the level of available public narratives. I 
am proud of my three data sets, and frankly surprised at how well they 
worked together to add richness to an evolving portrait of domestic violence, 
but aware that some might question the size or selection of that set. I 
purposely attempted to select different media, different sources and different 
available public texts that made rhetorical presentations of domestic violence 
as an issue of social concern. I am satisfied that the quality and 
representative quality of the sample met those criteria.
I did not sample all public discourse on domestic violence. I make no 
claims to even have examined the best discourse. I did, however, meet the 
(self-imposed) requirement to analyze discourse readily available in the public 
realm, texts that could be acquired by members of the general public, and 
texts which attempted to present a [specific] view of domestic violence for 
public acceptance. As with almost all qualitative studies, the question of 
generalizability remains.
Also, a disclaimer must be made: while Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show a 
progression of rhetorical casting of the battered woman from pure victim to 
survivor, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to assert that Defending
Our Lives was specifically created to answer the claims of grassroots 
feminists. That it did answer those claims, and within the time frame of public 
arguments over the original Violence Against Women Act, is significant, but 
causal claims cannot be made. Similarly, the appearance of A Woman Like 
You could more accurately be called coincidental and, from my perspective, 
fortuitous, rather than as a response to some organized organizational 
imperative.
The only cause-and-response claims that can be made concern 
Boulder County Safehouse’s move to a discourse of social justice. There a 
clear correspondence can be seen between adoption of a text (Davies, 1998) 
and consequent reframing of important concepts: survivor, social justice, 
educational outreach.
Moreover, while the analysis has revealed Boulder County 
Safehouse’s attempt to move the discourse and assert ownership over “social 
justice”, time will be the best judge of whether that move was successful. I 
can provide documentation that the program is moving into its third year, and, 
from that, assume, in a time of country- and county-wide financial and budget 
crisis, no non-profit organization would continue to invest time and labor in an 
“unsuccessful” program. Whether Boulder County Safehouse will be able to 
become primarily identified as an owner of “social justice” is a study that the 
future can better answer.
Finally, a niggling question, a strong subtext, remains unaddressed 
and unanswered: where is the voice of the victim? I sought to find her voice,
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and while I have heard the stories of survivors, of former victims, and have 
seen one-dimensional presentations of letters from “Sue” or some other alias,
I fear that the victim remains silenced.
Implications
Theoretically this dissertation serves to validate the application of both 
Gusfield and Hauser as appropriate and useful lenses through which we can 
view issue ownership, and ownership appeals to publics formation. Gusfield 
provides researchers a vocabulary for addressing how an issue is brought 
into the public view, how ownership is contested, the criteria that must be met 
for a problem to be perceived as public, and the benefits of ownership.
Hauser’s contribution is to illustrate that ownership is exercised 
rhetorically, practically, empirically, day to day, as an organization ~ or 
“owner” ~ issues morally imperative calls to potential publics, urging them to 
authorize action leading to the resolution of perceived exigencies. While 
Gusfield seems to assert that once an issue becomes a public problem it so 
controls public perception that the issue becomes reified and dictates 
perceptions of reality, Hauser allows for the flexibility of issue evolution.
We can see that the appeals change as owners respond to changing 
social reality: when challenges were made to the grassroots perception of 
victims a narrative appeared that framed the women as victims of social 
failures, rather than interpersonal ones. When the public face of the victim 
remained distanced, and moral imperatives to action required a personalized 
victim, faces and narratives became available that posited and presented the
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women as “like” rather than “other.” And while legislation has been enacted 
to protect and serve victims of domestic abuse, larger questions of social 
justice have allowed Boulder County Safehouse to extend ownership claims 
beyond “mere” battery.
As a sideline, the use of Gladys Murphy Graham’s “Natural Procedure 
of Argument”(1925) enhances an appreciation of the methods used in 
narrative persuasion. While there is no attempt made to preempt Fisher’s 
narrative paradigm, Graham, like Hauser, shows practically and impressively, 
how persuasion takes place.
Methodologically, narrative analysis allows for the discovery of 
common themes present in stories offered for public consumption as 
persuasive texts. Those common themes lead to framing victims and 
survivors in specific ways, ways which can be seen to change across time.
Finally, the theories and methodology chosen have allowed me to 
map or “track” the evolving face of domestic violence as it is framed, and re­
framed as a social problem deserving of public action and remediation. It has 
allowed analysis of an organization’s attempt to exert ownership over a still- 
contested terrain and reveals that there is no resting on laurels for agencies 
committed to social change. The process does not end, but the journey to 
enact solutions to social problems is a fascinating rhetorical accomplishment.
Future Studies
I remain frustrated by the lack of victims’ face and voice in public. I 
was so sure that somehow “her” story could make it into forums where “she”
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could be heard. And, in some ways, it does, but so often it is a post-mortem 
account, or a third person narrative. I believe there is a need to ask questions 
about why we have no room for her voice. Is it because we do not have a 
language for pain? Reality television would seem to deny that. Is it because 
we do not have time, as a society, for “losers” and victims must somehow be 
“losers?” Perhaps, but loss and tragedy are not unfamiliar themes in public 
venues. Is is because the victims are women, and their reality not as 
important in a capitalistic and profit driven society? Perhaps.
Or perhaps it is because victims of domestic violence are, as Foucault 
might tell us, the “sick other” against which we define our health(ier) selves. 
Perhaps we need their silent suffering to measure our own relative success.
It somehow, to me, seems like a dirty little secret that begs further 
examination. Their silent presence is a ghost that should haunt. Like a black 
hole, it challenges and terrifies at the same time.
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APPENDIX A
Domestic Violence Related Websites 
Updated 8/1/03
www.abanet.org/domviol/home.html
• American Bar Association Coalition on Domestic Violence
www.biscmi.org/ the Batterer Intervention Services Coalition of Michigan
BISCMI Mission Statement
• We will provide a working forum for interaction and information sharing 
among agencies and individuals concerned with the provision of 
batterer intervention services in Michigan.
• We will create and maintain coordinated community actions that hold 
batterers accountable for their behavior and promote safety and 
empowerment for victims/survivors.
• We will keep the needs of victims/survivors foremost in our efforts 
rather than the interests of batterers or any batterer intervention 
service or model.
www.centerwomenpolicy.org
• Founded in 1972, the nation’s first feminist policy research 
organization.
www.dvmen.org
• Domestic Violence Against Men In Colorado.
http://endabuse.org/
• the Family Violence Prevention Fund
www.fathersforlife.org
• the latest news:angryharry.com
www.feminist.org
• The Feminist Majority Foundation Online
www.mesacanada.com/domvio.htm
• Men’s Educational Support Association Preserving the integrity of 
fatherhood for the sake of the children, out of Canada
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• “The fact that politicians continue to operate on the false assumption 
that women are the feeble victims of male oppression is beyond belief” 
-  Gwen Landolt, REAL Women
www.ncadv.org/
• National coalition against domestic violence: Every home a safe home
www.ncirs.org:
• National Criminal Justice Reference Service
www.ndhvh.org/
• National Domestic Violence Hotline
www.now.org/issues/violence
• National Organization for Women
www.oip.usdoi.gov/vawo
• Department of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women
www.oip.usdoi.gov/vawo/statistics.htm
• Department of Justice Research and Statistical Publications
www.vaw.umn.edu/librarv/dv/
• Violence against women online resources (WAVOR)
• “This website is supported by grant number 98-WT-VX-K001 awarded 
by the Office on Violence Against Women, Office of Justice Programs, 
U.S. Department of Justice.
• This website is a cooperative project of the Office on Violence Against 
Women and Minnesota Center Against Violence & Abuse at the 
University of Minnesota
http://womhist.binghamton.edu/
• Women and Social Movements in the United States, 1775-2000
o Co-published by the Center for the Historical Study of Women 
and Gender at SUNY Binghamton and Alexander Street Press.
• Related sites
• http://womhist.binghamton.edu/vawa/intro.htm
• womhist.Binghamton.edu/vawa/prologue.htm
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APPENDIX B:
ROUGH TRANSCRIPT OF DEFENDING OUR LIVES
Documentary opens with black and white pictures of domestic violence
victims; Buel’s voiceover:
Sarah Buel’s’ voice:
They are punched, kicked, they are beaten while trying to hold on to 
their babies.
They are strangled, choked, burned with cigarettes; doused with 
kerosene and lighter fluid and set on fire.
They are run over by cars and trucks, they have their teeth knocked out 
with hammers, they are raped with hot curling irons and large objects; 
they are stabbed with everything from knives to ice picks to screwdrivers 
-anything that penetrates.
They are forced to watch the torture of their family members; their 
children are forced to watch their assault and torture, and they’re often 
tied up and forced to watch the torture and molestation of their own 
children.
*Am I describing atrocities committed in some foreign country? By 
soldiers in a country at war?
Am I describing atrocities about which Amnesty International and other 
human rights organizations are writing to you and pleading for money? 
I’m describing domestic violence as it occurs in America.
Yes, there is a war against women and children in this country.
*TEXT: “SARAH BUEL, Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk county Domestic 
Violence Unit”
1:28 Title runs: “Defending Our Lives. 1993, Cambridge Documentary 
Films, Inc.”
1:38 Meekah Scott
TEXT: Community Educator, Battered Women Fighting Back! speaking to 
“Battered Women and Self-Defense Conference,” Harvard Law School
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First: January 7th Lana Gilbert, 45 years old, of Summerville, Mass., 
was slain by her boyfriend of 15 years
Then again, on February 13, Regina McGee 20, was fatally shot, 
allegedly by her boyfriend, Joseph Smith, 23, in the Dorchester home of 
Smith’s mother. Smith was paroled from prison last year.
Then again, February 17, Betty Surreck, 29 years old, of Lang, was 
stabbed to death. Her boyfriend, Joseph Hoover, 36 of Haverhill, has 
been charged for her murder
Then again, March 21, Julie Harlow, 22, of Whitman, died of a gunshot 
wound to the chest, arms and legs.
Again, on April 19, Maryanne Mortel of Springfield, was stabbed to 
death. Her husband, Michael Montel [sic], is scheduled to be tried for the 
murder on December 6th
Again, May 1, Cynthia Reed, 22, of Peabody, was found dead, stabbed 
more than 40 times, in the front seat of her car at Logan Airport. Her 
former boyfriend, Wayne, 22, has been charged with her murder.
3:12 Patty Hennessy [on meeting Brian]
I met Brian when I was 11 years old. We started dating when I was 16, 
and when I was 18 we got married.
While we were dating everything was fine, he was sweet, he was kind -- 
everything I thought I wanted a man to be, someone I wanted to spend 
the rest of my life with.
After we got married, everything changed. He became a completely 
different person, and for 10 long years he abused me. Sexually 
physically emotionally.
3:49 Shannon Booker [meeting Jose]
My batterer’s name was Jose. I met him in 1987, and as our 
relationship started out it was nice, you know, he sported [sic] with me, 
escorted me with nice pretty cars and jewelry and clothes, buying gifts 
for my daughter and everything.
For about 6 months the relationship was fine until one day, we was at 
the Gallery, which is a club in Boston, came home from the Gallery and 
that’s when the abuse started. He socked me in my face, I had a black 
eye, and from that day the abuse became-- frantic.
4: 37 Eugenia Moore [relationship with Alfred]
I met Alfred one day, I was working with the Mass Bay transportation 
authority in Massachusetts. I was driving -  it’s a bus route that you drive
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throughout the local cities. I wanted to try to do something in my life and 
when I got the job life was good, but it was very strenuous job. When I 
met him it was just like the answer. He was polite, he opened doors for 
me, he catered to me, he waited on me, it was just so sweet. I knew 
that it was a lot of put-on, too because we had just gotten together.
5:12 Lisa Grimshaw [relationship with Tommy]
With Tommy, it was fine at the beginning, and then he started being 
obsessive and jealous, and then accusing me.
I was trying to work two jobs, and I was working two jobs, he was going 
to school. He would say “you’re going to work to look good for 
somebody else” that’s what he would accuse me of. And one time he -  I 
was standing in front of the bed and he threw me down on the bed and 
started ripping my uniform off me, and slapping me in the face. And as 
he was tearing my uniform off he had started to rape me and I didn’t 
want to have sex with him and he was just taking it. And uh he turned 
me over and sodomized me. After he got done with me I really couldn’t 
move.
I can remember laying there and asking him what just happened, and uh 
he said that’s probably what I asked for. That would happen numerous 
times with Tommy. He did that a lot to me.
6:28 Sarah Buel [admits being former battered woman, 15 years ago].
It has been fifteen years now since I found myself a battered woman on 
welfare, at a time when there were no abuse prevention laws, no 
shelters, DAs, judges, police that I could find that were at all concerned 
about my safety, the safety of my then-infant son and the two foster 
children I had.
Well, we’ve come a little ways in 15 years. There are now 1200 
battered women’s shelters across this country. But you need to keep 
that in perspective: there are about 3800 animal protection shelters. No 
matter how much you love animals it seems to me our priorities are a 
little skewed when we have three times the number of shelters for 
homeless animals then we have for battered women and their children. 
The Center for Disease Control has even come to understand, through 
their Violence Epidemiology Unit, that more women now seek treatment 
in our nation’s emergency rooms as a result of domestic violence 
injuries than from the combination of muggings, rapes and car 
accidents.
That domestic violence constitutes the number one cause of injury to 
women in America.
They also tell us that women are in nine times more danger in their own 
home than they are in the street.
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Now I don’t know about you, but when I was growing up in New York 
City I was always told not to go to certain areas late at night, to always 
be with one of my brothers or sisters or cousins if we were going to be 
near the park: all those stranger men who jump out from the bushes are 
going to get you. But none of those were the people who harmed me. 
But nobody said to me “you need to be careful who you marry. You 
need to be careful who you bring home to you.” And we don’t say that to 
our daughters, our sisters, our mothers, our brothers, our fathers our 
cousins -  even now.
We engage in an extraordinary level of denial about the extent of family 
violence as it occurs in Massachusetts and across this country.
The FBI tells us one out of every two women will be in a violent 
relationship in their lifetime. Not because 50% of all men are batterers, 
but because we as their community and society, completely fail to hold 
them accountable. They are free to move on to the next victim.
8:38 Meekah
May 28 Sandra Clinton, 21 years old, of Springfield, was strangled while 
her two children watched. Her former boyfriend, Frederick Murphy, 27, 
has been charged with the murder. The police say Murphy had 
attempted to strangle another former girlfriend the same day.
9:04 Shannon [lists abuses and why she didn’t turn Jose in].
Jose used to punch me. He would stomp me, drag me, drag me to the 
point where the meat in my knees was dug out of my kneecaps.
He would beat me with billy-clubs, any type of object that he could put 
his hands on he would beat me with.
And it didn’t matter where it was, he would beat me, so I never thought 
of turning him in because from my background, I come from an abusive 
background I’ve always thought it was OK for me to accept this type of 
abuse, you know, as a child.
9:40 Patty Hennessy: [abuses while pregnant; why women stay].
When I told him I was pregnant he punched me in the stomach, started 
slapping me, shoving me up against the wall, telling me he didn’t want 
this responsibility, how could I do this to him.
He just became very violent all the time. Slapping me, pushing me 
calling me names.
I didn’t know what was wrong. I didn’t know what I was doing wrong. 
Now I realize that, at that time you feel like it’s you, something you’re
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doing to provoke his behavior, so you try to do everything right um but 
nothing seems to work. It just doesn’t change the way they are.
You end up staying because you really want to believe that the person 
you love loves you back. Every person, human being needs to believe 
that they’re loved and needed and because you hate what they’re doing, 
it doesn’t mean you hate them.
And you believe they’ll change. When they’re crying and telling you that 
I love you. I need you. I can’t live without you.” I’m a human being, my 
heart goes out to that person, if they’re sin[cere]...l believe that they’re 
really sorry. I’d cry with him
11: 09: Eugenia Moore [examples of terrorism at work]
And one day when I didn’t expect [suspect?] him we had been arguing, 
he had fought me in the street just prior to that the day before, he would 
take and he showed up at the train station one day and it was no 
surprise because he was popping up everywhere and I didn’t realize at 
the time he was tracking me, so when he showed up and says “well can 
I go to work with you?” and I said “no look at what you just did to me this 
morning, look at what you did to me last night. All this violence 
everywhere we go and making a big scene everywhere we go.”
Lookit I thought it was ‘we’ I now know it was not ‘we’ -- it was him. And 
I said “no you’re not riding up there in the park with me because I know 
you aren’t here to ride the bus, you’re here to terrorize me and to show 
me you can do this because this is public transportation.”
So I said told him “no you can’t ride” so he stood over me, boxed me in 
the corner I had no where to go, I’m in the corner of the bus, you know, 
driving and he blocked me up in there “yes, I’m riding this bus" so I said 
“no you’re not” because I know we had been arguing for two or three 
trips, him standing' over me, cussing and swearing I’m trying to tell him 
look I talk to you later” “no no you got to agree that I’m goin home with 
you, can I ride with you?” I said “no you can’t ride with me look how you 
acting if you really wanted to ride with me you would be calm, leave and 
then call me later.”
12:17: Lisa Grimshaw [descriptions of rape and being tied up. Pregnancy
and beatings].
He would use objects on me, inside me. He left me tied up on the bed 
for hours leaving me there.
I got pregnant with Chad, he would hit me but I wouldn’t, I just wouldn’t 
let him hit me in the stomach. I really would try not to let him hit me 
anywhere near the baby.
So at different times there were a couple of teeth knocked out from 
punches. One time, I think I was about 6 months pregnant, and he threw
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me down on the bed we had been arguing and he said he was going to 
cut the baby out of my stomach because he just wanted to do it. And I 
really felt he was going to do this to the baby, and I was very scared.
13:20 Meekah
This list is so long, you know. On July 15th, Genevieve Adderson, 39, of 
Rosendale, died two days after she was beaten. She was beat to death. 
Her boyfriend, Gene, 42, is charged with her murder.
July 20th, Theresa Cole, 20 years old, of Danvers, was stabbed to 
death, with a steak knife, while her two year old son watched. Her 
boyfriend, 36 years old, he’s charged with her murder.
14:07 Patty Hennessy [violence escalates; the way she felt; leaving Brian]
Right after I gave birth, it was a boy. Brian just thought he was too cool, 
you know “I had a son. I have a son, I have a son now.” And I felt, I was 
never so happy in my life. The kid was my life. He was everything to 
me.
Brian never took care of him, he never bought a t-shirt for the kid, he 
never bought him a diaper, he never paid any attention to him. When he 
did pay any attention to him he would just hit him in the head, he used to 
like to hit him in the head all the time and I would go off the deep end..
At that point my attitude was: Do whatever you want to me, but don’t 
touch my kid, my kid meant everything to me. So the night I left, that 
was a lot with it. I know I should have been caring about my own life but 
I didn’t, at that point I didn’t. They get you to the point where you feel 
like you’re not worth anything and you don’t even deserve to live, but the 
love for my son made me want to live and made me want him to live and 
that’s why I left, for his sake more than mine.
[15:26] I was going to leave and run to my mother’s, my mother lived 
like three streets away, so I wrapped Timmy up in blankets and Brian 
came into the room and knocked Timmy out of my hands and Timmy 
bounced in the crib and he put a cigarette butt out on my neck and 
started pulling my hair and spitting on me, started kicking me. And I 
somehow managed to grab Timmy and run out of the house.
And I was running to my mother’s and urn he hopped in his van and he 
started chasing me down. And I went to cut across a lawn and there 
was trees there and there was a fence that I didn’t know was there prior 
to that so I was stuck up against the fence. And he took the van and he 
just floored it and he came right towards me and I just leaned up against 
the fence with Timmy in my arms and I thought I was dead, I thought
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that was it, I was going to die: this is it he’s finally gonna kill me like he 
says he’s gonna.
And he got stuck on a stump-- he kept backing up and going forward 
backing up and going forward and finally he was really stuck. So I just 
gathered myself together and I ran, kept running to my mother’s house, 
and I finally got up the driveway and he was right behind me. And I got 
in the house and I shut the door and I just slid down the door and my 
mother was in the standing in the kitchen and she started screaming.
I guess there was blood all over the wall -  all over the door, I had blood 
all over my face from goin through the bushes and stuff and him hitting 
me.
I never went back after that. That was the last night. When it came to he 
almost killed my son, too, I just couldn’t deal with that.
[17:17] For the next seven years it was a constant everyday struggle to 
keep him away from me.
17:25: Sarah Buel [statistics; the story of her attempts to leave].
A Texas study recently showed that 75% of the women currently in 
shelters had left at least several times previously.
[17:35] It is a myth that we do not leave. We generally leave many 
times before we are finally able to leave and stay away.
At first when I left I went back it was because he said he was sorry. It 
would never happen again. And then it was because I would leave, the 
first time after that I left I got a job in a shoe factory, but by the time 
you’ve paid your rent and daycare, there’s no money to eat. You 
probably can’t even pay your rent. So you go back because you decide 
that it’s more important to feed your children. That you will figure out 
magically how to stop that abuse.
[18:08] When I talk about fear, one of the stories that I will share with 
you that I hope I will never forget is having left New York, gone to a 
small rural town in New Hampshire where I thought I would be safe,
I was in a laundromat on a Saturday morning, my son was playing 
around, there were people over by the cash registers and my husband 
walked in the door. And I yelled over for the people to call the police.
But he said “No this is my wife. We’ve just had a little fight. Nobody 
needs to do anything.”
And I still had bruises on the side of my face. I said “No this is the 
person who beat me up. You need to call the police.”
But he said ” No this is my wife. We’ve just had a little fight. I’ve come to 
pick her up and take her home.”
So nobody moved. And I thought as long as I live I want to remember 
what it feels like to be terrified for my life and nobody could even pick up 
the phone.”
Do you know how many battered women tell me about assaults in front 
of their building, out in public, or in apartments with thin walls, or in
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summer with the windows and doors open? And nobody can be 
bothered to call the police.
19:17 Shannon [details of beating. Isolation.]
The beatings became worse. He would throw me down the stairs, 
stomp on me with his foot. He would beat me up in front of his friends to 
impress his friends.
It got to the point where he started isolating me. He wanted to know my 
whereabouts and a lot of the time he didn’t want me to go nowhere 
unless he was there.
And urn the violence, the beatings they were very dramatic. It was to the 
point where I was hospitalized several times.
19:55 Lisa [Tommy’s abuse; police lack of response]
This continued for years. And urn he kidnapped Chad, many times, took 
him to his mother’s house.
When I tried to kick him out, at different points I’d tell him I had 
restraining orders. One time I had a restraining order against him and 
he was living with his mother but he would be at my house all the time 
for hours, trying to get in the door. And it was in the middle of summer 
and I was hammering the windows closed and he told me that- I had 
called the police for them to come and they never came. It was one of 
those times because they just got real used to me calling they never 
bothered coming anymore so instead they’re not coming so I just was 
hammering my windows closed because I thought he was going to 
come in the door and he did, he busted through the door.
He came through and took the hammer off of the table because I ran, 
and he started hitting me with it. There were some teeth knocked out, I 
was hit in the back, I was hit in the— I don’t really remember where I 
was hit but there was blood everywhere. His friend was there and I’m 
lucky that his friend was there because if he wasn’t, he would have killed 
me that night there was no doubt in my mind I would not be here.
And the police came. There was charges brought against him: assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon, attempted murder, B&E in the 
daytime many charges which nothing happened with.
21:42 Eugenia Moore [police failure to respond]
When I told him that he couldn’t ride, all of a sudden he was standing 
over me, looking down, talking and he spit in my face. And I took and I 
wiped, and I said “look what you doing -why are you always doing this 
to me?”
276
And so after this after I wiped that off, I got ready to stand up because 
he was hitting me again, and that’s when I tried to grab him. I tried to 
grab him and bring him to me, that’s when he took and he punched me 
in my stomach. I mean there was like five or six of us trying to hold him: 
he was wild, all over the place, throwing blows at people: they were 
ducking they couldn’t hold him.
So the police came I said “Arrest him! Arrest him! he just attacked me” I 
was in hysterics. The guy says “Wait a minute. Wait a minute. He says 
he’s your boyfriend” I said “My boyfriend? what that has to do with it? 
The man just attacked me.” I said “what does that have to do with it?” 
“Urn well we didn’t see anything.”
They didn’t see anything? They’re the police. There was witnesses who 
held him there, there was the bystanders.
“No” they told me “you have to go down and get a restraining order” 
sometime this was like 4:30 in the afternoon, “tomorrow morning you 
have to go out and get a restraining order.”
I said “restraining order? Arrest him. I’m an employee. You’re supposed 
to protect me. Arrest him.” “No” he said. “Listen to me: calm down.”
In the meantime Alfred is standing back jumping [sic] around, laughing— 
it was a big joke to him.
I couldn’t believe what was happening, I was so embarrassed, I was so 
ashamed. This was on my job. This had happened on the streets before 
and people had intervened, but this was on the job I didn’t know if I was 
going to get fired or what...
23:10 Patty Hennessy [police failure to respond and consequences]
Right before I did leave him one time he had beat me so bad I had a 
broken nose, a fractured nose. I called the police.
The police came, and he was standing in the doorway and I was in the 
driveway covered in blood and I said “I want him arrested” and they says 
“well we didn’t see him do it, we can’t arrest him.”
And I’m like “well what, do you think I did this to myself?” And he was 
laughing. After the police left I got a worse beating.
They get, it makes them worse when the cops show up and they tell you 
we can’t help you. Then they get mad: “Oh, you gonna call the police on 
me? Oh, OK fine, I’ll kill you now...”
23:43: Meekah [crying]
Barbie, 45 years old, of Cambridge, was stabbed to death outside of her 
apartment she shared with her husband.
Oct 26th, Bernadette, 29, of Medford, died after being stabbed in the 
back six times and beaten on the head.
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24:25 Shannon [Jose’s murder]
We got into a fight. I managed to get away from him and I called him 
like about half an hour later to see was he at his mother’s house. I called 
him from a friend’s house because it was like two in the morning and I 
couldn’t call my grandmother, you know.
So urn I called him and I asked him, I said to him, I said “Jose why do 
you put me through these changes? You claim to love me and 
everything but yet you beat on me. You stomp on me with your foot.
You punch me in my face. Do you really like walking down the street 
with me with black eyes and with my body being black and blue?”
And he said to me “Shannon, just come on home. You know I’m sorry. I 
love you and everything”
So I went back to the house, and as I entered the door he punched me 
in my face full force, and said “Bitch, I got you.”
And I ran upstairs and I started packing my stuff and he came upstairs 
and me and him started tussling and arguing and stuff and I told him, I 
said “just let me pack my stuff I’m gonna leave and I won’t come back.” 
And he told me he said “Bitch, before you leave, I’ll kill you.”
Now he had threatened me several times. He has put guns in my mouth, 
guns to my head, and played like Russian roulette with me, putting the 
gun in my mouth and clicking the trigger and stuff.
And anytime he told me that he was going to kill me I believed him to a 
certain extent, but this night it was more fearful than ever. You know the 
expression on his face was like a real cold expression.
And urn he had threatened to kill me so he went downstairs and came 
back upstairs with a 357 Magnum that was his, and he had urn 
threatened me with the gun and I was laying on the bed you know, 
crying and everything, and then he put the gun in the drawer, he walked 
out the room and went back downstairs.
And I took the gun out and I placed it under the bed. My intentions was 
just to keep the gun from him.
But when he came back upstairs we started tussling and fighting and I 
pulled the gun out and I shot him.
And with the first shot that I shot him with he said “Bitch, you shot me in 
my head, I’m goin to kill you” [long pause]
26:50 Lisa Grimshaw [the murder of Tommy]
He ended up coming to the house, more and more every day, trying to 
get into the apartment. And my mother was living with me at the time 
and I was still working, bartending.
And I met these guys at work and they would see Tommy come in and 
terrorize me and they would say “You want us -  you know, playing 
macho men -you want us to take care of this for you? You want us...”
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and I would be like “well you can just tell him to leave me alone if you 
want. “
And they were like “That’s it Lisa, let’s go get him let’s go do something 
let’s go beat him up.”
Actually, you know, I don’t know what I was thinking, OK? He was at 
work, I went and got him from work, brought him in the car. My son was 
home. Two guys were with me. I rode him to a place. He thought that he 
was going to have his way with me and have sex and that wasn’t going 
to happen. But I left him.
I rode him to the woods, the other guys were there. I brought him to the 
woods, I turned around. The guy swung the bat and right when he 
jumped out of the woods I ran back to the car.
They came back to the car and one of the guys said that “why did you 
keep hitting him?” the other guy said “I don’t know. I just did.”
28:12: Eugenia Moore [Alfred’s murder]
He didn’t care. The only thing he cared about and told me about from 
January of 85 until June of 85 was that he was gonna kill me, he was 
gonna kill me, he was gonna kill me.
The only thing I can envision was him and his 007 knife. It’s a street 
name for a big butcher knife like switchblade that he carried, I know he 
carried it. I know that he felt that I had hurt him and that he wanted me 
to be hurting back like him.
I left Forest Hills Station I went home and I watched a video and I said 
“no, I’m gonna leave” and on my way out the door I went into the kitchen 
and I picked up a knife out of my kitchen drawer and I put it in my 
pocket.
When I went to the store I come out the store, I took and realized there 
wasn’t anybody around there that I knew. I knew I wouldn’t know 
anyone. So I opened my door of the back seat, and I put the umbrella in,
I laid it on the floor, it was wet, and I put the bag on the back seat of my 
car and I felt, half of my body was in the car, and I felt Alfred, which it 
was Alfred, hit me on the bottom part of my back. And I said “Lord he 
done found me.”
I turned around and backed up out of the car, and that’s when I turned 
around and I saw him. “Uhuh bitch, I done caught you. See you didn’t 
think I know where you’d be at, huh? I know everywhere you goin be 
bitch, I’m gonna kill you.”
And the next thing I remember it happened in two seconds. He hit me, I 
hit him back, my next hand went to reach for my pocket, I took the knife 
out and I know now that, which I had blocked it out, that I stabbed him 
twice, they say, in his chest.
29:14 Patty Hennessy [Brian’s murder]
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Brian’s attitude was “well if I can’t have you and Timmy then you’re not 
gonna have Timmy. If I can’t have Timmy, no one’s gonna have Timmy.” 
Brian somehow got a court order, another judge to say that he could 
take Timmy to Florida. Brian told me that I’d never see Timmy again. He 
told me that he’d kill me if I didn’t give him Timmy. I was afraid for my 
life and for Tim’s life.
Brian showed up early. He came up the steps and he was laughin. He 
said “You better kiss Timmy goodbye, because you’re never gonna see 
him again.”
And I went in the house and I just started freakin out. I didn’t know what 
to do. I knew if I came back outside and told him “No, Tim’s not here, 
you’re not getting him” he would kill me.
I knew he was going to kill me that day. I mean, he had told me so. It 
was like the final frontier. This was it. There was nowhere else for it to 
go. It was me or him.
And my father was a policeman. He had guns in the house all my life. 
And I never thought — ever -  of using any of those guns at any time 
except now. I knew my life was on the line here. So I went in the house 
and I grabbed a, I went in the cabinet and I grabbed my father’s gun 
because I didn’t know what else to do.
I had called the police, I had done everything in my power to leave this 
man and to get the police to help me and they wouldn’t. So I had to 
protect myself. It was me or him.
I guess I didn’t know if I even wanted to live up until that moment. 
Whether I should kill myself--1 didn’t know. So I grabbed the gun and I 
went out on the porch and he just stood there and he looked at me and I 
shot the gun.
He came after me. He like stepped back and he stepped forward and I 
was pinned up against the screen door and he was trying to grab the 
gun out of my hand so I shot him again and he just stood there.
So I shot him again and he still just stood there and it was like- I don’t 
know- like he was th is- I don’t know unbeatable thing.
It was horrible, I mean I felt his life go right through mine. It was like time 
was standing still for that moment and nothing was gonna change what 
was gonna happen. It was like fate or something. It was really heavy 
and urn I ran in the house and I locked the door I thought he was gonna 
get up and come after me.
32:58 Sarah Buel [unfair sentencing for victims who kill]
The New York Legal Aid Society documented, in their study of New York 
state, that battered women who kill are mistreated at every juncture in 
the criminal justice system: they have higher initial bails set, they are 
detained longer, and ultimately have higher sentences than any other 
kind of defendant, including serial rapists and murderers.
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This is nothing short of misogyny. This is nothing short of a criminal 
justice system that is dealing very differently with women as defendants, 
and in particular battered women as defendants, than any other kind of 
defendant.
33:41 Eugenia Moore [verdict and sentence]
My trial was for February the third to the sixth, I believe. I think I had 
four days of trial.
My attorney, urn, he introduced the battered women’s syndrome. But 
they wouldn’t allow it into the courtroom. The judge heard it and asked 
him “What was this? Who says so? Where did you get this thing from, 
battered women’s syndrome?”
So the jury was dismissed and we went through like two or three hours 
of expert testimony. When the jury came back the trial resumed without 
the expert testimony, and on that they saw that I did stab Alfred Phillips, 
so therefore it was murder.
I was charged with second degree murder and was given a life sentence 
at 27 years old.
34: 23 Patty [sentence]
I pled guilty to manslaughter. I got a 18 to 20 year sentence, which I’m 
serving now. I’ve served three and a half years of it.
Urn Brian’s parents ended up with my son, even though my family 
raised him for the first seven years of his life..
34:50 Lisa [sentence and imprisonment]
I was arrested for first degree murder. And then I went to ATU, awaiting 
trial.
It was a unit with this long hallway. There was 21 rooms. I was in room 
201. They brought me there in the middle of the night. And I spent three 
and a half years up there, in that one hallway, in that one room. I was 
locked 22 hours a day, awaiting trial.
I spent many hours crying, wondering what was going to happen to me, 
facing life in prison.
And I don’t know how I did those three and a half years up there. I 
mean, it was a prisoner of war camp, so to speak, locked up in this 8 x 
15 room.
But my life, it was, I wasn’t afraid anymore. I wasn’t afraid of dying. I 
knew Tommy wasn’t going to kill me. I went to trial three years later. 
They gave me 15 to 20 years for manslaughter.
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35:57 Shannon [arrest and sentencing]
They took me down to the police station, I was charged with murder 
one.
And in the police station, nobody never asked me how I was: I was 
bruised very badly, Jose had beat me so badly that the muscles in my 
knees were moving. You could see the muscles flexing in my kneecap. 
My head was busted open.
When I took Jose’s life, a part of me was taken too. But I had to defend 
my life. It was either me or him, and that night I felt it was going to be 
me.
You know I um I’ve been tortured all my life but being with Jose was the 
worst, and I just couldn’t take any more.
And here I sit in prison, serving eight to fifteen years.
I’m the victim, I’ve been victimized by Jose and now I’m being 
victimized by the system
37:10 Sarah Buel [indictment of system; call to action]
The very DA’s offices who somehow do not have the time, money, 
resources, people to help battered women when we come in as the 
plaintiffs in these actions or as witnesses in criminal cases, somehow 
have all the prosecutors, all the police investigators, they can possibly 
need when we are the defendants.
We need to do a little more of the up-front work, we need to demand 
that of our police, our district attorney’s offices and certainly parole, 
probation, anybody that has contact and works with battered women.
37:43 Patty [hopes for women]
I just hope that no other woman has to defend her life like I had to. If 
anybody learns anything from me telling my story I hope it’s that, that 
You do have rights, and demand them, because they HAVE to protect 
you.
The police should have protected me, the courts should have protected 
me and they didn’t, and here I sit and it shouldn’t have to happen...
38:08 If a stranger had been doing this to me, they would have helped 
me. But because it was my husband and my ex-husband they won’t help 
me and I don’t understand it. I don’t understand....
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38:23 Eugenia [on innocence]
I didn’t murder no one...he came to murder me, it just so happened I 
put the final blow to him instead of him putting the final blow to me....
38:32 Lisa [it didn’t have to be]
The whole situation with this, it didn’t have to be.
There didn’t have to be a death, and there didn’t have to be ME in 
prison, And my son didn’t have to lose his mother for how many years, 
and he doesn’t know me anymore...
38:47 It didn’t have to be this way.
38:47 Shannon [telling my story]
But I’m grateful to be alive. I thank God for letting me sit here, telling 
my story.
39:04 Sarah Buel: [moral imperative]
If you have not been victimized, if you have not been stalked, if you 
haven’t been stabbed, beaten, chased across state lines, tracked down, 
kidnapped, taken back, beaten again, feared for your life, you have truly 
been blessed.
And this is an opportunity to thank God that you have been spared that. 
But I would argue it means you have a greater responsibility to try to 
empathize and understand with those of us who live with that, who don’t 
know what it is to sleep through an entire night because you jump at 
every noise, yes, fifteen years later.
39:40 Meekah
Again, Oct 26th, Angeline, 55 years old, was shot to death.
And Kathleen, on November 11th, 35, and her son, Marcus, 8, were 
strangled to death, and stuffed in a closet.
[40:06] 20 women in 11 months. It’s crazy.
I could have been one of these statistics...but I fought back.
Text: Mekah Scott was sentenced to 8 -  12 years for killing her 
batterer. She is currently out on appeal.
40: 40 Text: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.
40:48 Text: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.
40:54 Text: No one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
41:00 Text: Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the
United Nations in 1948: Articles 1, 3 and 5.
Movie ends with silence and opening picture.
Credits roll.
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APPENDIX C
Captions to Pictures, A Woman Like You 
[refers to victim number]
Looking back, she remembers thinking his possessiveness was romantic. [2]
Joining a women’s support group has helped her restore her self-esteem. [3]
She had hoped her professional success would make her husband proud of 
her. [4]
When she was growing up in Japan, girls were encouraged to marry young 
and be obedient wives. [5]
Like most young wives in the 1950s, her dream was to make a nice home for 
her family. [6]
She was convicted of manslaughter for the death of her abusive husband. [7]
After she left him, she co-founded a battered women’s shelter in an inner-city 
neighborhood. [8]
She finally realized that trying harder to please him wouldn’t change his 
behavior. [9]
She knew her decision to leave would mean financial hardship. [10]
Her first step to a new life was breaking the silence about the abuse. [11]
She was acquitted in 1983 after killing her abusive husband in self-defense. 
[12]
She is serving 16 years to life in prison for killing her husband while he was 
battering her. [13]
She thought that battering only happened in heterosexual relationships. [14]
Now divorced she still has to see him at their son’s soccer games. [15]
After turning down a plea bargain, sure she would never be convicted for self- 
defense, she was sentenced to 17 years to life in prison. [16]
Granted a lifetime restraining order, she is building a new life for herself and 
her children. [17]
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She and her grown children have a loving and supportive relationship with her 
second husband. [18]
She is currently serving a sentence of seventeen years to life for killing her 
batterer. [19]
She didn’t think things like this happened in Jewish families. [20]
Their mother is serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for the death of their father. [20ab]
After her divorce, counseling helped her regain her confidence. [21]
She was granted clemency by the governor of Iowa after serving sixteen 
years in prison. [22]
She still believes there are many good men out there who are capable of 
having healthy, loving relationships. [23]
She continues to advocate for deaf and disabled women. [24]
When her father disapproved of her decision to leave her husband, she found 
support elsewhere. [25]
It still helps her to share her story with other women in a group. [26]
After her divorce became final, she changed her name and took a job in 
another state. [27]
Nine years old, he worries about his toddler brother. [28]
Even though she now feels safe, she still lives with a security building with no 
name on the mailbox. [29]
She is now serving 27 years to life in prison for killing her abuser. [30]
Not wanting to live the rest of her life in fear, she changed her name and 
moved out of the country. [31]
Marion died in prison in 1993. [32]
Recently married, her husband is patient and supportive with her lingering 
fears. [33]
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After serving 10 years for killing her husband, she was released from prison in 
March, 1997, becoming the first woman in California to be granted clemency 
based on battered woman’s syndrome. She is now building a new life with 
her children and continues to be an outspoken advocate on behalf of other 
abused women. [34]
